

JPRS-CPS-85-079

7 August 1985


China Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

NINE YEARS OF SINO-U.S. TALKS

IN RETROSPECT

MEMOIRS OF WANG BINGNAN



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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CHINA REPORT
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NINE YEARS OF SINO-U.S. TALKS IN RETROSPECT
MEMOIRS OF WANG BINGNAN

Guangzhou GUANGZHOU RIBAO in Chinese intermittently between 29 Sep 84-3 Feb 85; Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI [WORLD KNOWLEDGE] in Chinese No 4-No 8, 1985

[Memoirs "The Nine-Year Sino-U.S. Talks in Retrospect" by Wang Bingnan was published simultaneously in SHIJIE ZHISHI [WORLD KNOWLEDGE] and GUANGZHOU RIBAO]

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PREFACE

[Text]

In 1979 I flew over the Pacific Ocean to make my first trip to the United States. This trip was of special significance to me, especially because during this trip I was to meet my three counterparts at the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks which had caused a sensation throughout the world 20-odd years ago. They were U. Alexis Johnson, Jacob D. Beam, and John M. Cabot. All three were retired, having left diplomatic service. Living their remaining years in ease and comfort, they had already written their own memoirs and participated in research on various academic matters. When we firmly shook hands, looking closely at the changes in each other and smiling, none of us could contain our excitement. Past events seemed to have happened only yesterday and were impressively real to us. We had all experienced the special talks and struggles in the history of Sino-U.S. relations. Although the talks have become a part of history, they still left us with a feeling that "this kind of thing is truly over."

We all -- these three who were the negotiators on the U.S. side, and I, the negotiator on the Chinese side -- agreed that what has been achieved in Sino-U.S. relations today is not unconnected with the previous Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks and the role they played. It was out of just this sentiment that they received me cordially, like an old friend. Beam invited me to be a guest in his home and Johnson gave a banquet to entertain me in a high-class club in Washington, where host and guest toasted each other repeatedly, recalling the past and comparing it to the present. When I arrived in Boston, Cabot gave me an especially grand banquet in his luxurious garden home facing the Atlantic Ocean and invited all the celebrities in Boston to attend a gala banquet. The whole banquet was full of friendly sentiments and warmth. As we recalled the events of those years and spoke glowingly of present and future Sino-U.S. contacts, all sorts of feelings welled up in our minds. Who would have imagined that the two opponents crossing verbal swords at the conference table would be talking cheerfully and humorously now at the banquet table?

The Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks started in 1955 and adjourned in 1970, lasting 15 years with a total of 136 rounds. The duration, number of rounds, and intensity of the talks were the sort of activity seen in modern international relations. As the first PRC negotiator at the talks, I participated in the talks for 9 years from their beginning to 1964. It was precisely during this period that the U.S. authorities were extremely hostile to China, and China and the United States were in a state of mutual isolation and antagonism. I first dealt with Johnson, then with Beam, and last with Cabot. In those years, when we knew each other as opponents in the talks, we were in the prime of life and held important posts respectively in our own government departments with enterprising spirits, but getting together again now, we were already in our sixties. After nearly 30 years of trials and hardships, the whole world has undergone enormous shifts and taken on a greatly changed face.

After going through various situations, there was a turn in the tide of events in Sino-U.S. relations and the two countries eventually entered a new historical stage of establishing and developing diplomatic relations. It is precisely this change that stirred my memories and led me to write of the complicated, tortuous, and extraordinary Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks. History is always reference book of practical value. Reviewing past events may help people, young people in particular, understand that the road taken to normalize Sino-U.S. relations was rough and bumpy and also understand that the friendly contacts between the peoples of China and the United States of the present did not come easily, but are the result of the endeavors of a generation.

I hope this will also help people understand current Sino-U.S. relations and the Taiwan question, which has hindered to this day the further development of Sino-U.S. relations.

I begin my memoirs with the illustrious name of Zhou Enlai. He was the leader and commander in the struggle during the 15 years of talks and also the leader for whom I have the greatest respect. I worked under his direct leadership for 30 years. Long ago he said: Both China and the United States are big countries. It is unwise for us not to have contacts with the United States, and if there are to be contacts, there must be channels. The Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks were precisely such a channel. In a situation in which China and the United States had no diplomatic relations, the two countries promoted mutual understanding and discovered each other's true intentions through this channel.

There have been numerous comments from the world community on these marathon talks. Each of my negotiating counterparts has also published his memoirs. It is said that some high-ranking officials among the Taiwan authorities have gone over the whole transcript of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks in the United States and had to acknowledge that during the whole talks process, the PRC negotiators did adhere to principle.

CHAPTER I. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

Two Major Topics for Discussion

My reminiscences will begin with the proposal for the talks, and date back to an international conference held in Geneva, Switzerland on 26 April 1954. This conference is known to history as the Geneva Conference. It should be said that the prologue to the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks began with the Geneva Conference.

The Korean war -- a great conflict with China and Korea on one side and the United States on the other -- had just ended. The United States, through its defeat, came to realize New China's strength. Eisenhower, who had just come to power, was in a hurry to relieve the United States from its passive position in Asia and our party had greatly eliminated the social foundations of imperialism in China -- the counterrevolutionary forces and the ideas of worshipping, dreading, and fawning on the United States. Chairman Mao said that it was necessary "to clean house before inviting guests in," and the new period of unfolding work in foreign affairs in an all-round manner had arrived. On the other hand, of course, the United States did not resign itself to defeat; and since it had lost China, it turned Japan into its major strategic base in the East, armed Taiwan, established a foothold in Vietnam, and increased its control over other Asian countries. The United States established battlefields encircling the PRC in a planned way, simultaneously blocked China's entrance into the United Nations, and implemented an economic blockade against China in an attempt to create difficulties for New China's existence and development. However, the general situation in Asia was relaxed due to the Korean war truce. Therefore, the Soviet Union, at a foreign ministers conference in Berlin in February 1954 in which the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France participated, proposed that a conference be held in Geneva to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue and to restore peace in Indochina. After struggles and talks the proposal was put into effect, with China attending the conference as one of the big five countries which also included the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Although the United States insisted on writing into the communique that China's participation in the conference did not imply U.S. diplomatic recognition of China, it was actually the first time China had taken part in an international conference as a big power since New China was founded, and it was also a turning point for New China's playing an important role in world affairs. Facts have proven that the United States was very much afraid of China's voice in world affairs; however, it could not stop New China from stepping into the international political arena, striding like a giant.

The party central committee attached great importance to this conference. On 19 April, the government of our country formally appointed Premier Zhou Enlai, concurrently minister of foreign affairs, as the chief representative of our delegation to the Geneva Conference. The other representatives were Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, and Li Kenong. At that time, I was serving as director of the General Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I acted as the secretary general of the delegation, in charge of its administrative affairs. The central authorities instructed that, at the conference, we should "strengthen our diplomatic and international activities in order to counter the U.S. imperialist policies of blockade and embargo, arms expansion, and war preparations, and promote relaxation of the tense world situation." At the same time, we should do our utmost to reach some agreement, "so as to help open the road to solving international disputes through negotiations by the big powers."

In order to be successful at the conference, Premier Zhou exerted all his efforts and involved himself in every detail. It had not been long since the founding of New China, and it had met many difficulties in the world. Many countries dared not recognize China because of their lack of understanding or because they were subjected to pressure by the United States. Premier Zhou repeatedly instructed that it was necessary to open up a new situation in our country's diplomatic front through this conference, so that more countries would understand New China, and we should strive to establish diplomatic relations with them. At that time, the delegations of some countries were tremendously big, comprising a large number of people. We proposed to the premier that we too should send more people, including specialists and people of all circles, because this was the first time New China had participated in such an important international activity since its founding. On the one hand, this was because of the need to deal with work in all fields and would be helpful in making contacts in breadth and depth with the various countries participating in the conference; on the other hand, we could let more comrades go abroad in order to expand their vision and increase their experience in international struggles; at the same time, we could also demonstrate New China's strength in foreign affairs.

Premier Zhou entrusted me to make preparations for the delegation, to propose the delegation's personnel list, to draw up the regulations and discipline for the delegation, to prepare data on various issues involved in the conference, the uniforms, and so on. Here speaking of our clothing, in retrospect I find it very amusing. It was my opinion that the dress of the members of the Chinese delegation should be solemn and grave, so I selected some sort of black material, and had Chinese tunic suits made out of it for every member of the delegation. Later, when we appeared in those suits in the streets of Geneva, we found that passersby would stop, take off their hats, and salute us respectfully. We found out later that only priests wear black suits in Switzerland so many people had mistaken us for missionaries. That was a small incident, but it also showed that we had much to learn the first time we went out into the world.

Of course, the Swiss people were very friendly towards us, and would become warm and enthusiastic the moment they found out that we were the Chinese delegates. The open and clear smiling faces of the Swiss people and their friendly manner made a very good impression on us.

In order to do a good job in the conference, we made all kinds of preparations day and night. The data sent to me alone covered a whole floor. According to the premier's instructions, we were split into several groups according to specialities; several meetings were called and sometimes I had to talk with individuals, so I was very busy.

At that time, Huang Hua was the delegation's spokesman, while Gong Peng was in charge of the press. In order to deal with all kinds of questions at the scheduled press conference, we held a simulated press conference among ourselves. Everyone attending it posed questions, while the spokesman answered them to find out whether their answers were appropriate. The seething scene was most inspiring with everyone pooling his wisdom and efforts.

On the eve of our departure, Premier Zhou called a meeting of all delegation members. He pointed out that everyone, no matter what his position, should observe the regulations and discipline of the delegation and not violate them in any way. Premier Zhou himself was a model in setting an example. He also asked me to look for two capable chefs so we could invite guests to dinner and make friends during the conference.

I arrived in Geneva early with the advance party to arrange for the delegation's lodging and security and to find out about the final conference schedule and agenda. Geneva is a city in which international conferences are often held. The United States, the Soviet Union, and other big countries were hiring large villas there and even whole hotels. With the recommendation of some friendly people, we rented a large villa in the suburbs with a beautiful garden attached to it; we also reserved a whole floor of a hotel. Humorously, we called this villa "Huashan Villa." The landlord and landlady showed friendly feelings toward New China. In 1961, when Comrade Chen Yi led the Chinese delegation to attend the second Geneva Conference, they also stayed there.

On 20 April, the Chinese delegation headed by Premier Zhou left Beijing for Geneva via Moscow on a special plane.

On 24 April, the Chinese delegation and the Soviet Government delegation headed by Molotov arrived in Geneva in succession.

There was no grand welcoming ceremony at the airport; however, several hundred reporters were gathered around the Chinese delegation, vying for photographs. When Premier Zhou's agile body appeared at the door of the passenger compartment, there was ferment in the crowd, the reporters surged forward, and the dignified and graceful bearing and natural and unrestrained manner of the premier became the focus of the reporters' cameras. Since this was the first large delegation sent by New China, it was all the more conspicuous, and Premier Zhou became the central figure in the reports of Western press circles.

The Geneva Conference opened solemnly on 26 April in the League of Nations

Building (where the League of Nations was located after World War I). Many illustrious diplomats active in the international political arena at that time were at the conference, such as Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, British Foreign Secretary Eden, French External Relations Minister Bidault, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, Foreign Minister Nam Il of the DPRK and the representatives of South Korea and members of the "UN Forces" Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Greece, Luxembourg, Holland, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Turkey. The conference agreed that while discussing the Korean issue, the chief representatives of Thailand, the Soviet Union, and Britain would take turns presiding over the meeting day by day; and while discussing the Indo-China issue, the chief representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States will take turns presiding over the meeting.

The Geneva Conference was divided into two stages: The first stage, discussing the Korean issue, concluded on 15 June. A restricted meeting on the Indo-China issue was held at the second stage that began on 16 June. The conference closed on 21 July.

The confrontation between East and West was quite obvious throughout the Geneva Conference. The Soviet Union, China, Korea, and Vietnam, which represented one side, were closely united. They had frequent contacts outside the meeting and coordinated with each other at the meeting. Centering on many major and key issues, they waged a tit-for-tat struggle against the Western countries headed by the United States. The leaders of the delegations of the Soviet Union, China, Korea, and Vietnam frequently met at Molotov's residence to discuss and study problems occurring at the meeting and to exchange information and views and adopt countermeasures. The Soviet and Vietnamese comrades also came to our villa quite often to have conversations with Premier Zhou. At the conference, these delegations adopted identical stands and attitudes.

With regard to the Korean issue, the Military Demarcation Line was already settled and the further problem was to ensure our political power. Comrade Nam Il of Korea spoke at the meeting on 27 April. In light of the scheme prepared beforehand, he put forward an overall proposal for solving the Korean issue, which included the following: withdrawal of foreign troops within 6 months, free elections nationwide, and resumption of Korea's peaceful reunification.

Dulles, secretary of state and head of the U.S. delegation took the floor on the second day. Dulles was also a conspicuous figure at the conference. He was of medium height. With a pair of glasses, he looked stern and grim. He spoke insolently and attacked the stand of Korea, China, and the Soviet Union on the Korean issue. His language was vilifying and his attitude arrogant. The essence of this speech was that the United States was attempting to permanently occupy South Korea and realize the so-called resolution of the United Nations on unifying Korea.

Premier Zhou also delivered a speech at that conference. After listening to Dulles' speech, he immediately added a long passage to his original draft to refute Dulles' speech. He delivered this passage sternly with a sense of justice and dignity. Premier Zhou solemnly stated his support of the proposal put forward by the DPRK for national unification, condemned the U.S. act of aggression over Korea, and called for checking the U.S. act of aggression. He called on Asian countries to carry out consultations with each other and make concerted efforts to safeguard peace and security in Asia; called on all European countries to safeguard security in Europe on the basis of collective efforts; and called for universal disarmament, a halt in arms expansion, and prohibition in the use of A-bombs, H-bombs, and other large-scale devastating weapons. He also expressed regret at the fact that India, Indonesia, Burma, and other countries could not attend the conference. Later he specifically proposed a discussion at the restricted meeting attended by five big powers and North and South Korea.

Premier Zhou's speech was very successful, which indicated the clear-cut stand and sincere attitude of the PRC for actively solving problems. His speech won the acclaim of a number of countries' representatives.

However, the United States did not have any sincerity in the discussion of the Korean issue from the very beginning and was simply not willing to take a step forward on the issue. Owing to the stubborn attitude of the United States, the conference could not reach any agreement for a long time. Nevertheless, the struggle was still extremely acute and complicated and the task of the discussion was arduous. Seeing that no fruitful results were to be achieved on the Korean issue, Premier Zhou held that instead of winding up the matter there should be room for discussing the issue after the meeting. For this reason, he pointed out at the final meeting: The countries attending the Geneva Conference "will, on the basis of establishing a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, continue to make efforts to reach an agreement on peacefully solving

the Korean issue." He also proposed that the countries concerned should further consult the suitable time and place for resuming the talks. As the proposal was fair and reasonable and no one raised an objection at the meeting, the U.S. representatives appeared personally and refused to accept the proposal.

Due to the obstructions caused by the U.S. delegation, the discussion on the Korean issue, which lasted 51 days, closed without reaching any agreement.

The discussion on the issue of Indochina was more complicated than the issue of Korea. In about 1946, France staged a colonial invasion of Vietnam and Laos. The three Indochinese nations formed their own Indochinese united army to heroically resist the French. When the Geneva Conference was held, Laos and Kampuchea had not been separated from the united army, and had not organized their own independent armed resistance forces. Under the leadership of Comrade Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese people launched an 8-year nationwide war of resistance. However, their victory hung in the balance. The Indochinese war, which had been fought for many years, directly involved the interests of various Southeast Asian countries and had a bearing on the situation in the region. Due to the fact that the war dragged on for such a long time, France encountered economic and political difficulties. It intended to extricate itself from Indochina. However, the United States intended to seize the opportunity to step in. The situation was complicated. Under such circumstances, at the initial stage of the Geneva Conference, Vietnam won a great victory at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May. This greatly changed the situation. When the news poured in, people inside and outside the Geneva Conference Hall were shocked. People on our side ran around spreading the news. We were greatly encouraged, and had more confidence in solving the problem of Indochina.

However, the French Government looked utterly wretched, and flags were flown at half-mast at home. Bidault returned to Paris hurriedly because of this. The news that France's Lanier Government had taken from power once again shook the Geneva Conference. In addition, the United States was isolated at the conference, and France no longer wanted to completely follow the United States. Therefore, there was a possibility of reaching an agreement on the issue of Indochina.

At present, with the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations, a slander has been spread by Vietnam that the Chinese delegation "sold out" the interests of the Indochinese people, the Vietnamese people in particular. I was a participant of the Geneva Conference, and one of the witnesses who saw with his own eyes what was going on at that time. I know that this is a venomous attack and slander that flies in the face of facts. As I have already stated, when the conference was being held, the Soviet Union, China, Korea, and Vietnam closely cooperated with each other. At the discussion on the issue of Indochina, the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam united as one to carry out a resolute struggle against the United States and France while patiently holding the talks. At that time, the strategy, tactics, plans, countermeasures, and others were all defined after discussions by the three parties. Instructed by Premier Zhou, I met Pham Van Dong very often. I contracted him on several occasions to exchange information and views. To guard against listening devices installed by the other side, when we talked in a lavatory, we always turned on the water tap. Does Mr Pham Van Dong still remember this?

The crucial question of the Indochinese issue the delimitation of the Vietnamese-French temporary military demarcation line. At that time, some people in Vietnam hoped that they would unify Vietnam at one gulp. However, judging from the relative

strength of both sides, we realized that it is actually impossible to do so. When meeting Chairman Mao in October 1965, Premier Pham Van Dong also said: "The battle of Dien Bien Phu only liberated half of our territory." Therefore, through the discussions outside the conference, the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese sides unanimously maintained that delimiting a line between the North and the South was the most appropriate way to gain an integrated base north of the 16th Parallel and consolidate the North. Therefore, when the Geneva Conference stood adjourned, Premier Zhou went to Liuzhou on 3-5 July to meet and have a detailed discussion with Chairman Ho Chi Minh, who was on vacation in the city. Chairman Ho Chi Minh completely agreed with the plan of delimiting a line between the North and the South, and expected that the other side would at most concede territory to the 17th Parallel. In such a way, Vietnam eventually accepted at the conference the proposal of delimiting a temporary military demarcation line at 17 degrees north latitude, and a clause contained in the agreement explicitly stipulating the unification of Vietnam would be realized within 2 years through general elections.

At last, all the participating nations reached an agreement, adopting specific methods for ending the Indochinese war, and working out principles for solving the political problems of Indochina. According to these principles, France would respect the independence, territorial integrity, and unity of the three Indochinese nations. After the armistice, the three Indochinese nations would not join any alliance, and no foreign power would be allowed to establish any military bases on the territory of those countries.

After the Geneva Conference, Chairman Ho issued a statement: "At the Geneva Conference, thanks to the help of the delegations of the Soviet Union and the PRC, our delegation struggled hard to win a great victory for us. The French Government has recognized our independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, and has agreed to withdraw the French Armed Forces and others from our territory."

In 1960, the Third Congress of the Vietnam Workers Party adopted a resolution: "We have won a victory in signing the Geneva Agreement and restoring peace to Indochina," "the North has been fully liberated, and the revolution in Vietnam has entered a new stage." The Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party also sent a message to the CPC Central Committee, expressing its "heartfelt thanks" to the Chinese side for its help in the "war of resistance and diplomatic struggle in Geneva." I believe that through reviewing this phase of history, and recollecting the quotations of Chairman Ho and the documents of the Vietnam Workers Party, we can clearly find out the actual state of affairs. The slander spread by the Vietnamese authorities cannot withstand a single blow.

During the course of the conference, Premier Zhou often held banquets in honor of the delegations of various countries at the residence of the Chinese delegation. Apart from Molotov, Eden, later the Earl of Avon of the United Kingdom, was also invited, who asked the premier to autograph the menu for the occasion as a precious souvenir. In the early eighties when the Earl's widow visited China, she brought the menu specially with her. Among other guests were Mendes-France of France, Ronning of Canada, and the world-famous comedian and movie star Charlie Chaplin and his wife. At the banquet in honor of Charlie Chaplin, we had a very cordial conversation; Chaplin even performed for us his unique gait, which evoked continuous laughter. Chaplin highly praised Chinese cuisine, in particular mao-tai. He said: I like this kind of strong liquor; it is the very liquor for a real man. When he left the premier sent him a bottle of mao-tai. The two chefs I had chosen for the delegation were also praised by the premier, who said to them: You have made due contributions to the Geneva Conference.

Premier Zhou was very busy with his work. He made use of every opportunity he could, not sparing any minute he could seize. Except for meetings he would spend all of his time on reading materials, listening to reports, finding out about and studying the most updated trends in the world, and considering and dealing with the problems emerging during the conference. Early in the morning we could find him either writing, reading, or in deep meditation at his desk. Often the light in his room would shine from dusk until dawn. Geneva is famous for its beautiful scenery, and has a reputation as the "world's garden."

All other delegations would seize the opportunity to tour the mountains and lake. When we saw that the premier had been overstrained in his work, we advised him to take a stroll in the open air, but he would always say cordially to us: We had better do more work; besides, we have to take into consideration our external influences. Our delegation has been entrusted by Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee. We have come here for the first time to strive for world peace and to carry out an international struggle with the people of the whole country pinning their hopes on us. We are not here to enjoy ourselves, so we should not do that. The Swiss newspapers wrote commentaries and reports to praise the Chinese delegation in particular for this. They said: The Chinese premier is unique; he is never found having fun outside his residence. He is really devoting his whole heart and mind to the conference.

Here I should like to mention that we were on friendly terms with India at that time. Although India did not participate in the Geneva Conference, Prime Minister Nehru's special envoy, Menon, was in Geneva, and he often came to call on Premier Zhou for talks. Once he relayed Nehru's invitation and his hope for Premier Zhou to visit India on his way back home via the southern route when the conference was adjourned. The delegation held different views on whether to accept this invitation or not; finally, Chairman Mao telegraphed his instructions, and it was his view that the opportunity should not be passed up, and asked Premier Zhou to make the trip and do some work concerning India. So on 14 June, Premier Zhou visited India at their invitation; later he also visited Burma. He was trying to win them over in support of our stand concerning the Indochina issue, and succeeded in overcoming the U.S. scheme to press the United Kingdom to make concessions in Southeast Asia in an attempt to sabotage peace in Indochina. It was precisely during this visit that Premier Zhou and Prime Minister Nehru made the joint announcement of the historic, famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

During the absence of Premier Zhou, Zhang Wentian returned to Moscow (he was concurrently ambassador to the Soviet Union at that time) and Wang Jiaxiang also returned to China, so the delegation was headed by Vice Foreign Minister Li Kenong to carry on the work of the Geneva Conference.

It has been 3 decades since the Geneva Conference. However, the premier's excellent diplomatic art, his brilliant spiritual features, and his magnanimous style keep reappearing before my eyes to this day. And it was precisely through this conference that the whole world came to know such an outstanding diplomat, politician, and an excellent communist fighter as Zhou Enlai. It was also at the Geneva Conference that Premier Zhou's outstanding activities and very efficient work made New China conspicuously appear on the international political arena with its explicit and independent diplomatic style and characteristics. Many people came to understand through that conference that China stands on the side of the oppressed nations and is a big power which resolutely opposes the Western hegemonist powers with patience and reason.

The Geneva Conference also proved that any international disputes can be solved through serious and ample negotiations between various countries. This has also been China's persistent view in diplomatic struggles, and it was our view that even with the United States, which was extremely antagonistic at that time, there were many problems we could negotiate and talk over. The Sino-U.S. talks at the ambassadorial level can also be said to have derived from such a guiding idea.

Unexpected Results

Formally, the Geneva Conference was an arena of conflict where delegations from various nations read their prepared statements and enunciated their official positions. Privately, the conference served as a channel of communication and understanding which helped bring about a tacit agreement on many an issue. Much inside information was likely revealed during chats in the bai. The comrades of our delegation actively circulated among, and made friends with, a large group of people.

Among the delegates to the conference were several acquaintances of mine from the 1930's and 1940's. I was then with the foreign affairs section of the southern bureau of the party Central Committee, which gave me an opportunity to come into contact with many diplomats. Premier Zhou Enlai also knew some of them. A number of the British and French delegates had worked at their respective embassies in Chongqing in the 1940's, including Xiao We Er, deputy leader of the French delegation, and Ya Ke Lu, who was in charge of the Asian desk. Ronning of Canada, too, was an old friend of mine. I introduced each and every one of them to the premier. One such person was French External Relations Minister Bidault.

The only United States delegate we knew was one Robertson. He was with the executive headquarters of the Military Reconciliation Office in Beiping in the mid-1940's. The main function of the Beiping executive headquarters was to mediate a truce between the Communists and the Kuomintang.

Before the Geneva Conference, we had no idea that it was to open the door to China-U.S. negotiations. At the time China-U.S. relations remained strained, with both sides adopting diametrically opposite positions, because of the stubborn refusal by the ruling circle in the United States to recognize China, its forcible occupation of Taiwan, which is Chinese territory, its support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan, and its invasion of Korea. China-U.S. relations sharply deteriorated after the United States sent its Seventh Fleet to cruise the Taiwan Straits, beefed up its troops in the Philippines and interfered in the Indochinese conflict. The two nations had had no contacts with each other, apart from the Panmunjom talks during the Korean War and Wu Xiuquan's [0124 0208 2938] denunciation of the United States at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Chairman Mao said repeatedly at the time: "We are neither afraid of the United States embargo nor eager to establish diplomatic relations with it and enter the United Nations. We follow a foreign policy of independence, self-determination and self-reliance." He also said: "One day when we rise again, the United States will regret its policy, but it will be too late." After its setback in Korea, there arose a

groundswell of opposition in the United States against the government's China policy. Many Americans believed that the United States had fought the wrong war with the wrong enemy at the wrong time in the wrong place. Consequently even within the ruling circle, there were people who were unhappy with the official rigid and hostile attitude toward China. Dissent was simmering beneath the surface.

Just such a message was conveyed to us by Molotov at the beginning of the conference.

One day, Molotov called on the premier and told him that he invited the U.S. delegation to dinner before Dulles' arrival in Geneva. In a private conversation with Molotov, Smith, the deputy leader of the U.S. delegation, voiced an opinion critical of his own government and said that its China policy was unrealistic. Molotov also said that Smith, a general in Europe during World War II, enjoyed a high standing and his words carried weight.

As deputy secretary of state, Smith indeed had clout. Following Dulles' return to the United States on 3 May, he became the head of the U.S. delegation. In an impromptu statement on 16 June after the premier announced his six-point comprehensive peace plan for Indochina, Smith said: "Mr Zhou's proposals contain a basis for discussion." Apparently this was his personal opinion which had not been cleared with the U.S. Government. The subsequent turn of events did not surprise us. When the conference was about to take up the Indochina issue again the next day, Smith excused himself, claiming that he had to leave for Berne to call on the federal authorities. Left in charge of the delegation was his assistant, Robertson, who had served time in Beiping. He lost no time in criticizing the premier's proposals, dismissing the views of the Chinese delegation as unworthy of consideration or discussion, thus nullifying completely Smith's position the day before. The premier soon got angry and sternly rebuked him: "Your delegation's words cannot be counted on, can they? Smith, your leader, said yesterday our proposals should be considered. What made you change your mind today?" Pointing at Robertson, the premier said: "Mr Robertson, we knew each other while you were in China. I understand you. If the United States dares to challenge us, we will take up the gauntlet." The premier's hard-hitting words left Robertson speechless and flushed with embarrassment. This incident shows that U.S. officials were not a monolithic bloc; Smith, for instance, had his own views. The premier was alert to this kind of things and adept at turning it to his advantage when the opportunity presented itself.

At the conference, delegates from various nations watched Sino-U.S. relations very closely, looking for any signs which might suggest how they were getting on and whether or not they had dealings with each other. Journalists, of course, were on the prowl everywhere, trying to ferret out something in Sino-U.S. relations with which they could build a story.

An American journalist asked Smith point-blank: "What contacts have you had with Zhou Enlai?" Smith replied humorously: "The only contact, if you can call it that, was when we were in the men's room and used the same towel." (The towel was wound around a roller. To use it, you pull the towel downwards.)

The conference was drawing to a close. One day, as a large group of us was gathered in the bar drinking tea, Smith, a glass in hand, came up to us and sought out the premier's interpreter, Pu Shouchang [3184 1108 2490]. Smith's move was unprecedented. He told Pu Shouchang: "You speak English beautifully, with just the right American accent. Where did you learn it?" He also praised China's ancient civilization and said many friendly words. We were impressed with Smith's extraordinary gesture, given the adversarial relations between the two nations, and reported it to the premier after we got back. The premier said: "Good! Since Smith is ready and willing to talk to us, let me reciprocate during the break tomorrow." The bar was a place for informal, casual conversation. During the break the following day, I looked for an opportunity for the premier to talk directly to Smith. When I saw Smith go up to the counter for a cup of coffee, I immediately steered the premier in the same direction. As soon as Smith saw the premier approach him, hand outstretched, he hastily reached for his coffee with his right hand and, since he had a cigar in his left hand, he could not shake hands with the premier. But he was all smiles as he greeted the premier and chatted politely with him. He again praised China's old civilization and beautiful country, saying: "I love Chinese porcelain and have acquired a collection in my living room." In short, Smith once again said all the nice things about China. On the last day of the conference, a smiling Smith took the initiative during the break to talk to the premier, who was then having a conversation with another person. Smith said: "As the conference draws to an end, I am very pleased and honored to be able to make your acquaintance. You have played a major role at this conference. Whether it is Korea or Vietnam, we hope that peace will be restored." Then he shook the premier's arm briefly and walked away with a smile. Rumors had it that before he left, Dulles had issued an order forbidding anyone in the U.S. delegation to shake hands with a Chinese delegate. Ingeniously, Smith shook the premier's arm, thereby expressing his admiration for the man while complying with Dulles' ban on handshaking.

At this point, I think I should correct a widely circulated story in international circles. It was said that in Geneva, Premier Zhou Enlai offered to shake hands with Dulles but was rebuffed by the American. In fact, nothing of the sort ever happened. Throughout the conference, I was at the premier's side every time he entered the conference room. I always took care to familiarize myself with the layout of the room beforehand, making sure I knew which entrance to take and where our seats were. I led the way for the premier and other members of our delegation and ushered them to our seats. The seating was arranged alphabetically, so we sat quite a distance from the U.S. and USSR delegations. The conference hall in the League of Nations Building had several entrances. As we did not use the same entrance as the U.S. delegation, we could not possibly have run into each other. During the 15-minute breaks between sessions, delegates could go to the restaurant or bar for a snack or drink. Our delegation never got together with the U.S. delegation. Since Dulles was the arch-champion of anticommunism, the premier was very cautious and strict about our not mixing with the Americans and it certainly never occurred to him to shake hands with Dulles. Even when their paths crossed by accident, Dulles always turned back and walked away the moment he saw Premier Zhou coming his way. Consequently, there was simply no practical or theoretical basis for the story that the premier wanted to

shake hands with Dulles but was cold shouldered. Some Americans, including Nixon and Kissinger, recall such an incident in their memoirs, but they are merely repeating a piece of hearsay.

Certainly there is room for a handshake even when two nations are adversaries. I recall a related incident in Denmark. An American military attache was having a drink at a military club. He came up to our military attache and offered to shake hands with him, but, to his great embarrassment and that of the owner, our man refused. I was put in charge of the case after it was reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Following instructions from the premier, the leaders of the ministry decided that our diplomats from now on should not be so rigid in public. Under the new regulation, we were not to take the initiative to shake hands with Americans. But if they volunteered to shake hands with us, we must not turn them down.

From these incidents, we can get a flavor of the intense animosity prevailing in Sino-U.S. relations in the early days.

But there was one thing which the United States was very anxious to negotiate with China, namely, the release of American prisoners of war captured in Korea and the fate of American civilians charged with criminal offenses and detained in China. Some Chinese students and scientists had also been detained in the United States. The U.S. Government was coming under increasing pressure from a public which felt very strongly that the fate of the detained personnel should not be at the mercy or become a victim of America's rigid China policy. On the one hand, the United States wanted to secure the repatriation of its nationals in China. On the other hand, it did not want to deal with us directly, which would make U.S. recognition of China a fait accompli. Therefore it decided to use a third party to handle this problem, asking Britain, which had then established charge d'affaires relations with us, to look after its interests in China. It was the policy of the U.S. delegation throughout the Geneva Conference to tackle the problem of repatriation through Humphrey Trevelyan, the British charge d'affaires in Beijing who was also attending the Geneva Conference.

As soon as we heard this news, the premier discussed with us that very night to work out a response. In his opinion, we should not refuse to talk to the Americans. Given the strain in Sino-U.S. relations and America's rigidly antagonistic policy toward China, we should seize its desperation to secure the release of its citizens held in custody in China and open up a channel of communication. Premier Zhou's decision was sensible and firm. So we told the British charge d'affaires that since both the United States and China had a delegation in Geneva, bilateral issues could be worked out directly by these two delegations and there was no need for Britain to get involved as a third party. On 27 May, the spokesman of our delegation took the initiative to talk to the press about the unreasonable imprisonment by the United States of Chinese nationals and students and express our willingness to hold direct talks with the United States about this problem.

Two factors forced the hand of the U.S. Government. One was public pressure; Eisenhower had said: "How eager I am to see our children come home as soon as

possible." The other was the desire within the ruling circle to establish contacts with and get to know the new China. Alexis Johnson, the first American to negotiate with China in Geneva, wrote in his memoirs: "On the face of it, Dulles might be vehemently anticommunist. Inwardly, however, he was very interested in exploring the possibility of easing tension with China and obtaining the release of Americans detained in China." Furthermore, at the time some of the allies of the United States believed that closer Sino-U.S. relations could help promote peace in the Pacific region. It was because of this pervasive desire, both domestic and international, for contacts between China and the United States that the latter agreed to hold direct negotiations with us. At the time they were referred to as Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks.

Through the arrangement of the British charge d'affaires, Humphrey Trevelyan, the Chinese and U.S. delegations decided to hold preliminary talks on the return of the nations of the two nations. After consulting the party Central Committee, the premier named me as the Chinese negotiator. Also involved were such comrades as Huan Xiang [1360 6763] and Ke Bainian [2688 2672 1628] and others. The American negotiator was Alexis Johnson, then U.S. ambassador to Czechoslovakia, who had taken part in negotiations on the convening of a political conference on Korea. It was only after careful consideration that the United States selected him to head its negotiating team.

Thus a bridge of contact emerged by chance over the wide chasm separating the United States and China.

Four Rounds of Talks

The first round of talks was held on 5 June at a site picked by the United States. Probably to create a relaxed atmosphere, Johnson selected a reception room in the League of Nations Building. Furnished with several sofas but no desk, it had the atmosphere of a reception, rather than a conference. When we arrived, Johnson and his assistants came up to shake our hands and exchanged a few words of greeting with us.

The first meeting lasted half an hour. The mood was fairly relaxed and neither side attacked the other with sharp remarks. This being our first encounter, everybody was rather withdrawn, but it was obvious that Johnson was a veteran diplomat and well versed in Chinese affairs and had a nimble, alert mind. To make us feel less constrained and our talks more exploratory, he proposed that we do not take shorthand notes. Also, it would eliminate the danger of our minutes falling into the hands of reporters sniffing around for a story. We agreed and decided to hold the second round on 10 June.

It was now our turn to pick the venue. We also decided on a room in the League Building but furnished it differently. We put a long table in it and the two teams sat on opposite sides; it was a more solemn setting. Johnson submitted a list of American nationals and servicemen whom he thought were being held in China and demanded that they be given an early opportunity to return home. I replied: "Given sincerity on both sides, a solution can be worked out without too much difficulty." I also said: "As long as they obey

Chinese laws, American nationals in China will be protected. They can choose to stay in China and take up a legitimate profession. If, for some reason, they want to leave China and return to the United States, they can do so anytime provided they have not been involved in pending criminal or civil cases. Actually, 1,485 American nationals have left China since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. As for the minuscule number of Americans who are being held for espionage or sabotage activities, they deserve the punishment. We will look into your list and give you a reply next time we meet, when we will also raise the question of detained Chinese students in the United States."

The third round of talks was held on 15 June. First, I responded to the issue put forward at the earlier meeting. I said: "The Chinese Government agrees to let American military personnel and nationals imprisoned for criminal offenses correspond with their families through the Chinese Red Cross and receive small packages from their families. The Chinese Government has meted out punishments in accordance with the gravity of their crimes. If their conduct is good, we may consider remitting their sentences or even releasing them ahead of time, and we have done that before. As for the list which Mr Johnson gave us last time, we will certainly schedule a meeting on it as soon as our delegation receives the relevant information from home."

These words were spoken calmly and our actions were also reasonable. Next I referred to the unjustifiable detention of Chinese students by the U.S. Government. Assuming a more somber expression, I said sternly: "There are now over 5,000 Chinese students in the United States. Many of them want to return to China but have been obstructed in every way possible by the U.S. Government. When they applied for permission to leave the United States, the U.S. Government told them they could not go and even threatened to fine them as much as \$5,000 or send them to jail for anything up to 5 years, or both. This is totally unreasonable."

When I uttered these words, I realized our complaints were fully justified. I also felt upset; the United States policy toward China was then of military blackmail, economic blockade, political attack and reactionary McCarthyism. At home, the U.S. Government persecuted and discriminated against all Americans who were friendly toward China, "investigated" and illegally interrogated many organizations and individuals, whipped up hostility toward communists and the labor movement and cracked down on progressive and democratic forces. We had in the United States a large number of patriotic, accomplished students, including Qian Xuesen [6929 1331 2772] and Zhao Zhongyao [6392 1813 1031] who went there in the early years. After they heard that the new China had been established, they were overjoyed and eagerly made plans to return to the motherland. However, not only did the United States detain them, but it also illegally arrested, imprisoned and ill-treated them with the result that some people did not even dare to apply to come home. As the mother of these Chinese descendants, the new China had the obligation and responsibility to protect them. They wanted to come back and we also needed them for our development.

We demanded that the U.S. Government "immediately put an end to their custody of Chinese students and restore their right to leave the United States to return

to China anytime. Chinese nationals in the United States should also be given a similar right."

Johnson was almost at a loss for words, but he reiterated that in taking Chinese scholars into custody, the United States was acting entirely within the law. During the Korean War, the U.S. Government did issue an order, which I had often criticized, prohibiting the departure of all Chinese who had received training in the United States in such fields as rocketry, atomic energy and weapons design. I believed very strongly that this unreasonable order should be rescinded immediately.

We tackled this issue again in subsequent sessions and finally worked out a solution. I will discuss it further in the next chapters.

We met for the fourth time on 21 June. I opened by suggesting that we draft a joint communique declaring the complete freedom of the nationals of either country, provided they had not broken any law, to return to their own country. I also proposed that a third nation be asked to take care of the interests of detained nationals and students of both nations on the basis of mutual equality.

The attitude of the United States was stubborn; its only concern was to take what it could from the talks. Johnson therefore turned down my suggestion and said that the United States would issue a unilateral statement affirming the complete freedom of Chinese nationals to go anywhere they liked, provided they obeyed American laws and regulations.

Once again Johnson emphasized "American laws and regulations." To put it bluntly, they were not ready to let Chinese students go.

The liaison personnel of the two nations met again on 16 and 21 July. We were represented by Pu Shan [3184 1472], a section chief in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the United States, by Alfred Le Sesne Jenkins, political affairs officer at the China desk in the State Department.

We spent the two meetings examining and verifying the lists of names submitted by the other side. Pu Shan gave the Americans the names of American nationals already granted permission to leave and demanded that they provide us information concerning the conditions of Chinese nationals and students in the United States. He again asked the Americans whether or not they were agreeable to our suggestion of entrusting the interests of both countries' nationals to the representative of a third nation.

Jenkins thanked us in diplomatic language for allowing six Americans to leave China. Yet he failed to update us about the situation of Chinese students and nationals in the United States and again turned down our "third nation" proposal.

From the minutes-like record above, it can probably be seen that we had a positive attitude and always tried to take the initiative. Our solutions to various problems were reasonable, as were our demands. Chinese diplomatic struggle had demonstrated its flexibility as well as its adherence to principles.

The United States, on the other hand, revealed itself as rigid and stubborn, often to the point of putting itself in a reactive situation. The ambassadorial talks clearly mirrored both sides' attitudes and positions.

As I said before, the Geneva Conference was only a prelude to 15 years of Sino-U.S. talks. Once the prelude began, even Dulles did not want to close the door on Sino-U.S. contacts. China, for its part, was also ready to leave the door slightly ajar so as to better observe the United States, wage a struggle against it and keep open a channel of communication in the absence of formal diplomatic ties. This was the art of Chinese diplomatic struggle, the fruit of Premier Zhou Enlai's painstaking labor to develop Sino-U.S. relations.

CHAPTER II. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

The Selection of the CPC Central Committee

In April 1955, I took up the post of Chinese ambassador to Poland. One day at the end of July, the bright sun was shining over beautiful Warsaw. Comrades working in the embassy went to the outskirts for a picnic. I very much liked the scene on the outskirts of Warsaw. We found the green bushes and open country pleasing to both the eye and the mind. We felt relaxed and happy. When we were sitting together talking cheerfully and eating our food, a confidential secretary gave me a telegram sent by the Foreign Ministry.

This was a telegram for the office of the Chinese charge d'affaires in Britain, to the effect that through the mediation of Britain, the United States had advanced a proposal on Sino-U.S. talks at ambassadorial level. A copy of the telegram had been sent to the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw. I felt puzzled after reading the telegram. Why had a copy of a telegram for the office of the charge d'affaires in Britain been sent to the embassy in Warsaw? Every comrade talked about this matter. They guessed that Ambassador Wang would possibly be sent to participate in the talks. I never thought of this myself, because after the Geneva Conference, I was no longer in charge of matters regarding Sino-U.S. relations.

Several days later, the Foreign Ministry sent a message officially notifying me that I had been appointed senior representative of the Chinese side at the ambassadorial-level Sino-U.S. talks. The U.S. side appointed its ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Johnson, as its negotiator at the talks. It was a coincidence that the two rivals at the Geneva Conference came to grips again.

After receiving the notice, I was uneasy and even disturbed. Although I participated in the Sino-U.S. meetings at the Geneva Conference, there was a powerful delegation at my side, and there were many experienced "capable persons" who suggested ways and means. In particular, I was working by the side of Premier Zhou. I could personally listen to his teachings, and go about things according to his direct instructions. When doing things, I could rely on the prime minister. However, as a chief negotiator, I had to take sole charge of everything. Although I could contact the government and the premier at all times, I was far from the motherland, and should make decisions, analyses, and judgment myself with regard to many things. I should also actively put forward suggestions to the government, and be good at acting according to circumstances. I was not allowed to commit a single mistake. It was absolutely not easy to do so. The situation was complicated, and what I was doing was a matter of prime importance, to which the whole world paid close attention. I felt as if a heavy burden had been laid on me.

Of course, I also thought of some other, beneficial factors. To deal with the talks at ambassadorial level, the Foreign Ministry specially set up a guiding group responsible for the Sino-U.S. talks. The group was responsible for devising measures to be taken at the talks. The group leader was Zhang Hanfu, the deputy group leader Qiao Guanhua, and secretary-general, Dong Yueqian. In addition, its members included Gong Peng, Pu Shan, Wang Baoliu, and so on. A brain trust comprised of a galaxy of talent was my mainstay. What gave me assurance was that the group was working directly under the leadership of Premier Zhou, and that Qiao Guanhua, who was called a "talented scholar," was responsible for specific work. As far as I was concerned, I had had dealings with the Americans as early as the 1930's. I was familiar with their thinking, work style, and the way they handled things. Generally speaking, they were frank, open, lively, and easygoing. Comrade He Long once told me that when the central authorities were selecting the negotiator, there were several candidates in addition to myself. Due to my experience in foreign affairs for 10 years or so in the party, and to having had long-term contacts with, and being familiar with, the Americans, I was eventually selected as chief negotiator on the Chinese side.

The matter of my contacts with the Americans made me recall the diplomatic work of our party during the war of resistance against Japan. Indeed, the contacts between the CPC and the Americans did not begin after the CPC became a ruling party. They started during the period of the war of resistance against Japan. Comrade Zhou Enlai worked in the KMT-controlled area for a long time, and led the party work in the area. In 1938, to meet the demand for giving publicity to the party policy on resisting Japan, an external propaganda group was established directly under the southern bureau. The group worked under the direct leadership of Comrade Zhou Enlai, and I was responsible for specific work. Members of the group included my former wife Anna von Kleist, Bi Shuowang, Xu Mengxiong, and others. These members of the group had a good command of English. The task of the group was to translate the works of Chairman Mao, articles on the war of resistance against Japan, and the battlefield reports of the 8th Route Army. The article "On the Protracted War" and others, written by Chairman Mao during the war of resistance against Japan, were first translated by our group.

We vigorously publicized the party's advocacy of a united front and the achievements of the liberated areas.

During the initial period of the second cooperation between the CPC and the KMT, the two parties carried out their cooperation relatively smoothly and the work of the external propaganda team flourished. In Wuhan, we had discussions with Rewi Alley, Edgar Snow, and Agnes Smedley and decided to set up a national industrial cooperative. We also made arrangements for Doctor Bethune, an Indian medical team, and others to go to Yanan. It was precisely in this period that our work team began to contact some Americans. At that time, General Joseph W. Stilwell, military attache of the U.S. Embassy to China, Colonel Evans F. Carlson of the U.S. Marine Corps, and other people in the American Consulate General had frequent contact with us. At that time, the KMT did not interfere in or restrict these activities in our work.

In October 1938, Wuhan was lost and all the party organizations were moved to Chongqing, the then alternate capital of the Chiang Kai-shek government. In 1939, Comrade Ye Jianying announced on behalf of the south China bureau the formal establishment of the foreign affairs team. I was appointed head of the team, Chen Jiakang was deputy head, and Qiao Guanhua, Gong Peng, Li Shaoshi, Zhang Wenjing, Liu Guang, Chen Hao, and others were members of the team. The foreign affairs team worked under the direct

leadership of Comrade Zhou Enlai. As a result, our party's external activities were carried out more vigorously, so that we broke the situation of only one party, the KMT, carrying out diplomatic activities, and won the understanding, sympathy, and support of the antifascist allies, including Britain and France. The foreign affairs team had contacts with all the embassy reporters and military organizations of the various countries. What is particularly worth mentioning is the work done by Gong Peng, who was a capable female member of our team and who was in charge of contacting the news reporters of various countries. She did her work prominently and even now many old reporters who worked in Chongqing remember and respect her.

At that time, one of the important aspects of the work of the foreign affairs team was obtaining international aid, and the key to the work was to obtain aid from the United States. On Comrade Zhou Enlai's instruction, we made friends widely and deepened friendships. We became acquainted with the personnel of the U.S. military headquarters in China and the U.S. Embassy in China and with reporters of U.S. press circles. We paid particular attention to making friends with those among them who adopted an objective attitude toward the CPC and we worked on them. For example, I had many contacts with U.S. Ambassador Gauss and Councillor John Carter Vincent, and became good friends with young diplomats in the U.S. Embassy, including Davies, the (Service) [Xieweisi 6200 0251 1835] brothers, (Efty Tremlett), George Atchison, Freeman Tawney, and Philip Sprouse; and with Mac Fisher, John King Fairbank, and Colonel David D. Barrett. We often met, discussed problems, and exchanged opinions. I gave them some Yanan propaganda materials to read. Some of them were descendants of missionaries sent by the United States, had grown up in China, were familiar with things in China, were considerate, and spoke Chinese fluently. Generally, they were indignant regarding the corrupt rule of the KMT government and wanted to know something about the CPC, the largest party in China not in office. Even now, I cherish the memory of General Stilwell, who was commander in chief of the U.S. Far East Military Region and who was an honest soldier filled with a sense of justice. He established a friendly relationship of mutual respect and confidence with us.

Through our work and through the efforts of American friends, in 1944 a small number of U.S. news reporters first broke the blockade of the KMT and visited Yanan. They gave many reports to the world on the CPC, who had won the support of the people and who had conscientiously fought against Japan, and on their interviews with Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai, and other CPC leaders. Soon afterward, President Franklin Roosevelt sent Vice President Wallace to visit China.

Urged jointly by General Stilwell and ourselves, the United States proposed sending a military observer mission to Yanan. Chiang Kai-shek feared that the United States would thus know the true situation there and many times rejected this proposal. At a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, Wallace told Chiang that if Chiang continued to reject the proposal on the visit of a U.S. military observer mission to Yanan, the United States would cut its military aid to Chiang Kai-shek. Under such pressure, Chiang was forced to satisfy this demand of the United States. Colonel Dixie made preparations for and organized the observer group, which was headed by Barrett. This mission arrived at Yanan in July 1944. They were enthusiastically welcomed by Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou and they made an on-the-spot investigation in the Yanan liberated area. The democratic atmosphere everywhere in Yanan, the strict discipline of the troops led by the PLA, the spirit of hard struggle of the officers and soldiers in Yanan, and the pithy analysis of the situation by Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou, and other leading comrades impressed them deeply.

The flourishing revolutionary atmosphere constituted a sharp contrast to the corruption in the areas under the rule of the KMT. Xie wei en [6200 0251 1869] and others were also members of the observer group. This visit opened their eyes and enabled them to have a clearer view of the situation in China. In their report to the U.S. Government, they correctly estimated the Chinese situation and reflected the corruption and incompetence of the KMT government and its passive attitude toward the resistance against Japan. At the same time they praised the CPC's policies in resisting Japan. They proposed that the United States should not implement a policy of supporting Chiang and opposing the communists and wanted it to support the CPC. It was a pity that their penetrating judgement was not accepted by the U.S. State Department, which always banked on the KMT and thus caused a serious historic mistake of far-reaching impact in the China policy of the U.S. Government.

Comrade Zhou Enlai was delighted to see the U.S. military observers mission arrive in Yanan. In a letter to me he said: "Your letter flying to me pleases me very much. Now that we have established ties with them, it will be easy for both sides to keep in touch in the future. Your efforts have finally brought about good results. The prospects are simply boundless. Jiakang has just come back (author's note: this denotes Chen Jiakang's return to Yanan from Chongqing) and has told us about what has happened this year. Thank you all for your great efforts...."

"We send you a lot of books and newspapers this time. You can select some of them to reprint and distribute in the United States. Father (Xia Nanhan) [1115 0589 3352] has taken away a copy of the English version of the report by the chief of staff (author's note: Chief of Staff Ye Jianying). If you cannot get the copy from him, you may perhaps translate it yourself and have copies of the translation distributed. Probably Colonel Barrett (author's note: Colonel David D. Barrett, a colonel of the U.S. Army) has already copied the report and sent it to the Stilwell headquarters.

"Some American friends have written to us. I would like you to write back for us. I hope you can maintain contact with these friends: Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Evans Carlson, John Carter Vincent, and (Belton) [4101 1422 4098]. Have you heard anything from (Breadland) [4101 3676 5695] in the concentration camp in Hong Kong? Please send us some copies of the booklets that you have published in English by the next flight. We hope we can have three copies of each edition on hand. As for the year's work report, you had better ask our revered Comrade Lin (author's note: Lin Boqu) to bring it back...."

"Zhou Enlai, 6 August 1944"

The reader can see what great importance Comrade Zhou Enlai attached to our contacts with American friends as well as to the work of the external affairs section at that time. Although he then stayed in Yanan, he still gave specific instructions to us and encouraged us to work hard.

I still remember that it initially took 15 days to travel from Chongqing to Yanan by car. It was only after the arrival of the U.S. military observers mission in Yanan that there was a regular flight between Chongqing and Yanan. What Comrade Zhou Enlai said in his letter -- "your letter flying to me" -- reflects the situation at that time. When the first airplane landed in Yanan, there was an accident as the runway was not long enough. Fortunately, nobody was injured in the accident. When receiving the crew of the plane, headed by David Barrett, Chairman Mao humorously asked them: "Was anybody injured? Anyway, it is not the horse's responsibility."

I still remember that we waged a struggle against the KMT over the question on the delegation to the UN founding ceremony in 1945. The KMT's attempt to monopolize the whole delegation by their own delegates encountered strong objection from the CPC. We demanded that the CPC be represented in the delegation and nominated Comrade Dong Biwu as the CPC representative; Guo Moruo and I as advisers; and other comrades including Wu Xiuquan, Zhang Hanfu, Shen Qizhen, and Chen Jiakang as members of the delegation. However, the KMT tried in every possible way to reject this justified demand by the CPC. And finally, after exhausting all pretexts, the KMT agreed to let our party be represented in the delegation by Dong Biwu, Zhang Hanfu, and Chen Jiakang only.

Despite all the obstacles the KMT had thrown in our way, we managed to surmount every difficulty and did a great deal of work among foreign diplomatic envoys and reporters in China. Many of them appreciated our call for resistance against the Japanese aggressors. And, with pleasure, they took an active part in publicizing the honest and democratic image of the CPC while exposing all sorts of malpractices by the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek was very discontented with this. It was reported that he once flew into a rage, scolding the enormous KMT propaganda organization for losing the upper hand to a small group of the CPC. In a note sent to the KMT Propaganda Department, he angrily said: All you guys are so stupid and indolent in studying that you are defeated by the CPC. What a pity this is!

The U.S. Government continued to stick to its reactionary policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and opposing the Communist Party after the war of resistance against Japan. These friendly Americans were rudely treated by Patrick J. Hurley, the then U.S. ambassador to China, and they were cruelly persecuted under McCarthyism after the founding of New China. Before I went to Geneva for the talks, these friends were all investigated either openly or in secret. Some of them were removed from office, others were transferred and demoted, and still others had to change their professions or lost their jobs. They drifted from place to place and led vagrant lives. In particular, Davies and John Stewart Service suffered the most miserable experiences. Service was charged with treason and the accusation was not withdrawn until 1951. He took his case to the Supreme Court and won the suit in 1957. He worked again at the State Department in 1958 and his reputation was restored, but he still faced pressure from all sides. His miserable experience was really put to an end only after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States.

In 1945, Ambassador Hurley, who was unpopular in the U.S. Embassy in China, was recalled. With great attention to China, Truman appointed his special representative General George C. Marshall as the U.S. ambassador to China. At that time, Gen Marshall was already retired and was living in a city in the South. Just as he and his wife were tidying up their new house, a telephone call came from Truman, asking him to return to Washington as quickly as possible. In Washington, Gen Marshall accepted the appointment. He was asked to go to China in the capacity of the president's special envoy to act as a mediator between the KMT and the CPC. For its part, the U.S. Government hoped that the KMT and the CPC would stop the civil war and consent to forming a democratic coalition government, with stress on the KMT. This was the mission that brought Marshall to China.

At the U.S. Army headquarters, I was told the exact date of Marshall's arrival in China. I immediately informed Comrade Zhou Enlai and accompanied him and Comrade Wang Yifei to the airport. We got there before T.V. Soong, a trusted aide of Chiang Kai-shek. After Marshall came to China, the three sides -- the KMT, the CPC, and the United States -- set up a group headed by Zhou Enlai (the CPC), Chang Chun (the KMT), and Marshall

(the United States). Under the group there was the "Peiking executive headquarters" with Comrade Ye Jianying as our representative, Cheng Chieh-min as the KMT representative, and Walter Spencer Robertson as the U.S. representative, who also took part in the Geneva talks later. As I worked as an assistant of Comrade Zhou Enlai at that time, I often conveyed opinions and letters of Comrade Zhou Enlai to Gen Marshall, so we got a chance to see each other often.

Recommended by Marshall, Leighton Stuart was appointed ambassador to China in 1946. The son of an American missionary in China, he is an American born in China and was very close to Chiang Kai-shek. He used to pretend to love both the United States and China. He had established Yenching University. Many comrades of our party, including Gong Peng, Huang Hua, Mu Qing, and Wu Qing were all students at the university.

One day, Comrade Zhou Enlai said to Leighton Stuart in jest: We thank you for having trained so many people for us. Throughout this period, I worked as an assistant of Comrade Zhou Enlai, so I maintained necessary contacts with Leighton Stuart. Together with Comrade Zhou Enlai, representative of the CPC, I also participated in the talks with Marshall and Leighton Stuart.

I believe that I was assigned to this important task just because I had experience of maintaining contacts with different types of Americans and because Premier Zhou knew me and trusted me very much. With the support of comrades around me and summing up past experiences, I felt that I had to accomplish the task with confidence. Thinking that I would hold talks with the United States on behalf of the CPC, the Chinese Government, and the 600 million invincible Chinese people who had stood up, I was immediately imbued with a strong sense of pride and self-confidence. Although the United States refused to recognize us, it was still forced to hold talks with us.

As the talks approached, I was busy about preparations in line with the leadership's instructions, leafing through much reading material and discussing with comrades all the questions that might arise. Like a soldier sent on an expedition, I was excited and under some strain, but I kept on warning myself that I had to be coolheaded.

Generally speaking, the international situation tended toward relaxation after the 1954 Geneva Conference. The situation in the Far East began to be alleviated as a result of the cease-fire in Korea and the restoration of peace in Indochina. However, the United States did not take its defeat at the Geneva Conference lying down. For the purpose of retaliation and confrontation, the U.S. Government was busy preparing a so-called "joint defense treaty" with the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan after the Geneva Conference. With this treaty, the United States attempted to legalize its invasion and occupation of Taiwan and to use Taiwan as a base for expanding its military confrontation with China and unleashing a new war. Consequently, the military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait became much more obvious. The party Central Committee discussed the situation and believed that in order to destroy the U.S.-Chiang military and political alliance it was necessary to raise the call, "liberate Taiwan" to the whole country and the whole world as well. The party Central Committee also believed that it was inappropriate not to set the task of "liberating Taiwan" immediately after the cease-fire in Korea, and that we would commit a serious political mistake if we failed to carry out the task promptly. Thereupon, RENMIN RIBAO published an editorial, reaffirming: "We are determined to liberate Taiwan. We will not stop until we reach our goal."

Chief Commander Zhu De also delivered the speech, "The Chinese People Are Determined To Liberate Taiwan," on the occasion of National Day. After the returning from the

Geneva Conference, Premier Zhou made a report to the 33d meeting of the Central People's Government, specially stating the task of liberating Taiwan and calling on the entire people to carry on to the end the glorious task of liberating Taiwan and defending world peace.

In his report on government work at the First Session of the First NPC, held in September, Premier Zhou reaffirmed: "We are determined to liberate Taiwan," and pointed out that any proposal to "neutralize" Taiwan and create an "independent Taiwan" was aimed at splitting China and legalizing the U.S. invasion and occupation of Taiwan, and that the "Chinese people will never tolerate it." On 2 December the United States and Chiang officially signed the "joint defense treaty." On 8 December Premier Zhou made a further statement, ruthlessly exposing the nature of the treaty and pointing out that we would never recognize this illegal treaty.

In order to express the determination of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan, and to puncture the U.S.-Chiang "defense treaty," the PLA liberated Yijiangshan Islet at one blow on 18 January 1955, and Dachen Islet in 13 February.

In an interview with newsmen, Eisenhower called for "mediation" by the United Nations and said that troops would be sent to safeguard the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores when needed. At the same time, the United States also turned down the proposal initiated by China and the Soviet Union on convening a 10-nation conference to discuss the situation in the Taiwan area. Premier Zhou repeated time and again that the liberation of Taiwan was China's internal affair, and the United States had no right to interfere.

At that time we resolutely and strongly opposed American support for the Chiang gang and showed the dauntless spirit of the Chinese people in the face of U.S. military blackmail. At the end of 1954 we detained 13 American spies who undertook sabotage in China.

Faced with such a situation, the United States was compelled to make contacts with us and to acknowledge the fact that New China had stood up. Directed by the United States, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold in his own name visited our country in January 1955 after India made arrangements for the visit. His aim was to pry into how China would deal with the case of the 13 American spies and some other things. Premier Zhou pointed out to him that the UN position on China's representation in the United Nations and the Korean war was not fair, and that the United States had created tension in the Far East, and it should stop its interference in China's internal affairs and withdraw its troops from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

Here I remember one thing that shows again how Premier Zhou was flexible and magnanimous in handling diplomatic affairs. This happened just when Premier Zhou accompanied Hammarskjold to the gate after a banquet, he found that one of Hammarskjold's bodyguards was left out in the cold. Premier Zhou immediately asked me why he was not invited in, and someone replied that this bodyguard was an American. Premier Zhou said critically: Why should we be afraid of an American? Why can't we do work on Americans? We should invite him to the next banquet and I will even propose to toast to him when the time is ripe. This shows the tolerance and breadth of vision of Premier Zhou. We did as the premier instructed later and this ordinary American was deeply touched by our invitation to banquets.

Now back to the situation in 1955. In that year, the Afro-Asian conference opened in Bandung on 18 April. That was an important meeting, participated in by the majority of independent Asian and African countries with the exception of the Western powers and the Soviet Union. People now like to call it the Bandung Conference, which is of great and far-reaching historical significance in the world political arena. In line with the general principle of "striving to extend the united front line for world peace, pushing ahead with the national independence movement, and creating conditions to strengthen ties and establish diplomatic relations with most Asian and African countries," which was approved by the party Central Committee, Premier Zhou Enlai gave a series of sincere reports with far-sighted and broad vision to the conference, which shook the whole world. His lofty strength of character and modesty, as well as his wide vision of a great statesman, were widely admired and praised by delegates to the conference. China's position and attitude won sympathy and support from many Asian and African countries. With one voice, delegates to the conference praised Premier Zhou's outstanding contributions to the success of the conference. Noted American scholar Du Bois and his wife told me more than once that the African people's cause for liberation could attract wide attention in the world precisely because of Premier Zhou's brilliant speeches at the Bandung Conference.

In order to clear away the doubts of some Asian and African countries about China, sincerely show the Chinese people's ardent love for peace, and strive for peaceful world surroundings, beneficial to our country, the progressive cause of mankind, and the construction and development of our country's socialism, Premier Zhou made a historical statement on relations between China and the United States:

"The Chinese people are friendly with the American people."

"The Chinese people do not want to make war with the United States. The Chinese Government is willing to sit for negotiations with the U.S. Government on the question of easing tension in the Far East, and particularly the tension in the Taiwan region."

The very brief statement, like a huge stone thrown into the water, had repercussions all over the world. With this brief, explicit, and firm statement, the Chinese Government expressed its position and wishes. This was well received by the world press. As a result, the image and position of the PRC was evidently enhanced.

Many neutral countries, and especially the countries participating in the Afro-Asian conference brought pressure to bear upon the United States, hoping that it would hold direct negotiations with the Chinese Government in response to the call of Premier Zhou Enlai.

As more and more countries in the world knew, recognized, and supported New China, the United States landed itself in an increasingly isolated and passive position on the Taiwan issue. In order to seek an opportunity to ease the strained relations between China and the United States and to soften the denunciation by public opinion at home on the problem of prisoners relating to an espionage case, the U.S. Government found that it could no longer turn a deaf ear to the statement by Premier Zhou under the strong world-wide pressure. Hence, on 13 July the U.S. Government, though Britain, initiated a proposal to the Chinese side that China and the United States hold talks in Geneva at the ambassadorial level.

People appraised that Zhou Enlai was a strong match for John Foster Dulles in the struggle between China and the United States after the Geneva Conference. The impending talks would once again measure Zhou Enlai's strength with Dulles'.

Obviously, our talks would certainly involve the most acute, important, and uncompromising subject--the Taiwan issue, which was dealt with throughout the 9-year talks which I participated in.

China Took the Initiative

I went out to battle. I was fully prepared, but the facts in the following days proved that I took a naive view of problems. I originally thought that the most complicated thing would be no more than attending several meetings, but I did not expect marathon talks. When I set out from Warsaw, I took only a few summer clothes.

At the end of July, I first arrived in Bern, the capital of Switzerland. At that time Feng Xuan was ambassador to Switzerland. He accompanied me to Geneva by train.

The whole world was shocked by the news of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial level talks. Major newspapers of various countries frontpaged the news with comments and predictions. Many of them played up my personal career, relations with Premier Zhou and even private life, and I immediately became a newsmaker. Upon my arrival in Geneva, newsmen immediately swarmed toward me at the railway station.

I made a brief speech to the press. I said: "The Chinese people are always friendly with the American people and they do not want to make war with the United States. Early in his speech to the Afro-Asian conference, Premier Zhou stated that China and the United States should ease the current tension by means of negotiations. As long as the two sides are sincere, I believe that the talks not only can properly solve the question of repatriating American nationals, but can also make contributions to the relaxation of the tension between China and the United States."

By the way, here I have something to add. From the outset of the talks, acute differences arose between the two sides on the agenda and goal of the talks. We held that the talks had to emphasize discussing some substantial problems such as the Taiwan issue, arrangements for direct talks between Secretary of State Dulles and Premier Zhou Enlai, and the establishment of cultural ties between the two countries. But the United States insisted on repatriating the Americans detained in China and demanded that China not resort to force over Taiwan. In order to make a start at the talks, we finally agreed to discuss the question of repatriating American nationals first and then the other substantial questions.

The first round of talks was set to be held at the small meeting room of the building of the League of Nations on the afternoon of 1 August. The meeting room was previously the office of the council chairman of the League of Nations. The meeting room was furnished simply and solemnly with a large oval conference table in the center.

Comrades Li Huichuan and Lin Ping and I reached the meeting room earlier than others. Our XINHUA NEWS AGENCY's correspondents told us that the "journalists club" was in a bustle.

It happened that some newsmen had already got wind of the news that our government would declare the release of 11 American spies in the first round of talks. For newsmen, this news was much more attractive than the holding of Sino-U.S. talks. An American correspondent burst out shouting: "Oh! China has taken the 'initiative' again." Some correspondents of other countries beside him immediately sneered at him and said: "Not that the United States cannot take the 'initiative.' For example, the U.S. State Department can immediately make a statement declaring that it will withdraw the 7th Fleet, which is protecting Chiang Kai-shek, and adopt a friendly attitude toward the Far Eastern countries. Then the United States could gain the initiative at the negotiating table."

We declared that we would release 11 American spies before the talks. This decision by Premier Zhou really created a favorable start for the talks and enabled us to take the initiative in the talks. But, at that time, I thought that it would be better to hold talks before we released the spies. However, the actual results of the first step we took for the talks were great. World opinion immediately pointed out that China was sincere and active in the talks and people's feelings also quickly turned favorable to us.

When we were entering the conference hall, many reporters waved us greetings in a friendly manner. Ambassador Johnson was several minutes late. Among those who accompanied him was Crowe, a sinologist of the U.S. Department of State. After the delegates of both sides took their seats, all reporters were busying themselves taking pictures of the occasion under the constant blink of magnesium light flashes that seemed to mark in history the vestiges of Sino-UN contacts. When the reporters left the conference room, the talks formally began.

First I read out the statement of our government on the release of 11 American spies and Johnson expressed his thanks to me. Subsequently, we began discussing the agenda of the negotiations.

The atmosphere of this round of talks was happy and relaxed whether partly because we had announced the release of American spies or partly because Johnson and I were well acquainted with each other. I was informed later that Dulles enjoined Johnson to exercise patience during the talks so as to avoid the repetition of the practice of confronting the tough with toughness as adopted during the Panmunjom talks, and to seek ways to preserve the present ties with Beijing so as to ensure the negotiations would not break down. Prior to the talks, Dulles said that he would be very happy if the talks lasted for 3 months.

The first round of talks made relatively smooth progress. Both sides reached an agreement on the agenda of negotiations ultimately, namely, on the repatriation of nationals of the two countries living abroad and other disputed practical issues between them. At the same time, it was decided that the talks would continue to be held the following morning.

The second round of talks lasted for only 1 hour. Both sides exchanged lists of their nationals living abroad to be expatriated. On the list I exchanged with my counterpart, there was included the name of Qian Wuesen. In a letter he wrote in July to Vice Chairman Chen Shutong, Qian Xuesen asked the government to help him return to the motherland at an early date. After reading the letter, Premier Zhou promptly passed it on to me. Then I took up the returning home of Qian Xuesen with Johnson, who quibbled that there was no proof indicating that the Chinese residing in the United

States wanted to return home and I immediately refuted his argument by citing the case of Qian Xuesen. I also proposed that India be empowered as a third country to look after the interests of the Chinese citizens living in the United States.

Johnson asked for a 1-day recess in order to request instructions from the Department of State. The third round of talks would be held on 4 August as scheduled.

During the third round of talks, the moment the talks were resumed Johnson asked our side to unconditionally allow all Americans in China to leave the country so that the meeting would enter the second item of the agenda -- with the aim of paving the way for discussion of substantive issues. I held that the question of the American personnel detained in China was part of the content of the talks and on no account was it a condition for continuing the talks and, with this in mind, I solemnly reaffirmed China's stand on the repatriation of Chinese students studying and Chinese nationals living abroad, pointing out that the United States should promptly release all the innocent Chinese who had been put in jail so that they could take the opportunity to return to their motherland. By then Johnson no longer insisted on the argument that keeping those Chinese who had a high level of technological knowledge in the country had always been the law of the United States. It can thus be seen that the law of the United States is not unalterable at all and it also serves politics.

Later in our talks, we discussed over and over many times the question related to repatriating the people of each country living in the other country.

On behalf of the U.S. Government, Johnson stubbornly clung to a principle that they thought was the most fundamental in U.S. policies toward China, namely the principle of refusing to recognize the PRC as an entirely independent sovereign state. Therefore, in dealing with some specific questions, the U.S. Government would always sensitively think whether its action would give an impression of or result in recognition of the PRC. Therefore, Johnson beat about the bush in discussing any question related to our country's sovereignty. For example, he always refused to agree to our proposal that the Indian Embassy to the United States take care of the Chinese living in the United States. For he thought that this would amount to recognizing the PRC's legitimate consular right to be responsible for Chinese people living in the United States, and to recognizing the PRC as a sovereign state and excluding the Taiwan authorities. The United States would by no means agree to this.

On this question alone, we carried out several rounds of struggle. Our side fully presented the facts and reasoned things out and finally Johnson found that he had no grounds to counter our arguments. After asking for instructions from John F. Dulles, he was forced to accept our proposal on empowering India to take care of Chinese people living in the United States. However, he made trouble again on the word "empower." Johnson said that the word "empower" could not be used and only the word "invite" was to be used. He thought that the word "invite" had less of a meaning of legitimacy and legal responsibility on the part of the PRC. He also unreasonably proposed that the power given to the Indian Embassy had to be strictly restricted to the investigations relating to those Chinese citizens who really wanted to leave the United States. Obviously, such a restriction would have left many loopholes for the United States to exploit. Moreover, the United States could have given any explanation to the specific conditions at will. Of course, we could not agree with that and I flatly refused his proposal. As a result, no positive results could be achieved, though we held about 10 rounds of talks.

Soon after the beginning of the talks, we began to find that we were wrong to think that the problem could be solved through a few round of talks. It seemed to us that the talks would be very arduous and would take a long time. The reporters who had some optimism or who wanted to catch news about a new breakthrough always waited impatiently for news outside the site of the talks. At the beginning, when we left the site, they would gather around us in high spirits and viewed with one another in asking questions, but our simple answers always failed to give them any exciting new information. Later, they seemed to feel disappointed as soon as they saw the expression on Johnson's and my faces. They began to doubt whether any results could be achieved in the talks or whether the talks would be suspended. There were more and more disappointing and pessimistic views in newspapers. The enthusiasm of the reporters also began to gradually cool down. By about the end of August, the talks were reduced from three times a week to once a week and the temperature had obviously dropped.

By that time, the talks were carried out in fixed patterns. Johnson and I read our written speeches by turns. Of course, sometimes there would be disputes between the two sides, and this depended on the ability of each side to find loopholes in the speech of the other side. Johnson was an experienced diplomat with wide knowledge. Perhaps, he strictly obeyed Dulles' instructions, therefore, he never broke etiquette or used caustic language in the disputes. Even when he was most embarrassed, he merely blushed and smoked a few more cigarettes.

We were also courteous at all time. Our stand was firm and our attitude was serious, but we spoke reasonable, acted calmly, and maintained a civilized and reasonable diplomatic style.

The assistants to each side never spoke at the talks but sometimes wrote their opinions on slips of paper to or whispered their opinions in the ears of the speakers. Both Comrade Li Huichuan and Comrade Lin Ping gave me many useful suggestions during the talks.

What was interesting was that though we were very serious and neither side gave ground at the conference table, there were some interesting or even friendly personal contacts between the two sides outside the conference room. Premier Zhou instructed us to boldly have personal contact with Johnson. Johnson had also obtained Bulles' consent to make personal contact with us.

When the talks were stalemated, in order to ease the atmosphere, we sometimes invited each other to meals. During personal contacts, we could say some things that we could not say on formal occasions, discuss with each other, exchange views, and sound each other out, and it was even possible for us to make some breakthroughs. I remember that it was Johnson who was the first to do this. In order to solve a problem, he wanted to know the attitude of our side and avoid the attention of the reporters. Therefore, he invited us to a quiet meal at a villa on a remote mountain and we solved a technical problem at the dinner table. Later, out of a similar need and with the consent of Premier Zhou, we invited them to a meal at the same place.

A few years later, perhaps Premier Zhou had forgotten the latter meal and asked me several times: Have you given them a meal in return for their treating you to a meal? That was Premier Zhou's way in doing things. He was always very careful and particular about diplomatic courtesy. On another occasion, when our Beijing Opera Troupe was giving a performance in Geneva, I invited Johnson and his assistants to see the performance, but time and again urged them to keep it secret and be sure not to let reporters know about it. After the performance, Johnson praised the performance, saying: "This is an artistic manifestation of China's ancient civilization and is something we Americans do not have."

At that time, there was no non-stop flight between Warsaw and Geneva. Each time I went to Geneva to attend the talk, I had to fly to Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia, 1 day ahead of schedule so that I could board a Czechoslovak plane there and then fly from Prague through Zurich, where I changed to a Swiss plane to Geneva. In Prague, I often met Johnson, so we two often boarded the same plane both on our way to and from Geneva. Sometimes, because of the bad weather, the plane could not take off. Under such circumstances, Johnson and I had to stay overnight in Zurich. Very often we had accommodations in the same hotel. During our trip, we did not have interpreters, so we never talked about official business. My English was not so good, but I managed to speak some English, while Johnson could speak some simple Chinese sentences. So, when Johnson and I chatted freely, sometimes in English and sometimes in Chinese, we felt relaxed and happy. At that time, the Swiss Government paid great attention to the Sino-U.S. talks in Geneva. It had ordered the airport authorities to give special consideration to us. So when we boarded or disembarked from a plane at the Zurich Airport, the head of the airport was very friendly to us, and each time, he came to meet or see us off in person, and also accompanied us to the guest room for a rest and treated us to coffee.

Later, owing to an airplane crash, Johnson no longer dared to fly on this route and flew from Paris instead. The crashed plane was a larger Czechoslovak plane that took off from Zurich Airport. On board were Chinese actors and actresses who had just completed their performances in Latin America and were returning home. Quite unexpectedly, the plane exploded less than 5 minutes after taking off. Originally, I had also booked a seat on that plane. I only escaped death by sheer luck because of a 1-day business delay. On another occasion, because of mechanical troubles, the plane I boarded had to land in Munich. At that time, the Federal Republic of Germany had no diplomatic relations with China, so I had to sit with all the other passengers waiting in the sitting room of the airport. This situation made the Chinese Embassy in Berne very anxious and Ambassador Feng Xuan was extremely worried and feared that something might happen to me. In order to inform the government of the Federal Republic of Germany of my presence at the Munich Airport, he purposely telephoned to the airport directly, demanding to speak to "Ambassador Wang." As a result, all the passengers in the waiting room looked at me in surprise, thus creating a sensation.

The reporters who heard the information rushed in and passed on the same news to one another: "The Chinese Ambassador for the Sino-U.S. talks has arrived in Munich!", from which you can see the great influence of the contacts between China and the United States.

In order to avoid quibbling over one question so as to enter the substantive talks more quickly, at home, we carried out a further check and handling of the detained Americans. I received the instruction from home: Announce to Johnson on 10 September that the re-check of 12 Americans has been completed by the authorities concerned in China, and they can be permitted to leave China. Our side had also made some proper concessions on some other concrete questions so that the talks, which had been stagnating for a period of time, finally made progress.

China and the United States finally reached an agreement on 10 September, the only agreement reached after 15 years of talk: "The People's Republic of China (the United States of America) acknowledges that the Americans in the People's Republic of China, who are willing to return to the United States of America (the Chinese in the United States of America, who are willing to return to the People's Republic of China) have the right to return to their own country, and declares that proper measures have been taken and will continue to be taken to ensure that they will be able to exercise their right of returning to their own country as soon as possible."

It is easy to see that the agreement was a strange joint communique, produced through painstaking efforts, under the circumstances that both countries did not recognize each other. The joint communique should not only embody the lack of recognition of one another, but also embody the common view of the two sides and the contact between the two sides, so a masterpiece called "agreement announcement," which is "agreement announcement" in English, was deliberately produced, in which each side spoke for itself. Many years later, the Shanghai Communique, issued after an agreement was reached between Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai, was in a similar form. This agreement was the only formal agreement between China and the United States before the Shanghai Communique was issued in 1972. So when I read it again today, I still feel the weight carried by each word in the agreement.

Now, I'd like to stop talking about the question of the return of the overseas natives for the time being.

At the end of the 1950's, Premier Zhou once said at a meeting: Although we have not achieved any substantial results so far in the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial-level talks, we have had concrete and constructive contacts between our two sides on the question of the overseas natives, and we have gotten Qian Xuesen back. Only as far as this matter is concerned, the talks are worthwhile and valuable.

Entering Substantive Talks

On 22 September, we resumed a sitting in the talks. I thought that the first item on the agenda should come to an end after an agreement was reached on the issue of the Chinese living in the United States, and that we had to start the second item on the agenda of the Sino-U.S. talks at the ambassadorial level to discuss other substantive problems. However, I had not expected that the United States would take an extremely perfunctory attitude in the second stage of the talks, endlessly quibbling over the problems that had already been solved in the first stage, so that the talks became disorganized and could not move a single step.

Earlier, I put forward the essential problems to be discussed in the second stage of the talks, namely, the Taiwan issue and direct talks between Premier Zhou Enlai and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. I pointed out again and again: Only through talks at the level of foreign ministers, a practical way to eliminate differences, will we be able to solve such grave problems as the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan and easing of tension in the Taiwan region, and to discuss operating cultural exchanges and establishing trade relations between the two countries.

Compared with the first subject, the issue of the Chinese living in the United States, talks on the second subject, the Taiwan issue, became more complex and tough.

As far as I recollect now, on the condition that the United States was unlikely to change its policy toward China at that time, we came straight to the most arduous, insoluble, and contentious problem -- the Taiwan issue. This inevitably became a major obstacle to the talks.

So, was it possible for us to sidestep this problem and start with other problems? I think that under the historical conditions of that time, we had in the first place to force the United States to make concessions to key problems, and thus, by moving a step forward, push ahead with the whole situation. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to deal with other problems. At that time, the United States had invaded and occupied

Taiwan, split China's territory, created "two Chinas," and fiercely supported the Chiang bandit gang in intruding into the mainland in order to stage a comeback. The United States was so swollen with arrogance and hostility toward New China that the Chinese people could no longer tolerate it. For this reason, we had to wage a tit-for-tat struggle in the talks so as to boost the morale of the Chinese people and dampen the spirit of the U.S. Government. Before liberation, the Chinese people had long been humiliated and bullied by Western powers, therefore, the newborn China should, by no means, show the slightest timidity before them. This was the very strong feeling of the Chinese people at that time.

If we set aside these historical conditions and stubbornly concentrated on making a breakthrough in the talks, then we should depart from principles, hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, and even damage the great trust of the Chinese people in the government. This would lead us to commit "serious political mistakes," as Chairman Mao pointed out.

Dulles underestimated the strong national self-respect and feelings shown by the Chinese people on the Taiwan issue and their determination to seek a fair solution to the question. Johnson first got around substantive problems and tabled a question relating to the so-called fate of 450 American soldiers missing in the Korean war. Obviously, they had racked their brains and put forward such a question to play stalling tactics before starting negotiations on substantial problems.

I refused to discuss this question and said that the problem concerning military personnel in Korea had to be discussed by the Korean Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom. There was no need for us to discuss it.

Johnson's second proposal, that is, regarding the Taiwan issue, that both sides should promise not to resort to force, was of some substantive significance.

Premier Zhou seriously studied this proposal and unambiguously pointed out: The Taiwan issue has two sides. On one hand, the U.S. occupation of Taiwan has become an international dispute and the tension in the Taiwan Strait is affecting the peace, stability, and security of Southeast Asia. The tension is, above all, the result of the U.S. military presence in Taiwan. This military presence is directed against the PRC. The United States should abstain from using force against our country and withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, from China's point of view, Taiwan is, legally, historically, and factually, the inalienable territory of China. The Chinese people's preference for particular ways of liberating Taiwan is China's internal affair. The United States has no right to interfere, nor has it the right to ask us not to use force. These two questions must not be confused.

I solemnly relayed the above views to Johnson. At the same time, I asked the United States to turn its attention to more substantive problems.

Thus, when discussing the content of the second agenda, again, both sides refused to give in. After repeated consideration, we decided that we should take the initiative. Thus, we suggested that both sides could freely exchange their views on the second item on the agenda and that there was no need to define in detail the topics to be discussed or to arrange the order in which they were to be discussed -- all this took place at the 19th meeting, which was held on 5 October.

After we had broken the deadlock, the 20th meeting was held on 8 October. As expected, Johnson first spoke freely. He then read aloud and at length the U.S. Government's Taiwan policy and gave me several copies of his script. His speech, which was full of repetitions, could be summed up in two sentences: First, the United States intended to forcibly occupy Taiwan for a long time; second, the United States demanded that, before it consented to the holding of meetings between the Chinese and U.S. foreign ministers, China first had to announce that it would not use force against Taiwan.

Finally, it was my turn to speak. I severely criticized Johnson's speech and sharply pointed out that the second point in his speech meant an attempt to interfere in China's internal affairs as well as a conspiracy to keep "two Chinas."

On 27 October, acting on our own initiative again, we proposed another draft agreement concerning the U.S. proposal that both sides should promise not to resort to force. In this draft agreement, we invoked an article of the UN Charter, which calls on all UN members to settle their disputes by peaceful means, and recommended:

"The PRC and the United States of America agree that they should settle their disputes by peaceful means and not by resorting to force. In order to attain their common desire, the PRC and the United States of America have decided to hold meetings between their foreign ministers to discuss and settle the problem of alleviating and ending the tension in Taiwan."

Johnson rejected this draft agreement. Thus, the U.S. side landed itself in a passive position. This distressed Johnson very much. He kept on smoking and his ashtray was filled with cigarette butts before a round of talks finished.

Up to 10 November, the United States put forward its draft agreement, alleging "... with the exception of independent and collective defense, the United States, generally speaking, will not resort to force, and particularly in the Taiwan region." "With the exception of independent and collective defense, the PRC, generally speaking, will not resort to force, and particularly in the Taiwan region."

The first article of the draft agreement was absurd, as the United States wanted to have the right to "carry out independent and collective defense" in the Taiwan region. Did this mean that the Chinese Government had to recognize the U.S. illegal status of forcibly occupying Taiwan? The second article of the draft agreement was unreasonable because it meant that we had to abandon our right to liberate Taiwan.

In spite of this, I made an effort again with patience after I rejected this U.S. draft agreement. On 1 December I put forward a new draft agreement. Out of consideration of the fact that the United States was unwilling to refer to articles of the United Nations Charter and talks between foreign ministers of the two countries, this new draft only suggested that "the two countries should solve their disputes through peaceful negotiations and not by resorting to blackmail or force."

The United States lacked sincerity. They simply did not want to seriously discuss our draft. Johnson stubbornly played for time. In three meetings in succession he refused to make any concrete comments on our new draft and took a noncommittal attitude. He did not initiate any counterproposal until 12 January 1956. Compared with the previous draft agreement he advanced, the new one had nothing new in content. It again required our side to recognize that the United States had the right to "carry out independent and collective defense" in our Taiwan region. This was a matter of principle. We would in no way grant such a "right" to the United States.

The above facts show that we made endless efforts to seek a common agreement in the second stage of the talks so as to make the Sino-U.S. talks a channel for easing tension in the Taiwan region. Our proposals were practical and reasonable, but the negotiations became bogged down due to lack of sincerity on the U.S. side. Thus no agreement was reached at this stage of the talks. Between April and May 1956, the American side advanced another draft agreement and our side put forward a counterproposal, but again no agreement was reached and the talks made no headway at all.

One thing I want to point out in particular is that during the second stage of the talks, the United States violated the agreement reached in the first stage of the talks. It did not provide us the list of the Chinese living and studying in the United States even after stalling for a long time, and continued to make things difficult for them to return to their motherland. The United States put up innumerable obstacles to hinder the development of the talks in defiance of certain agreements which had been reached. I soon perceived this and was very angry. The antics of the United States in this stage of the talks made me further realize the anticommunist and anti-China nature of the U.S. Government.

In 1956 a tense situation remained in the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, Sino-U.S. talks at the ambassadorial level were bogged down endlessly; and on the other hand, Dulles stated wildly that the United States would not shrink from launching an atomic war in the Taiwan region to intimidate the Chinese people into relinquishing China's sovereignty over Taiwan.

The dual tactics aimed at one thing. Just as I said above, Dulles, however, was too arrogant and underestimated the national pride of the Chinese people and the determination of the Chinese Government. No matter what tactics he might exploit, the Chinese Government in fact would on no account abandon its fundamental position of protecting the interests of the Chinese people.

An Excellent Move

The talks were still going on. However, by then, I had almost no hopes for them. As usual, Johnson and I would read each of our statements, then I would address some protests against U.S. incursions into our territorial waters and skies; and after a few words of confrontation, the meeting would end when a date was fixed by the two parties for the next round of talks.

Nevertheless, Premier Zhou was devising strategies within a command tent, and he was actively thinking of how to conduct a new struggle. The comrades of the guiding group were also making suggestions, thinking of ways and means, to seize every opportunity to do things favorable to our side and to boost the progress of the talks.

Like being startled by the first thunder in spring, the whole world was shocked in August 1956: The Chinese side unilaterally announced the lifting of the ban on U.S. reporters entering China, while a telegram was sent to 15 important U.S. news agencies, inviting them to send their reporters to China for a 1-month visit!

The U.S. press and State Department were shocked, too, causing sensation. We know that at that time the U.S. Government was practicing a strict news blackout on China, and nobody was allowed to provide true coverage of New China. As a result the overwhelming majority of the American people knew very little about New China, and they were yearning to learn the truth. The decision of the Chinese Government was un-

doubtedly a difficult problem for the U.S. Government, while the U.S. press became excited, and those U.S. reporters who had received the invitation of the Chinese Government were all the more so; and they successively sent in their applications for their visit to China.

However, the cunning Dulles took no action, and he would not easily lift the ban of the State Department on U.S. citizens, whether ordinary people or reporters, traveling in China. Therefore, at one time almost all the newspapers and magazines in the United States were unanimously criticizing this stubborn position of the U.S. State Department. In wrath they said, as a democratic country which advocates personal freedom that the United States should flagrantly restrict the freedom of travel of its own people was intolerable either under the Constitution or in justice.

For more than a year, the U.S. press pressed the U.S. State Department. Several reporters boldly broke through the blockade despite the ban and visited China. The U.S. youth delegation attending the World Youth Festival in the Soviet Union boldly arrived in China collectively after the conclusion of the festival regardless of the State Department ban, and they were received with the friendship of the Chinese people. They were willing to be punished when they returned to the United States just to visit New China. Toward the end of the 1970's, these people gathered again and revisited China. Then they were all in their fifties. The yearning and friendship of the American people for China has moved us deeply.

Confronting this situation which came all of a sudden, Dulles could hardly remain silent. Weighing the pros and cons, the U.S. State Department was finally compelled to make some concession, to prevent U.S. public opinion from opposing its all-round policy of isolating China. Even so, Dulles had dragged on for a solid year before acting. In August 1957, Dulles quietly negotiated with some U.S. press representatives. He had to compromise somewhat, and finally announced that the United States would allow 24 news agencies to send their reporters to China for visits.

Many U.S. reporters praised Premier Zhou for his marvelous move regarding this event, for he had successfully made the U.S. press fight against the U.S. State Department.

The reason Premier Zhou made this move was his hope of cultivating ties between the American people and New China; at the same time, the U.S. reporters would also be allowed to see what the Chinese people were doing, and what the aim of their activities were under the leadership of the CPC, and he also hoped that the U.S. reporters would brief the American people on the true features of New China.

Premier Zhou's move was also meant to boost the Sino-U.S. talks. In September 1957, I proposed in the talks a negotiatory draft on allowing reporters of the two countries to cover each country under the conditions of equality and mutual benefit, which was turned down. Dulles would never agree to China's sending an equal number of reporters to the United States for visits. He said, Chinese reporters were allowed to enter the United States only when they were eligible under the existing U.S. immigration law. What a sharp contrast between Premier Zhou's active invitation of U.S. reporters and the stiff refusal of Dulles on the negotiatory draft on visits by Chinese reporters. Premier Zhou's broad vision and his wise strategy won the high esteem of the world's public opinion and in particular the American people.

Toward the end of September, I proposed a negotiatory draft on embargo. In mid-October, I proposed the negotiatory draft on cultural exchanges and ties between the two peoples. In early December, I proposed a negotiatory draft on judicature. However, all were turned down.

Because of this stubborn attitude of the United States, the series of drafts I proposed failed to be implemented. These proposals have now become historical documents. Leafing through these documents today, people may see how the United States repeatedly played word games, in an attempt to indefinitely drag the talks on. And their general principle in the Sino-U.S. talks was to drag them on indefinitely.

Time passed with one round of talks after another. By 12 December, the talks had been going on for 73 rounds. During the last round of talks, Johnson announced politely that he would withdraw from the talks, as he was being transferred to Thailand as U.S. ambassador to that country. And he had appointed his assistant Ed Martin to take his place in the talks.

It was not difficult to see that was another of Dulles' tricks and he was trying to replace the ambassador participating in the talks with a counsellor, in an attempt to de-escalate the talks. I promptly stated that I would not agree to such a change. And I politely made it clear to Johnson: The present Sino-U.S. talks were at ambassadorial level. However, Mr Martin was only a counsellor, and he could not possibly represent the ambassador. I said, you cannot be serious about doing such a thing, Your Excellency Ambassador Johnson.

Just as Premier Zhou had said: We are willing to talk, and we are actively striving for some results, but if the United States is not willing to carry on the talks, we may put a stop to them. We are not willing to see the talks break down, but we are not afraid of a breakdown. If the United States wants war, we are ready to keep you company in that war.

Just because we adopted such a lofty stance with the United States, our party was able to maintain the initiative in the struggles of the talks. Thus, after the 73rd round of the talks, the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial level talks were interrupted for a year.

Here, I would like to quote Premier Zhou's speech on the Sino-U.S. talks at the Third Plenary Session of the First NPC as a summation of my talks with Johnson over a span of more than 2 years.

Premier Zhou said: "The Chinese side does not oppose publishing a joint statement on refraining from the use of force or armed threats in Sino-U.S. relations. In fact, as early as the Bandung Conference, China had declared that the Chinese people do not want war with the United States, and the Chinese Government is willing to sit down and talk with the U.S. Government, and to discuss the issue of relaxing and eliminating the tense situation regarding the Taiwan region. However, it must be pointed out that the tense situation regarding the Taiwan region was created entirely by the United States by occupying the Chinese territory of Taiwan by force. Therefore, any statement on refraining from the use of force between China and the United States will certainly lead to the relaxation and elimination of this tense situation. At the same time, in reference to how China will liberate Taiwan, it involves China's sovereignty and internal affairs, and we will not allow any foreign country to interfere in this matter. Therefore, a statement by China and the United States cannot interfere with this issue in any manner.

"Although the United States has said that the principle of not resorting to force should be specifically applied to the Taiwan region, it has been opposed to holding Sino-U.S. meetings at the foreign ministers' level to implement this principle, and it has refused to seek and decide on a channel to solve the disputes between China and the United States within a certain period of time. Not only that, but the United States has insisted on

its right of so-called "independent or collective self-defense" on China's territory of Taiwan. All this has demonstrated that the United States attempted a onesided statement favorable to itself, to maintain the status quo of the U.S. occupation of Taiwan on the one hand, and to continue to interfere with the Chinese people in liberating Taiwan on the other. Under the circumstances of failing to making such a statement, the United States has attempted to drag out indefinitely the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial-level talks, to achieve the aim of maintaining the status quo of the Taiwan region.

"These attempts by the United States are precisely the reason the Sino-U.S. talks have so far failed to reach an agreement. China will never agree to issuing a statement that is favorable only to one of the two parties, and it will not allow the talks to be utilized by one of the two parties as a means of achieving a onesided purpose. China holds that any joint statement must be mutually beneficial. At the same time, the continuance of the Sino-U.S. talks will be possible only on the basis of mutual benefit."

This passage won the warm and long-standing ovation of the delegates to the NPC.

Today, reading this passage, the scenes of that time--the bright eyes of the premier when demonstrating the above-quoted penetrating view, and his erect posture--reappear before my eyes; and the unremitting efforts Premier Zhou painstakingly made to develop the Sino-U.S. relations are even more unforgettable.

CHAPTER III. THE WARSAW TALKS

The Crisis in the Taiwan Strait

In 1957, Eisenhower continued in power. The international situation was rather complicated for a period of time then. There was a powerful voice against the United States throughout the world. The struggle of the African people for national liberation was surging forward. In the Middle East, a new situation appeared: The pro-American Chamoun government was overthrown in Lebanon; and a revolution burst out in Iraq overthrowing the old kingdom. In order to stamp out the anti-American flames in Middle East, the United States dispatched troops to Lebanon from July to October 1958. This was further denounced by the whole world.

Under such circumstances, in order to divert world attention from the situation in the Middle East and to put forth threats against China, the United States agitated the Chiang Kai-shek clique to "counterattack the mainland." The latter then dispatched planes to distribute propaganda leaflets over the mainland. The planes even flew deep into Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Xizang, Qinghai and other provinces. They also parachuted in special agents and bombarded Fujian Province. For a time, the clamor for "counter-attacking the mainland" and sabotage activities were often heard and seen. At that time, the United States assembled a large number of planes and warships from the Mediterranean, as well as from its own territory, to strengthen its 7th Fleet, which was deployed in the Taiwan region. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Burke even said that the U.S. Navy was ready to stage a landing on China's mainland at any time, just as it had done in Lebanon. Dulles threatened to expand the sphere of U.S. invasion of the PRC in the Taiwan Strait. The deliberate war provocation of the United States seriously threatened peace in the Far East and the world. For a period of time a pall of gunpowder spread all across the Taiwan Strait, and the situation there was very serious.

In order to severely punish the reckless provocations of the Chiang gang and to puncture the arrogance of the United States in international affairs, and at the same time to indirectly counter the Soviet policy of toleration toward the West after Khrushchev assumed power, the Chinese Government ordered the PLA to start shelling Jinmen, Mazu, and other islands from 23 August 1958. On 25 October, it announced the shelling of these islands during odd-numbered days and a halt to shelling the other days. The shelling was so heavy and sudden that the United States was very flustered.

Eisenhower, Dulles, and many other U.S. high-ranking officials were also greatly alarmed. It was said that as they did not know much about our real strength; they could not even fall asleep well and felt quite restless. To deal with this situation, the United States moved more troops from its west coast and another fleet from the Mediterranean to the Taiwan Strait. Dulles said later that this had been the largest assemblage of forces in U.S. history. They had never before concentrated so many forces in a certain area. At that time, the United States had deployed in the Taiwan Strait 6 of its 12 aircraft carriers and other warships. In short, by desperately moving troops and deploying forces in this area, the United States meant to stop us from getting back Jinmen, Mazu and Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek was also dreadfully scared at that time and was ready to move to other places. As a matter of fact, one of his economic departments had already been moved to the countryside.

The CPC Central Committee and Chairman Mao paid close attention to the development of the situation, pondering the way to deal with it.

I was then Chinese ambassador to Warsaw. One day at the end of August, I received an urgent telegram from Zhang Hanfu, asking me to return to Beijing as soon as possible because there was something urgent to discuss with me. Many comrades were guessing what the urgent matter might be, and I thought it could possibly be something concerning the resumption of Sino-American talks.

I packed my simple luggage and rushed to Moscow at once. It so happened that there was no scheduled flight to Beijing that day, but fortunately Gromyko was just leaving Moscow for Beijing on the same day because of the Korean issue. So I returned to Beijing with him on his MIG plane and arrived that very evening.

Zhang Hanfu told me that Premier Zhou wanted me back because the Central Committee was going to discuss the question of struggle against the United States. He also said that Chairman Mao had considered this matter for a long time and had many new ideas. He wanted to discuss the matter with me. I was told to wait for further information.

Two days later I was informed that the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was going to hold a meeting, at which I would be asked to deliver a report on details of the previous stage of the Sino-U.S. talks at the ambassadorial level. I arrived at the Yiniantang of Zhongnanhai, where the meeting was being held. Chairman Mao and Comrades Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Zhang Wentian were all present at the meeting. Premier Zhou asked me to deliver the report first. This was the first time I had a chance to report on the Sino-U.S. talks in the Political Bureau and directly to Chairman Mao. I said that we were always in an active position during the talks because the truth was on our side and we did not fear the United States and needed no help from it. Chairman Mao smiled and chimed in with a question: We want to make Taiwan return to the motherland, so how can we say that we need no help from the United States? I replied: Taiwan has always been part of Chinese territory since ancient times. It is our territory. The United States has no right to occupy it and should return it to us rather than asking us to beg for its help. During the meeting I also answered a number of questions raised by some Political Bureau members about the Sino-U.S. talks. Finally, the meeting decided to appoint some people to draft a new plan for Sino-American talks. When the meeting was about to end, Chairman Mao clasped my hand and said excitedly: You have made a good speech; that was full of vigor. You have made good progress! Comrade Qiao Guanhua and other comrades who had attended the meeting also said: Your speech was really very good.

After the meeting the comrades working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to busy themselves in drafting the plan for restarting the Sino-U.S. talks in accordance with the decision of the CPC Central Committee.

As far as I can remember, Comrade Chen Yi was then in Shanghai and did not attend this meeting. Later he became Premier Zhou's assistant in handling affairs concerning the Sino-U.S. talks. Once he instructed me to formulate a principle to solve a "package" of problems as a whole, as those raised in the previous stage of the talks were difficult to solve separately. In other words, the principle was: Without a solution of the Taiwan issue, all other problems could not be discussed. Comrade Chen Yi's instruction was entirely correct when there was a tension in the Taiwan Strait. It expressed the firm stand of China on the Taiwan issue. No matter whether the United States would talk with us or would resort to force on this issue, the Chinese Government would never waver on this question of principle. Once when Comrade Chen Yi saw me, he also said with a sense of humor: "It is good that you have dealt with military affairs in literary ways!"

The CPC Central Committee and the people throughout the country showed great concern for the Sino-U.S. talks, and I was often encouraged and spurred on by this. I came back to China twice on leave in the more than 2 years I was holding talks with Johnson. Since quite a few colleagues, friends, and young men wanted to know something about the Sino-U.S. talks, and especially, some democratic party friends were eager to know some inside stories and facts about the talks, Premier Zhou instructed me to deliver a report on Sino-U.S. talks to the CPPCC. On that same day many people were sent by various ministries and commissions to listen to my report. I said something about our tit-for-tat struggle against the United States and the determination of the CPC Central Committee, which was really inspiring. Some old people from the democratic parties were quite satisfied with my report. They said: What we have learned from newspapers about the Sino-U.S. talks is very simple. We did not know that the struggle was so sharp and the talks were so complicated until we heard your report. They said excitedly: The Chinese people have stood up and are no longer afraid of the Yankees. The Sino-U.S. talks have boosted the morale of the Chinese people! During those days at home, I once again felt the determination of the CPC Central Committee and the feelings of the people.

On 6 September, Premier Zhou issued a statement. It pointed out that Taiwan and the Penghu Islands have always been China's territory since ancient times, reiterated China's determination to liberate these islands, and warned the United States that it would have to accept the consequences if it provoked a war. It also suggested that both the Chinese and U.S. Governments should sit down and talk, exchange envoys within a definite time, and resume the talks at the ambassadorial level, which had been interrupted by the United States unilaterally.

On the very same day, the U.S. Government said that it welcomed Premier Zhou's suggestions.

Before I went back to Warsaw, Chairman Mao had a talk with me, pointing out some matters to pay attention to during the Sino-U.S. talks. He said: During the talks with the Americans, you must try to use more methods to persuade them. For example, you may tell them that both the United States and China are big countries, so why should you act as the enemy of the 600 million Chinese people merely for such a small island as Taiwan, with a population of less than 10 million? What can you gain from this? He also said that in the talks it is necessary to think more, to be modest and prudent, and to pay attention not to use these stimulating expressions once used during the Panmunjon talks and not to hurt the national feelings of the Americans. Both the Chinese and American

peoples are great people. They should be friends. He told the comrades also present that when I returned to Warsaw, the XINHUA NEWS AGENCY would be authorized to send a dispatch, saying that Wang Bingnam had been back to China for consultations.

This time when I was back home, Premier Zhou also talked with me several times and offered some concrete and detailed instructions for my work. One week later, I returned to Warsaw, bringing with me new instructions and the spirit of the CPC Central Committee.

On the day I was to leave there was no scheduled flight. That very night, Premier Zhou made a phone call to certain comrades concerned, asking them to send a special plane to take me to Irkutsk. Then I returned to Warsaw on a Soviet plane. Before I left I received a letter from Premier Zhou, which was written by him personally:

Comrade Bingnan: I am presenting you a typescript (draft) of the main points for our statement. During the first round of talks, if the U.S. side is impatient to state its views, just let it speak first. According to Dulles' remarks today in an interview with reporters, this is quite possible. If the U.S. side puts forward the first plan and there is still room for further discussion, do not be in a hurry to produce our plan. Instead, it is necessary to make some comments on the absurd points of the U.S. plan first and reserve the rest to be replied to at the next meeting. If the U.S. side does not give concrete opinions and is eager to know our opinions, we can also use these main points and produce our predetermined plan.

If the first round of talks is merely for making arrangements on technical matters, during which both sides will just make ordinary contacts, then the first paragraph of these main points can be used as a draft for your speech in this talks. Please act according to your judgment. Zhou Enlai 9 September 1958

Under the pressure of world opinion, the U.S. Government was finally forced to appoint Jacob Beam the U.S. ambassador in Warsaw, as its representative to the restarted talks and to give up its demand of holding the talks in a third country. Another reason for this change in the U.S. attitude toward the place for the talks was the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The concession was made in emergency when it did not know the real strength of the Chinese side.

As Beam and I were both staying in Warsaw, the place for the talks was then shifted from Geneva to Warsaw. As we did not have to rush about between the two places, much time was saved. However there were still some difficulties in determining the exact meeting place.

Soon after I arrived in Warsaw, Beam gave me a phone call, informing me that he was ready to hold talks with me. I gave him a reply on 12 September, saying that I was ready to meet him on the 14th in the Chinese Embassy. He did not answer me right away. Obviously, he had to ask Dulles for instructions. Later, he replied that he could not come to the Chinese Embassy and suggested that the talks be held in the Swiss Embassy in Warsaw.

Dulles was setting up defenses at every step. The reason why he did not allow Beam to come to the Chinese Embassy was simply to prevent any form of recognition of the PRC in international affairs.

In view of this state of mind of the U.S. Government, I suggested that both sides could hold talks in each other's embassies in turn. But this was again refused by the

American side. So we had to ask the Polish Foreign Ministry to provide us with a meeting place. The Polish Foreign Ministry agreed with pleasure to provide us with a meeting place and selected the Mysliwicki Palace for our talks, which was situated in the urban area of Warsaw.

We were busy making preparations to deal with our new adversaries. I had more confidence and knew how to act this time, because in addition to my experience gained at the previous stage in the talks with Johnson, the CPC Central Committee and Chairman Mao had given me concrete instructions during my stay in Beijing. Moreover, at any time and in all places I could feel the concern and expectations of the motherland, the people, and the party, although they were a thousand miles away from me. RENMIN RIBAO carried an editorial, and the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also made a statement. Premier Zhou was looking at me and giving me instructions for what I said and did, as if he were with me all the time. Seriously and calmly, I awaited the coming of the struggle, the talks which were to be renewed soon.

The Talks Shift to Warsaw

On 15 September 1958, the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks began when the situation in the Taiwan Strait was extremely tense. My assistants were replaced by Huang Hua and Lai Yali. Sometimes Comrade Yao Guang also joined us. In addition to Qiu Yingjue, we had one additional interpreter, Guo Jiading. They were all very competent.

The conference room was decorated in a way that was simple but yet elaborate. Four large tables were put together to form a large rectangle. The two delegations sat face-to-face on the two sides of the rectangle. The delegation heads sat in the middle. To their left and right were their own advisers and interpreters. The talks formally began at 1500, when everything was ready.

The director of the Protocol Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry showed the delegations to their seats and Ambassador Beam and I nodded to each other.

Beam was an experienced professional diplomat. He was calm, sober, and clear-headed. He lacked Johnson's sense of humor and a smile did not easily come to his face. However, he had the style of a scholar and looked like a professor. Beam was still single then and he did not marry until he was well over 50. His wife was a very able woman and she was very active in social circles. Later, a friend who knew Beam told me that it was an extremely uninteresting experience to be seated next to Beam, and that the presence of his wife could offset his weaknesses. Before holding talks with me, Beam had held talks with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and he was supposed to be one experienced in dealing with the communists. Unlike the eloquent diplomats, Beam did not appear to be gifted with a silver tongue. However, I could hardly afford to underestimate him.

I asked Ambassador Beam to speak first. He began by asking China to stop its bombardment of Jinmen, Mazu, and other islands. He said that the United States acknowledged the protracted dispute between China and the United States over Taiwan and other nearby islands. However, it did not ask either side to give up their own opinions at this stage and that the United States aimed at ending those activities likely to be considered militarily provocative or else military activities would become more extensive. In a dull voice, he said that the common task for both China and the United States was to ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

His speech deliberately held China responsible for tension in the Taiwan Strait, and it obviously regarded the United States as the logical and legitimate occupant of Taiwan.

I was prepared for that. Thus, I calmly argued against his points. I pointed out that he had neither the right to speak for the Taiwan authorities nor the right to propose a cease-fire. I solemnly reiterated to my counterpart: Taiwan and the Penghu Islands are Chinese territory and the liberation of Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, Jinmen, and Mazu are China's internal affair. I also added that after recovering Jimen, Mazu, and the other islands, China would strive to liberate Taiwan and Penghu by peaceful means.

For some time after the beginning of the Warsaw talks the U.S. attitude toward Taiwan had remained unchanged and showed no sign of becoming more flexible. Thus, the talks became stylized again. Each time I spoke I began by reiterating the Chinese Government's stand on the Taiwan issue. I was of the opinion that if the United States did not abstain from interfering in China's internal affairs with respect to the Taiwan issue, China and the United States could not jointly settle any other problems.

On 30 September, at the 78th round of talks, Beam put forward a "draft declaration." Later, I learned that it had been meticulously drafted by Dulles. That was his last piece of "work" concerning the Sino-U.S. talks. The "draft declaration" began by stating in parallel the two countries' different views on the Taiwan issue and that China had Soviet support. Then the draft went on to say that China should promise to end its military operations against Jinmen. I did not give him a reply immediately. After studying the draft declaration thoroughly, we found nothing new in it. The United States was in fact using this "draft declaration" as a smokescreen to conceal its violation of China's sovereignty and its military operations in the Taiwan Strait.

So I flatly refused to accept this "draft declaration."

Thereafter the talks became monotonous. Beam and I held back. We were on guard against each other and we could not find a common language.

With the help of the Soviet Union, we had installed a direct telephone line connecting Beijing and Warsaw. Thus, Premier Zhou and I were in close contact. He always personally called me in order to give instructions and to remind me to pay attention to certain issues.

Now I can still remember the suspension of our shelling of Jinmen and Mazu on even-numbered days. Once we held a meeting on an even-numbered day by chance. Beam was glad about this and said that he hoped the shelling would be permanently suspended. I found this ridiculous and told him that it was our business whether the shelling was suspended or not, that the suspension of shelling and the Sino-U.S. talks were totally unrelated, and that we should discuss the question of the permanent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan at the talks!

Like Johnson, Beam did not attack people with harsh remarks. However, he was a little dull and serious in speech and manner. Whenever he was excited, he spoke with a slight stutter. However, he was not quite so rigid, and one could get acquainted with him more easily.

When the situation in the Taiwan Strait became tense, we were quite indifferent to each other and we rarely came into private contact.

At the end of 1959, Dulles, who stubbornly opposed New China and who did not want to change anything in his China policy, left office. However, Herter, the new state secretary, brought nothing new either.

In March 1960 James Edward Walsh, an American disguised as a Roman Catholic bishop, was arrested by our judicial organs and sentenced to death for espionage and his attempt to subvert the Chinese Government. On 22 March, I informed Ambassador Beam of this at our meeting. He was surprised at first. Then he lodged a protest. I rejected the protest and stated the serious crimes committed by Walsh. I said that there was ample evidence that Walsh had committed the crimes, that he could not deny the charge, and that it was China, not the United States, that had the right to lodge a protest.

During the Warsaw talks the United States never diverted their attention from the question of American criminals in China. At almost all the meetings they unjustifiably asked the Chinese Government to release those criminals. I rejected their request as a matter of course.

The 100th Round of Talks

The 100th round of the Sino-U.S. talks was held on 6 September 1960. I thought that in order for the talks to make progress in the future and for people to understand why no progress had been made in the talks, each of us should make a summary speech.

I first pointed out that throughout the 100 rounds of talks over the past 5 years, China had always negotiated with the United States on the basis of the principle of settling disputes through negotiations. However, I said, the United States had no sincerity whatsoever about settling the disputes and it is continuing to make the situation in the Taiwan area even more tense.

After that I said that since China and the United States began discussing the second item on the agenda, that is, those practical problems over which there were disputes between China and the United States, no satisfactory progress had been made. Although China had always adopted a positive attitude, made great efforts, and successively put forward 10 reasonable proposals in the hope that the tension in the Taiwan area could be eased and that Sino-U.S. relations could improve, the United States had adopted a diametrically opposite attitude. On the one hand the United States deliberately misinterpreted the agreement on the return of nationals of the two countries to their own countries by obstinately considering the agreement to be applicable to those Americans who had committed serious crimes in China and by asking China to unconditionally release them. On the other hand, the United States violated the agreement by not allowing Chinese in the United States to return to China.

In addition, the United States refused to abstain from using force against China or to withdraw all its Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

The efforts to ease and remove tension in the Taiwan area, I said emphatically, are the key to the Sino-U.S. talks as well as a touchstone for determining sincerity about holding the talks. In order to permanently occupy Taiwan, the U.S. Government has gone as far as to call Chiang Kai-shek's regime China's "legitimate government" and to deliberately interpret the U.S. invasion and occupation of Taiwan as a "treaty obligation" stipulated in a treaty concluded with the Chiang Kai-shek clique. Its conspiracy to create "two Chinas" and to turn Taiwan into a U.S. colony has become known to the whole world.

I pointed out some concrete facts: In the fall of 1958, the United States assembled the largest armed force up to that time in the Taiwan Strait in order to challenge and provoke the Chinese people; in the summer of 1960, President Eisenhower personally visited Taiwan in order to show hostility to the Chinese people, and U.S. military

aircraft and naval vessels kept intruding into China's territorial airspace and territorial waters. Not long ago the United States sent cruisers, submarines, and aircraft armed with nuclear weapons or capable of launching nuclear weapons to the Far East in order to openly pose a nuclear threat to China.

The facts were there. Beam felt rather uneasy when I came to that part of my speech. He sat there without uttering a word. He wanted to say something and yet he could find nothing to say.

I said, Mr Ambassador, you should know that those who play with fire will get burned in the end.

At that moment I felt that I was standing in front of the people of the whole world, and I had an urge to unreservedly expose the aggressive nature of the U.S. Government. I thought that otherwise I could not give full expression to the 600 million Chinese people's efforts, struggle, and aspirations over the past 5 years.

The disputes between China and the United States, I continued, cannot be settled by relying on the efforts made by China and nothing else, and it is now time you seriously reconsidered your approach to the Sino-U.S. talks and, in particular, the withdrawal of all U.S. Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. You had better consider this and leave at an early date. By doing this, you can extricate yourself earlier.

When I was delivering my impassioned speech, Beam remained silent. After listening to my speech, apart from showing disappointment, he could not forcefully refute me and he looked quite embarrassed.

After that, I put forward a new proposal on the exchange of Chinese and American reporters and correspondents. As far as China is concerned, said I, the purpose of exchanging Chinese and American reporters and correspondents is to clear up misunderstandings between the peoples of China and the United States, to initially improve the cold and stiff relations between the two countries, and to enable the two countries to settle, by peaceful means and on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the problem of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

The sensitive nerve of the U.S. Government could not bear this. As usual, the new proposal was not accepted.

On 8 September, RENMIN RIBAO especially published an editorial entitled "The 100th Round of the Sino-U.S. Talks" in order to back up my speech at the 100th round of talks. Comrades at home enthusiastically read the article and the peace-loving people praised the Chinese Government for its correct stand.

The New Tricks of John Fitzgerald Kennedy

At the end of 1960 there was a presidential election in the United States. During the election debates between John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Richard Milhous Nixon, it seemed that both concentrated their attention on the issue of Jinmen

and Mazhu and regarded it as a major issue. They both expressed the will to unswervingly support the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan.

After Kennedy took office, the United States launched an overbearing offensive all over the world. At the "20th Congress" of the CPSU, the Soviet Union entirely negated Stalin, and there was a serious difference between the CPSU and the CPC. This difference gradually came out in the open. The international environment around China was being aggravated day by day.

Because of China's mistake of the Great Leap Forward; because of serious natural disaster; and because the Soviet Union broke its contracts with China, withdrew its experts, and stopped its economic aid, the Chinese mainland was encountering serious economic difficulties. Talks at that time made no progress at all, like a huge unmovable rock.

Three months after Kennedy took office, I held talks with Beam in Warsaw.

Of course, I did not place any extravagant hopes in the Kennedy administration, but thinking about the positive side of the event, I expressed to Beam the hope that Kennedy would not stick to his predecessors' hopeless old policies and would be able to achieve something in developing Sino-U.S. relations.

After a few rounds of talks, Kennedy showed that he was no different from his predecessors. The U.S. side continued to pester us with the problem of repatriating civilians and continued to raise the old demand for both sides to refrain from resorting to arms in resolving the Taiwan issue.

Kennedy also invented a few new tricks. For example, he made a comprehensive proposal to us on exchanging reporters, but, regarding the concrete method for doing so, he impeded those Americans invited by us from visiting China. He proposed selling grain to China on preferential terms and donating relief packages to the poor in China. I thought that Kennedy was a bit naive, or even childish, to think that he could induce us to make concessions on such a major issue as the Taiwan issue by a few economic steps. I solemnly rejected his proposal. I said that New China was undergoing a period of serious difficulties, but China had a vast territory and rich resources, the Chinese people were hardworking and brave, and we were confident in our ability to overcome these difficulties by relying on our own strength. I also said that the Chinese people would never live on other people's alms; even less would we barter away principles.

Despite the failure to make any progress in the conference rooms, we continued to make efforts to have private contacts with Beam. Sometimes we invited him to tea and talked with him about the Laotian issue. During the Berlin crisis, I invited him to our embassy and asked him a series of questions. During these meetings, we would unavoidably mention the Taiwan issue, but we did so simply as a topic of discussion and with relatively mild language. None of us ever gave up the principle and stand of our respective governments.

In late September of 1961, Beam received an order to return to the United States to be transferred to the job of deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. When Beam left, my counterpart was again changed.

It was said that when the United States chose its ambassador to Warsaw, instead of considering whether the candidate was familiar with things related to Poland, it first

considered whether he was familiar with the China issue, for this ambassador would have to conduct talks with the Chinese ambassador there. Cabot, who succeeded Beam as U.S. ambassador to Warsaw, was chosen precisely because he had had the experience of being U.S. consul general in Shanghai. Therefore, it was natural that he be appointed to the post.

A New Development

In March of 1983, I continued the talks with Ambassador Cabot. Cabot was very different from his two predecessors. He had 36 years of experience in diplomatic work, had been consul general in Shanghai, was kind and gentle, and was U.S. ambassador to Brazil before he came to Warsaw, but he did not display any outstanding diplomatic ability.

It was not until I met him in Boston in 1979, that I learned that he was one of the two most wealthy people in Boston. The other was Henry Cabot Lodge who was once U.S. ambassador to Vietnam. People in Boston had a saying: Local people talk to the Lodges, the Lodges talk to the Cabots, and the Cabots talk only to God. This meant that Cabot was richer than Lodge and he was able to buy over God.

Cabot accorded me a grand reception in Boston. He felt uneasy about his unfriendly speeches toward China in the past, and he wanted to visit China again, but he was afraid that he would not be welcome. His wife kept making negative comments at his side, saying China would not allow a man like him to visit again. When I heard this, I said that all of this had happened in the past and it was of no use to bring it up again now. Therefore, I immediately invited him and his wife to visit China, which made them very happy. Later, they were busy making preparations for the visit.

In 1982, Cabot wrote a special letter informing me of his decision to visit China on a certain date and expressing his appreciation for my invitation. Unfortunately, shortly before he set out for the visit, he died of sudden heart trouble. At the time of the talks between us in 1962, he was over 50 years old, was careless about his speeches, and did not hold to diplomatic etiquette. We often joked. I remember that once he said, laughing, that the CPC had to thank the United States. Did you see lots of U.S. equipment when you reviewed your troops after your victory? The equipment was supplied to you by Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, you called Chiang chief of the transportation team who sent you these weapons without even asking for a receipt.

At that time, the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan took advantage of the serious natural disasters in our country and once more launched a wanton campaign to attack the mainland. The situation was unprecedentedly tense on the Fujian frontline where war clouds were gathering. According to the intelligence we gathered at that time, Chiang Kai-shek was purchasing large numbers of new-style weapons and refitting his airplanes to increase their fuel capacity so that they could fly between Taiwan and the mainland. The Chiang Kai-shek clique also announced the lengthening of the term of military service, forbidding its soldiers to leave their barracks and telling them to be ready for orders at any time. It had their shoes and belts carved with the words "Recover the mainland." It was said that it purchased a large amount of blood plasma from Japan. It seemed that Chiang Kai-shek planned to make a reckless move and would madly attempt to fight a desperate war with the mainland.

At the end of May 1962, I was on leave in China. One day the premier made a personal appointment to talk with me. He said that Chiang Kai-shek thought that it was a good opportunity to attack the mainland now because externally the CPC was on bad terms with the Soviet Union, and at home on the mainland there were serious natural disasters.

Chiang thought that this was one chance in 1,000 years and had made up his mind to make an all-out effort. Regarding the military situation, he told me to talk with Luo Ruiqing, chief of the PLA General Staff. I immediately called Luo to make an appointment with him. Luo asked me to go the office of the PLA General Staff Headquarters to talk with him. He told me many things related to the situation. He drew aside the curtain in front of a large map on the wall and pointed out to me the military deployment of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. He said that it was not a question of whether there would be a war, but a question of how we were to fight the war, that is, the question of whether we had to repel the enemy before they reached our coast or had to induce the enemy to go deep into our hinterland. We discussed these two strategies. When I was informed, I thought that the situation was indeed very serious.

On another occasion, the premier urgently wanted to have a talk with me. He told me to immediately wind up my leave and return to Warsaw. He said that after careful study, the CPC Central Committee believed that Chiang Kai-shek was very determined to attack and return to the mainland, but Chiang still faced some difficulties, and that the key question now was the attitude of the United States and whether or not the United States supported Chiang. We had to strive to make the United States stop Chiang Kai-shek's military action of launching a counterattack at the mainland. The premier gave me the instruction that we had to find an opportunity as soon as possible through talks to learn the attitude of the United States. I was aware of the vital importance of this task, which could not be neglected to the least degree. Therefore, I soon headed back to Warsaw and within the time set by our government authorities, contacted Cabot and made an appointment to have an interview with him. On the day we were to meet, our government sent me a telegram telling me to postpone the formal talks on the excuse of being sick. Therefore, for a few days I dared not go out of the gate of our embassy. Later, I learned the reason for the postponement: At home we were concentrating forces on the frontline in Fijian, but as there was heavy rain in the south, which had flooded some important bridges, the concentration of troops was delayed.

Later, following an instruction from home, I again broached the subject of a meeting with Cabot. In order to talk freely, I proposed informal talks. On 23 June, I invited Cabot to tea in my official residence to have a chat with him. Cabot came at my invitation.

As usual, Cabot did not hold to etiquette, and looked untidy. He talked and laughed while having tea. First, I talked about the situation in Southeast Asia. I said that the Chinese Government was worried about the development of the situation in Southeast Asia. Since the beginning of that year, the United States had sent additional troops to Vietnam, sent troops to Thailand, and stepped up its intervention in Laos, and had thus pushed the situation in Southeast Asia to the verge of a large-scale international conflict that could take place at any time. The Chinese Government had always adopted an attitude of restraint. Although Chiang Kai-shek's remnant troops were taking part in the Laotian civil war, and although China was suffering an increasingly growing threat to its security, it did not abandon its effort to achieve a peaceful solution of the Laotian issue or its attempt to ease the tension in Indochina and in the whole Southeast Asian region on the basis of noninterference in the internal affairs of the countries concerned. However, the key to the question of whether the tension could be eased was not in China's hands.

Then I emphatically said that the Chinese Government also wanted the U.S. Government to notice the tension in the Taiwan Strait. At this, Cabot suddenly turned serious and listened very carefully.

With emphasis, I said that the U.S. Government was entirely clear about the fact that the Chiang Kai-shek clique was making preparations to attack the coastal areas of the Chinese mainland and that this preparatory work was precisely carried out with the support, encouragement, and coordination of the United States. Since last February, the Chiang Kai-shek clique had begun to mobilize and deploy its military forces for an attack on the coastal area of the Chinese mainland. It had recruited soldiers ahead of schedule, lengthened the service term for its soldiers, and so on, and had thus made preparations for crossing the sea and forcing a landing. With the participation and coordination of the United States, the Chiang Kai-shek clique had frequently carried out landing maneuvers with live ammunition and frequently conducted activities to reconnoiter the coastal areas of the Chinese mainland.

The United States encouraged and praised Chiang Kai-shek for its preparations to attack the mainland. The U.S. Government had increased its "military aid" and "economic aid" to Chiang Kai-shek. Obviously, the United States wishfully thought that it had to support and encourage Chiang Kai-shek to undertake military adventures and that no matter what the outcome, it would get the benefit of dealing a blow to and further controlling Taiwan. With the support and encouragement of the United States, the Chiang Kai-shek regime was eager to try.

When I stressed the U.S. Government's role in backing Chiang Kai-shek's preparations for a counterattack on the Chinese mainland, Cabot looked a little nervous. Therefore, I went on to say that the Chinese people had dealt with Chiang Kai-shek for decades and knew how to deal with him. The Chinese Government had to point out that the U.S. Government was playing with fire, that once Chiang Kai-shek launched a war against the mainland it would not result in anything good for the United States, and that the U.S. Government had to shoulder full responsibility for Chiang Kai-shek's adventurous actions and for all the serious consequences of his adventures.

Finally, in a tone of warning, I said that I was sure that the day when Chiang Kai-shek attacked the mainland would be the date when the Chinese people liberated Taiwan. In view of the serious nature of the situation, I asked him to immediately inform the U.S. Government of the above situation. There was an interval of silence after Cabot heard my words. Then he expressed his appreciation of my frankness and said that he would inform the U.S. Government by telegram of what I had said.

He straightforwardly said that under the present situation, the United States would never support Chiang Kai-shek in launching a counterattack on the mainland. Chiang Kai-shek had undertaken the obligation to the United States that without the consent of the United States, it would not launch an attack on the Chinese mainland.

He said: I pledge to Your Excellency the Ambassador that we by no means want a world war and will make every effort to prevent such a war. Later, he time and again repeated this pledge. When he left, he even said that if Chiang Kai-shek wanted to act, we had to make joint efforts to stop him.

When I heard Cabot clearly declare his hand, I was aware that I had attained my aim. I could not help but feel relaxed. The United States had already made its attitude very clear and this was precisely what we urgently wanted to know. It had a direct bearing on the CPC Central Committee in arranging the strategic deployment on the Fujian front-line. Without any delay, I reported to the government at home what Cabot said. Later, some leading comrades of the CPC Central Committee expressed their great satisfaction for the information I had obtained in a timely manner about the attitude of the United

States. At that time, that information had a great impact on policy decisions at home. Later, I carried out more than 10 rounds of talks with Cabot. The talks did not bring about any results on the essential problems of Sino-U.S. relations.

Returning Home on Orders

I was instructed to return to China in 1964 to take up the post of vice foreign minister. The Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks continued intermittently in Warsaw between Wang Guoquan, who succeeded me, and the U.S. ambassador.

The Sino-U.S. talks at ambassadorial level came to a conclusion in February 1972 due to Nixon's visit to China, which effected a radical change in the situation. Consequently, this ended an important stage in the history of Sino-U.S. relations.

In the talks, which lasted for many years, aside from the issue of repatriation, no agreements were reached between the two sides on substantive issues involving Sino-U.S. relations.

With regard to this point, the press spokesman of China's Foreign Ministry explained the following in a speech made on 26 November 1968 on the date of the 135th round of talks: The Chinese Government has all along adhered to two principles at the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks. First, that the U.S. Government guarantee the immediate withdrawal of all its Armed Forces from China's territory, Taiwan Province, and the Taiwan Strait and removal of all its military facilities from Taiwan; second, that the U.S. Government agree to the signing of an agreement between China and the United States on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. However, over the past 13 years, the U.S. Government has refused to reach an agreement with the Chinese Government on the two principles, but has tried over and over again to quibble over side issues. The Chinese Government has repeatedly stated that it will never barter away principles. If the U.S. side continues to adopt such an attitude, the Sino-U.S. talks will produce no results, no matter what administration assumes power in the United States.

The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was further intensified in the early 1970's. As the PRC grew stronger day by day, the United States had to revise its global strategy and adopt corresponding measures to improve its policy toward China.

At the repatriation of Premier Zhou Enlai, Nixon, who was elected President of the United States in 1969, paid a visit to China in February 1972 and signed the famous Shanghai joint communiqué, thus effecting a genuine breakthrough in the substantive issues involved in the Sino-U.S. talks. Diplomatic relations were established between China and the United States on 1 January 1979, 30 years after the founding of New China. The Carter administration declared the severance of its "diplomatic relations" with Taiwan. Following the exchange of ambassadors on 1 March, the U.S. Government withdrew its troops stationed in Taiwan in April. On 1 January 1980, the U.S. Government officially declared the termination of the U.S.-Taiwan "joint defense treaty."

The issues of principle repeatedly emphasized by Premier Zhou Enlai at the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks and the position of the Chinese Government on the Taiwan issue again and again stated by me in the 9 years and by Comrade Wang Guoquan in the following 6 years of the talks were at last recognized by the U.S. Government. Although this question is still an obstacle to the development of Sino-U.S. relations and the U.S. Government is still trying to create side issues, the historical trend will, after all, surge forward. A new epoch is approaching and history has proved that it is irresistible.

Having finished my memoirs, I put aside the writings and got lost in deep thought. I was overcome with emotion and could not remain calm.

The people of our generation, represented by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other outstanding figures, have shed blood and we have left our footprints on the tortuous road of Chinese revolution. Future generations will evaluate our achievements and errors. What conclusion, then, should we leave for the future generations?

In my opinion, the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks were an original creation of New China's diplomacy under specific conditions. It provided for the two big nations, which were mutually confronted, a channel to contact each other. Although the two countries did not recognize each other, they maintained a speaking relationship. Although they did not have diplomatic relations, they sent ambassadors to hold long-term talks. Both sides also reached certain kinds of agreements, namely an agreed-upon statement, a new form of statement in which each party stated its own position. This was also a new development in the history of international relations. At that time the new development played the role of indicating China's position and attitude as well as carrying out struggles and negotiations directly with the United States. As far as I can remember, in the late 1950's and early 1960's, when U.S. airplanes or warships intruded into China's airspace or waters, I lodged protests at the talks and then the U.S. side immediately replied: The matter will be investigated. The U.S. side also stated time and again that although it did not recognize China's 12-nautical-mile territorial waters, its warships would not enter the 12-nautical-mile area.

When the United States sent troops to Vietnam, I directly lodged a protest with the U.S. representative at the talks and indicated China's position. Therefore, we can say that the ambassadorial talks were in a sense the relations between the two countries under the specific conditions of the time. In certain respects, the contacts between China and the United States were more frequent than contacts between countries with diplomatic relations. If there had been no ambassadorial talks, it would have been rather difficult for us to find an occasion to express our views. When a major event took place in the international arena, both China and the United States could express their views and positions at the ambassadorial talks; thus each side knew the attitude and methods adopted by the other. As a result, the two countries knew each other very well even though they had no diplomatic relations. Herein lies the significance of the 15-year Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks.

My 9-year experience in the Sino-U.S. talks was also the period in which Premier Zhou Enlai displayed his talent in China's diplomacy, which was full of creativity, vitality, and distinguishing features. Sticking to principles and never wavering in the slightest degree, he adopted flexible strategies with courtesy, good reason, and restraint. In addition, he was also broad-minded. He established a new style for China's diplomacy, which combined the firmness of principle with the flexibility of strategy. Through his brilliant display in international activities, he became an outstanding diplomat of the communist party. Without Premier Zhou Enlai's wisdom and talent and without the 15-year Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks, it would have been impossible for the United States to establish diplomatic relations with China on the basis of recognizing Taiwan as its sacred territory. These are our contributions to China's diplomatic cause.

Times have changed, but the mark of history is still stamped on the wheels of the new era. The U.S. Government has not yet given up the Taiwan issue and it is still playing with the "Taiwan Relations Act." The question of Taiwan still exists though the form and extent of its expression has changed greatly.

Having dealt with the U.S. Government for so many years, I would like to offer the following advice: The U.S. Government should not try to make use of the Taiwan issue to follow the beaten track of harming Sino-U.S. relations. History will never turn backwards. The Chinese people will never forsake their principles, either. History has already drawn a conclusion and the lesson learned from this issue should be remembered.

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
China Report

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NINE YEARS OF SINO-U.S. TALKS

IN RETROSPECT

MEMOIRS OF WANG BINGNAN



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7 August 1985

CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
NINE YEARS OF SINO-U.S. TALKS IN RETROSPECT
MEMOIRS OF WANG BINGNAN

Guangzhou GUANGZHOU RIBAO in Chinese intermittently between 29 Sep 84-3 Feb 85; Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI [WORLD KNOWLEDGE] in Chinese No 4-No 8, 1985

[Memoirs "The Nine-Year Sino-U.S. Talks in Retrospect" by Wang Bingnan was published simultaneously in SHIJIE ZHISHI [WORLD KNOWLEDGE] and GUANGZHOU RIBAO]

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PREFACE

[Text]

In 1979 I flew over the Pacific Ocean to make my first trip to the United States. This trip was of special significance to me, especially because during this trip I was to meet my three counterparts at the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks which had caused a sensation throughout the world 20-odd years ago. They were U. Alexis Johnson, Jacob D. Beam, and John M. Cabot. All three were retired, having left diplomatic service. Living their remaining years in ease and comfort, they had already written their own memoirs and participated in research on various academic matters. When we firmly shook hands, looking closely at the changes in each other and smiling, none of us could contain our excitement. Past events seemed to have happened only yesterday and were impressively real to us. We had all experienced the special talks and struggles in the history of Sino-U.S. relations. Although the talks have become a part of history, they still left us with a feeling that "this kind of thing is truly over."

We all -- these three who were the negotiators on the U.S. side, and I, the negotiator on the Chinese side -- agreed that what has been achieved in Sino-U.S. relations today is not unconnected with the previous Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks and the role they played. It was out of just this sentiment that they received me cordially, like an old friend. Beam invited me to be a guest in his home and Johnson gave a banquet to entertain me in a high-class club in Washington, where host and guest toasted each other repeatedly, recalling the past and comparing it to the present. When I arrived in Boston, Cabot gave me an especially grand banquet in his luxurious garden home facing the Atlantic Ocean and invited all the celebrities in Boston to attend a gala banquet. The whole banquet was full of friendly sentiments and warmth. As we recalled the events of those years and spoke glowingly of present and future Sino-U.S. contacts, all sorts of feelings welled up in our minds. Who would have imagined that the two opponents crossing verbal swords at the conference table would be talking cheerfully and humorously now at the banquet table?

The Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks started in 1955 and adjourned in 1970, lasting 15 years with a total of 136 rounds. The duration, number of rounds, and intensity of the talks were the sort of activity seen in modern international relations. As the first PRC negotiator at the talks, I participated in the talks for 9 years from their beginning to 1964. It was precisely during this period that the U.S. authorities were extremely hostile to China, and China and the United States were in a state of mutual isolation and antagonism. I first dealt with Johnson, then with Beam, and last with Cabot. In those years, when we knew each other as opponents in the talks, we were in the prime of life and held important posts respectively in our own government departments with enterprising spirits, but getting together again now, we were already in our sixties. After nearly 30 years of trials and hardships, the whole world has undergone enormous shifts and taken on a greatly changed face.

After going through various situations, there was a turn in the tide of events in Sino-U.S. relations and the two countries eventually entered a new historical stage of establishing and developing diplomatic relations. It is precisely this change that stirred my memories and led me to write of the complicated, tortuous, and extraordinary Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks. History is always reference book of practical value. Reviewing past events may help people, young people in particular, understand that the road taken to normalize Sino-U.S. relations was rough and bumpy and also understand that the friendly contacts between the peoples of China and the United States of the present did not come easily, but are the result of the endeavors of a generation.

I hope this will also help people understand current Sino-U.S. relations and the Taiwan question, which has hindered to this day the further development of Sino-U.S. relations.

I begin my memoirs with the illustrious name of Zhou Enlai. He was the leader and commander in the struggle during the 15 years of talks and also the leader for whom I have the greatest respect. I worked under his direct leadership for 30 years. Long ago he said: Both China and the United States are big countries. It is unwise for us not to have contacts with the United States, and if there are to be contacts, there must be channels. The Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks were precisely such a channel. In a situation in which China and the United States had no diplomatic relations, the two countries promoted mutual understanding and discovered each other's true intentions through this channel.

There have been numerous comments from the world community on these marathon talks. Each of my negotiating counterparts has also published his memoirs. It is said that some high-ranking officials among the Taiwan authorities have gone over the whole transcript of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks in the United States and had to acknowledge that during the whole talks process, the PRC negotiators did adhere to principle.

CHAPTER I. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

Two Major Topics for Discussion

My reminiscences will begin with the proposal for the talks, and date back to an international conference held in Geneva, Switzerland on 26 April 1954. This conference is known to history as the Geneva Conference. It should be said that the prologue to the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks began with the Geneva Conference.

The Korean war -- a great conflict with China and Korea on one side and the United States on the other -- had just ended. The United States, through its defeat, came to realize New China's strength. Eisenhower, who had just come to power, was in a hurry to relieve the United States from its passive position in Asia and our party had greatly eliminated the social foundations of imperialism in China -- the counterrevolutionary forces and the ideas of worshipping, dreading, and fawning on the United States. Chairman Mao said that it was necessary "to clean house before inviting guests in," and the new period of unfolding work in foreign affairs in an all-round manner had arrived. On the other hand, of course, the United States did not resign itself to defeat; and since it had lost China, it turned Japan into its major strategic base in the East, armed Taiwan, established a foothold in Vietnam, and increased its control over other Asian countries. The United States established battlefields encircling the PRC in a planned way, simultaneously blocked China's entrance into the United Nations, and implemented an economic blockade against China in an attempt to create difficulties for New China's existence and development. However, the general situation in Asia was relaxed due to the Korean war truce. Therefore, the Soviet Union, at a foreign ministers conference in Berlin in February 1954 in which the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France participated, proposed that a conference be held in Geneva to seek a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue and to restore peace in Indochina. After struggles and talks the proposal was put into effect, with China attending the conference as one of the big five countries which also included the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Although the United States insisted on writing into the communique that China's participation in the conference did not imply U.S. diplomatic recognition of China, it was actually the first time China had taken part in an international conference as a big power since New China was founded, and it was also a turning point for New China's playing an important role in world affairs. Facts have proven that the United States was very much afraid of China's voice in world affairs; however, it could not stop New China from stepping into the international political arena, striding like a giant.

The party central committee attached great importance to this conference. On 19 April, the government of our country formally appointed Premier Zhou Enlai, concurrently minister of foreign affairs, as the chief representative of our delegation to the Geneva Conference. The other representatives were Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, and Li Kenong. At that time, I was serving as director of the General Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and I acted as the secretary general of the delegation, in charge of its administrative affairs. The central authorities instructed that, at the conference, we should "strengthen our diplomatic and international activities in order to counter the U.S. imperialist policies of blockade and embargo, arms expansion, and war preparations, and promote relaxation of the tense world situation." At the same time, we should do our utmost to reach some agreement, "so as to help open the road to solving international disputes through negotiations by the big powers."

In order to be successful at the conference, Premier Zhou exerted all his efforts and involved himself in every detail. It had not been long since the founding of New China, and it had met many difficulties in the world. Many countries dared not recognize China because of their lack of understanding or because they were subjected to pressure by the United States. Premier Zhou repeatedly instructed that it was necessary to open up a new situation in our country's diplomatic front through this conference, so that more countries would understand New China, and we should strive to establish diplomatic relations with them. At that time, the delegations of some countries were tremendously big, comprising a large number of people. We proposed to the premier that we too should send more people, including specialists and people of all circles, because this was the first time New China had participated in such an important international activity since its founding. On the one hand, this was because of the need to deal with work in all fields and would be helpful in making contacts in breadth and depth with the various countries participating in the conference; on the other hand, we could let more comrades go abroad in order to expand their vision and increase their experience in international struggles; at the same time, we could also demonstrate New China's strength in foreign affairs.

Premier Zhou entrusted me to make preparations for the delegation, to propose the delegation's personnel list, to draw up the regulations and discipline for the delegation, to prepare data on various issues involved in the conference, the uniforms, and so on. Here speaking of our clothing, in retrospect I find it very amusing. It was my opinion that the dress of the members of the Chinese delegation should be solemn and grave, so I selected some sort of black material, and had Chinese tunic suits made out of it for every member of the delegation. Later, when we appeared in those suits in the streets of Geneva, we found that passersby would stop, take off their hats, and salute us respectfully. We found out later that only priests wear black suits in Switzerland so many people had mistaken us for missionaries. That was a small incident, but it also showed that we had much to learn the first time we went out into the world.

Of course, the Swiss people were very friendly towards us, and would become warm and enthusiastic the moment they found out that we were the Chinese delegates. The open and clear smiling faces of the Swiss people and their friendly manner made a very good impression on us.

In order to do a good job in the conference, we made all kinds of preparations day and night. The data sent to me alone covered a whole floor. According to the premier's instructions, we were split into several groups according to specialities; several meetings were called and sometimes I had to talk with individuals, so I was very busy.

At that time, Huang Hua was the delegation's spokesman, while Gong Peng was in charge of the press. In order to deal with all kinds of questions at the scheduled press conference, we held a simulated press conference among ourselves. Everyone attending it posed questions, while the spokesman answered them to find out whether their answers were appropriate. The seething scene was most inspiring with everyone pooling his wisdom and efforts.

On the eve of our departure, Premier Zhou called a meeting of all delegation members. He pointed out that everyone, no matter what his position, should observe the regulations and discipline of the delegation and not violate them in any way. Premier Zhou himself was a model in setting an example. He also asked me to look for two capable chefs so we could invite guests to dinner and make friends during the conference.

I arrived in Geneva early with the advance party to arrange for the delegation's lodging and security and to find out about the final conference schedule and agenda. Geneva is a city in which international conferences are often held. The United States, the Soviet Union, and other big countries were hiring large villas there and even whole hotels. With the recommendation of some friendly people, we rented a large villa in the suburbs with a beautiful garden attached to it; we also reserved a whole floor of a hotel. Humorously, we called this villa "Huashan Villa." The landlord and landlady showed friendly feelings toward New China. In 1961, when Comrade Chen Yi led the Chinese delegation to attend the second Geneva Conference, they also stayed there.

On 20 April, the Chinese delegation headed by Premier Zhou left Beijing for Geneva via Moscow on a special plane.

On 24 April, the Chinese delegation and the Soviet Government delegation headed by Molotov arrived in Geneva in succession.

There was no grand welcoming ceremony at the airport; however, several hundred reporters were gathered around the Chinese delegation, vying for photographs. When Premier Zhou's agile body appeared at the door of the passenger compartment, there was ferment in the crowd, the reporters surged forward, and the dignified and graceful bearing and natural and unrestrained manner of the premier became the focus of the reporters' cameras. Since this was the first large delegation sent by New China, it was all the more conspicuous, and Premier Zhou became the central figure in the reports of Western press circles.

The Geneva Conference opened solemnly on 26 April in the League of Nations

Building (where the League of Nations was located after World War I). Many illustrious diplomats active in the international political arena at that time were at the conference, such as Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, British Foreign Secretary Eden, French External Relations Minister Bidault, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, Foreign Minister Nam Il of the DPRK and the representatives of South Korea and members of the "UN Forces" Australia, Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Greece, Luxembourg, Holland, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Turkey. The conference agreed that while discussing the Korean issue, the chief representatives of Thailand, the Soviet Union, and Britain would take turns presiding over the meeting day by day; and while discussing the Indo-China issue, the chief representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States will take turns presiding over the meeting.

The Geneva Conference was divided into two stages: The first stage, discussing the Korean issue, concluded on 15 June. A restricted meeting on the Indo-China issue was held at the second stage that began on 16 June. The conference closed on 21 July.

The confrontation between East and West was quite obvious throughout the Geneva Conference. The Soviet Union, China, Korea, and Vietnam, which represented one side, were closely united. They had frequent contacts outside the meeting and coordinated with each other at the meeting. Centering on many major and key issues, they waged a tit-for-tat struggle against the Western countries headed by the United States. The leaders of the delegations of the Soviet Union, China, Korea, and Vietnam frequently met at Molotov's residence to discuss and study problems occurring at the meeting and to exchange information and views and adopt countermeasures. The Soviet and Vietnamese comrades also came to our villa quite often to have conversations with Premier Zhou. At the conference, these delegations adopted identical stands and attitudes.

With regard to the Korean issue, the Military Demarcation Line was already settled and the further problem was to ensure our political power. Comrade Nam Il of Korea spoke at the meeting on 27 April. In light of the scheme prepared beforehand, he put forward an overall proposal for solving the Korean issue, which included the following: withdrawal of foreign troops within 6 months, free elections nationwide, and resumption of Korea's peaceful reunification.

Dulles, secretary of state and head of the U.S. delegation took the floor on the second day. Dulles was also a conspicuous figure at the conference. He was of medium height. With a pair of glasses, he looked stern and grim. He spoke insolently and attacked the stand of Korea, China, and the Soviet Union on the Korean issue. His language was vilifying and his attitude arrogant. The essence of this speech was that the United States was attempting to permanently occupy South Korea and realize the so-called resolution of the United Nations on unifying Korea.

Premier Zhou also delivered a speech at that conference. After listening to Dulles' speech, he immediately added a long passage to his original draft to refute Dulles' speech. He delivered this passage sternly with a sense of justice and dignity. Premier Zhou solemnly stated his support of the proposal put forward by the DPRK for national unification, condemned the U.S. act of aggression over Korea, and called for checking the U.S. act of aggression. He called on Asian countries to carry out consultations with each other and make concerted efforts to safeguard peace and security in Asia; called on all European countries to safeguard security in Europe on the basis of collective efforts; and called for universal disarmament, a halt in arms expansion, and prohibition in the use of A-bombs, H-bombs, and other large-scale devastating weapons. He also expressed regret at the fact that India, Indonesia, Burma, and other countries could not attend the conference. Later he specifically proposed a discussion at the restricted meeting attended by five big powers and North and South Korea.

Premier Zhou's speech was very successful, which indicated the clear-cut stand and sincere attitude of the PRC for actively solving problems. His speech won the acclaim of a number of countries' representatives.

However, the United States did not have any sincerity in the discussion of the Korean issue from the very beginning and was simply not willing to take a step forward on the issue. Owing to the stubborn attitude of the United States, the conference could not reach any agreement for a long time. Nevertheless, the struggle was still extremely acute and complicated and the task of the discussion was arduous. Seeing that no fruitful results were to be achieved on the Korean issue, Premier Zhou held that instead of winding up the matter there should be room for discussing the issue after the meeting. For this reason, he pointed out at the final meeting: The countries attending the Geneva Conference "will, on the basis of establishing a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, continue to make efforts to reach an agreement on peacefully solving

the Korean issue." He also proposed that the countries concerned should further consult the suitable time and place for resuming the talks. As the proposal was fair and reasonable and no one raised an objection at the meeting, the U.S. representatives appeared personally and refused to accept the proposal.

Due to the obstructions caused by the U.S. delegation, the discussion on the Korean issue, which lasted 51 days, closed without reaching any agreement.

The discussion on the issue of Indochina was more complicated than the issue of Korea. In about 1946, France staged a colonial invasion of Vietnam and Laos. The three Indochinese nations formed their own Indochinese united army to heroically resist the French. When the Geneva Conference was held, Laos and Kampuchea had not been separated from the united army, and had not organized their own independent armed resistance forces. Under the leadership of Comrade Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese people launched an 8-year nationwide war of resistance. However, their victory hung in the balance. The Indochinese war, which had been fought for many years, directly involved the interests of various Southeast Asian countries and had a bearing on the situation in the region. Due to the fact that the war dragged on for such a long time, France encountered economic and political difficulties. It intended to extricate itself from Indochina. However, the United States intended to seize the opportunity to step in. The situation was complicated. Under such circumstances, at the initial stage of the Geneva Conference, Vietnam won a great victory at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May. This greatly changed the situation. When the news poured in, people inside and outside the Geneva Conference Hall were shocked. People on our side ran around spreading the news. We were greatly encouraged, and had more confidence in solving the problem of Indochina.

However, the French Government looked utterly wretched, and flags were flown at half-mast at home. Bidault returned to Paris hurriedly because of this. The news that France's Lanier Government had taken from power once again shook the Geneva Conference. In addition, the United States was isolated at the conference, and France no longer wanted to completely follow the United States. Therefore, there was a possibility of reaching an agreement on the issue of Indochina.

At present, with the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations, a slander has been spread by Vietnam that the Chinese delegation "sold out" the interests of the Indochinese people, the Vietnamese people in particular. I was a participant of the Geneva Conference, and one of the witnesses who saw with his own eyes what was going on at that time. I know that this is a venomous attack and slander that flies in the face of facts. As I have already stated, when the conference was being held, the Soviet Union, China, Korea, and Vietnam closely cooperated with each other. At the discussion on the issue of Indochina, the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam united as one to carry out a resolute struggle against the United States and France while patiently holding the talks. At that time, the strategy, tactics, plans, countermeasures, and others were all defined after discussions by the three parties. Instructed by Premier Zhou, I met Pham Van Dong very often. I contracted him on several occasions to exchange information and views. To guard against listening devices installed by the other side, when we talked in a lavatory, we always turned on the water tap. Does Mr Pham Van Dong still remember this?

The crucial question of the Indochinese issue the delimitation of the Vietnamese-French temporary military demarcation line. At that time, some people in Vietnam hoped that they would unify Vietnam at one gulp. However, judging from the relative

strength of both sides, we realized that it is actually impossible to do so. When meeting Chairman Mao in October 1965, Premier Pham Van Dong also said: "The battle of Dien Bien Phu only liberated half of our territory." Therefore, through the discussions outside the conference, the Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese sides unanimously maintained that delimiting a line between the North and the South was the most appropriate way to gain an integrated base north of the 16th Parallel and consolidate the North. Therefore, when the Geneva Conference stood adjourned, Premier Zhou went to Liuzhou on 3-5 July to meet and have a detailed discussion with Chairman Ho Chi Minh, who was on vacation in the city. Chairman Ho Chi Minh completely agreed with the plan of delimiting a line between the North and the South, and expected that the other side would at most concede territory to the 17th Parallel. In such a way, Vietnam eventually accepted at the conference the proposal of delimiting a temporary military demarcation line at 17 degrees north latitude, and a clause contained in the agreement explicitly stipulating the unification of Vietnam would be realized within 2 years through general elections.

At last, all the participating nations reached an agreement, adopting specific methods for ending the Indochinese war, and working out principles for solving the political problems of Indochina. According to these principles, France would respect the independence, territorial integrity, and unity of the three Indochinese nations. After the armistice, the three Indochinese nations would not join any alliance, and no foreign power would be allowed to establish any military bases on the territory of those countries.

After the Geneva Conference, Chairman Ho issued a statement: "At the Geneva Conference, thanks to the help of the delegations of the Soviet Union and the PRC, our delegation struggled hard to win a great victory for us. The French Government has recognized our independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, and has agreed to withdraw the French Armed Forces and others from our territory."

In 1960, the Third Congress of the Vietnam Workers Party adopted a resolution: "We have won a victory in signing the Geneva Agreement and restoring peace to Indochina," "the North has been fully liberated, and the revolution in Vietnam has entered a new stage." The Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party also sent a message to the CPC Central Committee, expressing its "heartfelt thanks" to the Chinese side for its help in the "war of resistance and diplomatic struggle in Geneva." I believe that through reviewing this phase of history, and recollecting the quotations of Chairman Ho and the documents of the Vietnam Workers Party, we can clearly find out the actual state of affairs. The slander spread by the Vietnamese authorities cannot withstand a single blow.

During the course of the conference, Premier Zhou often held banquets in honor of the delegations of various countries at the residence of the Chinese delegation. Apart from Molotov, Eden, later the Earl of Avon of the United Kingdom, was also invited, who asked the premier to autograph the menu for the occasion as a precious souvenir. In the early eighties when the Earl's widow visited China, she brought the menu specially with her. Among other guests were Mendes-France of France, Ronning of Canada, and the world-famous comedian and movie star Charlie Chaplin and his wife. At the banquet in honor of Charlie Chaplin, we had a very cordial conversation; Chaplin even performed for us his unique gait, which evoked continuous laughter. Chaplin highly praised Chinese cuisine, in particular mao-tai. He said: I like this kind of strong liquor; it is the very liquor for a real man. When he left the premier sent him a bottle of mao-tai. The two chefs I had chosen for the delegation were also praised by the premier, who said to them: You have made due contributions to the Geneva Conference.

Premier Zhou was very busy with his work. He made use of every opportunity he could, not sparing any minute he could seize. Except for meetings he would spend all of his time on reading materials, listening to reports, finding out about and studying the most updated trends in the world, and considering and dealing with the problems emerging during the conference. Early in the morning we could find him either writing, reading, or in deep meditation at his desk. Often the light in his room would shine from dusk until dawn. Geneva is famous for its beautiful scenery, and has a reputation as the "world's garden."

All other delegations would seize the opportunity to tour the mountains and lake. When we saw that the premier had been overstrained in his work, we advised him to take a stroll in the open air, but he would always say cordially to us: We had better do more work; besides, we have to take into consideration our external influences. Our delegation has been entrusted by Chairman Mao and the party Central Committee. We have come here for the first time to strive for world peace and to carry out an international struggle with the people of the whole country pinning their hopes on us. We are not here to enjoy ourselves, so we should not do that. The Swiss newspapers wrote commentaries and reports to praise the Chinese delegation in particular for this. They said: The Chinese premier is unique; he is never found having fun outside his residence. He is really devoting his whole heart and mind to the conference.

Here I should like to mention that we were on friendly terms with India at that time. Although India did not participate in the Geneva Conference, Prime Minister Nehru's special envoy, Menon, was in Geneva, and he often came to call on Premier Zhou for talks. Once he relayed Nehru's invitation and his hope for Premier Zhou to visit India on his way back home via the southern route when the conference was adjourned. The delegation held different views on whether to accept this invitation or not; finally, Chairman Mao telegraphed his instructions, and it was his view that the opportunity should not be passed up, and asked Premier Zhou to make the trip and do some work concerning India. So on 14 June, Premier Zhou visited India at their invitation; later he also visited Burma. He was trying to win them over in support of our stand concerning the Indochina issue, and succeeded in overcoming the U.S. scheme to press the United Kingdom to make concessions in Southeast Asia in an attempt to sabotage peace in Indochina. It was precisely during this visit that Premier Zhou and Prime Minister Nehru made the joint announcement of the historic, famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

During the absence of Premier Zhou, Zhang Wentian returned to Moscow (he was concurrently ambassador to the Soviet Union at that time) and Wang Jiaxiang also returned to China, so the delegation was headed by Vice Foreign Minister Li Kenong to carry on the work of the Geneva Conference.

It has been 3 decades since the Geneva Conference. However, the premier's excellent diplomatic art, his brilliant spiritual features, and his magnanimous style keep reappearing before my eyes to this day. And it was precisely through this conference that the whole world came to know such an outstanding diplomat, politician, and an excellent communist fighter as Zhou Enlai. It was also at the Geneva Conference that Premier Zhou's outstanding activities and very efficient work made New China conspicuously appear on the international political arena with its explicit and independent diplomatic style and characteristics. Many people came to understand through that conference that China stands on the side of the oppressed nations and is a big power which resolutely opposes the Western hegemonist powers with patience and reason.

The Geneva Conference also proved that any international disputes can be solved through serious and ample negotiations between various countries. This has also been China's persistent view in diplomatic struggles, and it was our view that even with the United States, which was extremely antagonistic at that time, there were many problems we could negotiate and talk over. The Sino-U.S. talks at the ambassadorial level can also be said to have derived from such a guiding idea.

Unexpected Results

Formally, the Geneva Conference was an arena of conflict where delegations from various nations read their prepared statements and enunciated their official positions. Privately, the conference served as a channel of communication and understanding which helped bring about a tacit agreement on many an issue. Much inside information was likely revealed during chats in the bai. The comrades of our delegation actively circulated among, and made friends with, a large group of people.

Among the delegates to the conference were several acquaintances of mine from the 1930's and 1940's. I was then with the foreign affairs section of the southern bureau of the party Central Committee, which gave me an opportunity to come into contact with many diplomats. Premier Zhou Enlai also knew some of them. A number of the British and French delegates had worked at their respective embassies in Chongqing in the 1940's, including Xiao We Er, deputy leader of the French delegation, and Ya Ke Lu, who was in charge of the Asian desk. Ronning of Canada, too, was an old friend of mine. I introduced each and every one of them to the premier. One such person was French External Relations Minister Bidault.

The only United States delegate we knew was one Robertson. He was with the executive headquarters of the Military Reconciliation Office in Beiping in the mid-1940's. The main function of the Beiping executive headquarters was to mediate a truce between the Communists and the Kuomintang.

Before the Geneva Conference, we had no idea that it was to open the door to China-U.S. negotiations. At the time China-U.S. relations remained strained, with both sides adopting diametrically opposite positions, because of the stubborn refusal by the ruling circle in the United States to recognize China, its forcible occupation of Taiwan, which is Chinese territory, its support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan, and its invasion of Korea. China-U.S. relations sharply deteriorated after the United States sent its Seventh Fleet to cruise the Taiwan Straits, beefed up its troops in the Philippines and interfered in the Indochinese conflict. The two nations had had no contacts with each other, apart from the Panmunjom talks during the Korean War and Wu Xiuquan's [0124 0208 2938] denunciation of the United States at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Chairman Mao said repeatedly at the time: "We are neither afraid of the United States embargo nor eager to establish diplomatic relations with it and enter the United Nations. We follow a foreign policy of independence, self-determination and self-reliance." He also said: "One day when we rise again, the United States will regret its policy, but it will be too late." After its setback in Korea, there arose a

groundswell of opposition in the United States against the government's China policy. Many Americans believed that the United States had fought the wrong war with the wrong enemy at the wrong time in the wrong place. Consequently even within the ruling circle, there were people who were unhappy with the official rigid and hostile attitude toward China. Dissent was simmering beneath the surface.

Just such a message was conveyed to us by Molotov at the beginning of the conference.

One day, Molotov called on the premier and told him that he invited the U.S. delegation to dinner before Dulles' arrival in Geneva. In a private conversation with Molotov, Smith, the deputy leader of the U.S. delegation, voiced an opinion critical of his own government and said that its China policy was unrealistic. Molotov also said that Smith, a general in Europe during World War II, enjoyed a high standing and his words carried weight.

As deputy secretary of state, Smith indeed had clout. Following Dulles' return to the United States on 3 May, he became the head of the U.S. delegation. In an impromptu statement on 16 June after the premier announced his six-point comprehensive peace plan for Indochina, Smith said: "Mr Zhou's proposals contain a basis for discussion." Apparently this was his personal opinion which had not been cleared with the U.S. Government. The subsequent turn of events did not surprise us. When the conference was about to take up the Indochina issue again the next day, Smith excused himself, claiming that he had to leave for Berne to call on the federal authorities. Left in charge of the delegation was his assistant, Robertson, who had served time in Beiping. He lost no time in criticizing the premier's proposals, dismissing the views of the Chinese delegation as unworthy of consideration or discussion, thus nullifying completely Smith's position the day before. The premier soon got angry and sternly rebuked him: "Your delegation's words cannot be counted on, can they? Smith, your leader, said yesterday our proposals should be considered. What made you change your mind today?" Pointing at Robertson, the premier said: "Mr Robertson, we knew each other while you were in China. I understand you. If the United States dares to challenge us, we will take up the gauntlet." The premier's hard-hitting words left Robertson speechless and flushed with embarrassment. This incident shows that U.S. officials were not a monolithic bloc; Smith, for instance, had his own views. The premier was alert to this kind of things and adept at turning it to his advantage when the opportunity presented itself.

At the conference, delegates from various nations watched Sino-U.S. relations very closely, looking for any signs which might suggest how they were getting on and whether or not they had dealings with each other. Journalists, of course, were on the prowl everywhere, trying to ferret out something in Sino-U.S. relations with which they could build a story.

An American journalist asked Smith point-blank: "What contacts have you had with Zhou Enlai?" Smith replied humorously: "The only contact, if you can call it that, was when we were in the men's room and used the same towel." (The towel was wound around a roller. To use it, you pull the towel downwards.)

The conference was drawing to a close. One day, as a large group of us was gathered in the bar drinking tea, Smith, a glass in hand, came up to us and sought out the premier's interpreter, Pu Shouchang [3184 1108 2490]. Smith's move was unprecedented. He told Pu Shouchang: "You speak English beautifully, with just the right American accent. Where did you learn it?" He also praised China's ancient civilization and said many friendly words. We were impressed with Smith's extraordinary gesture, given the adversarial relations between the two nations, and reported it to the premier after we got back. The premier said: "Good! Since Smith is ready and willing to talk to us, let me reciprocate during the break tomorrow." The bar was a place for informal, casual conversation. During the break the following day, I looked for an opportunity for the premier to talk directly to Smith. When I saw Smith go up to the counter for a cup of coffee, I immediately steered the premier in the same direction. As soon as Smith saw the premier approach him, hand outstretched, he hastily reached for his coffee with his right hand and, since he had a cigar in his left hand, he could not shake hands with the premier. But he was all smiles as he greeted the premier and chatted politely with him. He again praised China's old civilization and beautiful country, saying: "I love Chinese porcelain and have acquired a collection in my living room." In short, Smith once again said all the nice things about China. On the last day of the conference, a smiling Smith took the initiative during the break to talk to the premier, who was then having a conversation with another person. Smith said: "As the conference draws to an end, I am very pleased and honored to be able to make your acquaintance. You have played a major role at this conference. Whether it is Korea or Vietnam, we hope that peace will be restored." Then he shook the premier's arm briefly and walked away with a smile. Rumors had it that before he left, Dulles had issued an order forbidding anyone in the U.S. delegation to shake hands with a Chinese delegate. Ingeniously, Smith shook the premier's arm, thereby expressing his admiration for the man while complying with Dulles' ban on handshaking.

At this point, I think I should correct a widely circulated story in international circles. It was said that in Geneva, Premier Zhou Enlai offered to shake hands with Dulles but was rebuffed by the American. In fact, nothing of the sort ever happened. Throughout the conference, I was at the premier's side every time he entered the conference room. I always took care to familiarize myself with the layout of the room beforehand, making sure I knew which entrance to take and where our seats were. I led the way for the premier and other members of our delegation and ushered them to our seats. The seating was arranged alphabetically, so we sat quite a distance from the U.S. and USSR delegations. The conference hall in the League of Nations Building had several entrances. As we did not use the same entrance as the U.S. delegation, we could not possibly have run into each other. During the 15-minute breaks between sessions, delegates could go to the restaurant or bar for a snack or drink. Our delegation never got together with the U.S. delegation. Since Dulles was the arch-champion of anticommunism, the premier was very cautious and strict about our not mixing with the Americans and it certainly never occurred to him to shake hands with Dulles. Even when their paths crossed by accident, Dulles always turned back and walked away the moment he saw Premier Zhou coming his way. Consequently, there was simply no practical or theoretical basis for the story that the premier wanted to

shake hands with Dulles but was cold shouldered. Some Americans, including Nixon and Kissinger, recall such an incident in their memoirs, but they are merely repeating a piece of hearsay.

Certainly there is room for a handshake even when two nations are adversaries. I recall a related incident in Denmark. An American military attache was having a drink at a military club. He came up to our military attache and offered to shake hands with him, but, to his great embarrassment and that of the owner, our man refused. I was put in charge of the case after it was reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Following instructions from the premier, the leaders of the ministry decided that our diplomats from now on should not be so rigid in public. Under the new regulation, we were not to take the initiative to shake hands with Americans. But if they volunteered to shake hands with us, we must not turn them down.

From these incidents, we can get a flavor of the intense animosity prevailing in Sino-U.S. relations in the early days.

But there was one thing which the United States was very anxious to negotiate with China, namely, the release of American prisoners of war captured in Korea and the fate of American civilians charged with criminal offenses and detained in China. Some Chinese students and scientists had also been detained in the United States. The U.S. Government was coming under increasing pressure from a public which felt very strongly that the fate of the detained personnel should not be at the mercy or become a victim of America's rigid China policy. On the one hand, the United States wanted to secure the repatriation of its nationals in China. On the other hand, it did not want to deal with us directly, which would make U.S. recognition of China a fait accompli. Therefore it decided to use a third party to handle this problem, asking Britain, which had then established charge d'affaires relations with us, to look after its interests in China. It was the policy of the U.S. delegation throughout the Geneva Conference to tackle the problem of repatriation through Humphrey Trevelyan, the British charge d'affaires in Beijing who was also attending the Geneva Conference.

As soon as we heard this news, the premier discussed with us that very night to work out a response. In his opinion, we should not refuse to talk to the Americans. Given the strain in Sino-U.S. relations and America's rigidly antagonistic policy toward China, we should seize its desperation to secure the release of its citizens held in custody in China and open up a channel of communication. Premier Zhou's decision was sensible and firm. So we told the British charge d'affaires that since both the United States and China had a delegation in Geneva, bilateral issues could be worked out directly by these two delegations and there was no need for Britain to get involved as a third party. On 27 May, the spokesman of our delegation took the initiative to talk to the press about the unreasonable imprisonment by the United States of Chinese nationals and students and express our willingness to hold direct talks with the United States about this problem.

Two factors forced the hand of the U.S. Government. One was public pressure; Eisenhower had said: "How eager I am to see our children come home as soon as

possible." The other was the desire within the ruling circle to establish contacts with and get to know the new China. Alexis Johnson, the first American to negotiate with China in Geneva, wrote in his memoirs: "On the face of it, Dulles might be vehemently anticommunist. Inwardly, however, he was very interested in exploring the possibility of easing tension with China and obtaining the release of Americans detained in China." Furthermore, at the time some of the allies of the United States believed that closer Sino-U.S. relations could help promote peace in the Pacific region. It was because of this pervasive desire, both domestic and international, for contacts between China and the United States that the latter agreed to hold direct negotiations with us. At the time they were referred to as Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks.

Through the arrangement of the British charge d'affaires, Humphrey Trevelyan, the Chinese and U.S. delegations decided to hold preliminary talks on the return of the nations of the two nations. After consulting the party Central Committee, the premier named me as the Chinese negotiator. Also involved were such comrades as Huan Xiang [1360 6763] and Ke Bainian [2688 2672 1628] and others. The American negotiator was Alexis Johnson, then U.S. ambassador to Czechoslovakia, who had taken part in negotiations on the convening of a political conference on Korea. It was only after careful consideration that the United States selected him to head its negotiating team.

Thus a bridge of contact emerged by chance over the wide chasm separating the United States and China.

Four Rounds of Talks

The first round of talks was held on 5 June at a site picked by the United States. Probably to create a relaxed atmosphere, Johnson selected a reception room in the League of Nations Building. Furnished with several sofas but no desk, it had the atmosphere of a reception, rather than a conference. When we arrived, Johnson and his assistants came up to shake our hands and exchanged a few words of greeting with us.

The first meeting lasted half an hour. The mood was fairly relaxed and neither side attacked the other with sharp remarks. This being our first encounter, everybody was rather withdrawn, but it was obvious that Johnson was a veteran diplomat and well versed in Chinese affairs and had a nimble, alert mind. To make us feel less constrained and our talks more exploratory, he proposed that we do not take shorthand notes. Also, it would eliminate the danger of our minutes falling into the hands of reporters sniffing around for a story. We agreed and decided to hold the second round on 10 June.

It was now our turn to pick the venue. We also decided on a room in the League Building but furnished it differently. We put a long table in it and the two teams sat on opposite sides; it was a more solemn setting. Johnson submitted a list of American nationals and servicemen whom he thought were being held in China and demanded that they be given an early opportunity to return home. I replied: "Given sincerity on both sides, a solution can be worked out without too much difficulty." I also said: "As long as they obey

Chinese laws, American nationals in China will be protected. They can choose to stay in China and take up a legitimate profession. If, for some reason, they want to leave China and return to the United States, they can do so any time provided they have not been involved in pending criminal or civil cases. Actually, 1,485 American nationals have left China since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. As for the minuscule number of Americans who are being held for espionage or sabotage activities, they deserve the punishment. We will look into your list and give you a reply next time we meet, when we will also raise the question of detained Chinese students in the United States."

The third round of talks was held on 15 June. First, I responded to the issue put forward at the earlier meeting. I said: "The Chinese Government agrees to let American military personnel and nationals imprisoned for criminal offenses correspond with their families through the Chinese Red Cross and receive small packages from their families. The Chinese Government has meted out punishments in accordance with the gravity of their crimes. If their conduct is good, we may consider remitting their sentences or even releasing them ahead of time, and we have done that before. As for the list which Mr Johnson gave us last time, we will certainly schedule a meeting on it as soon as our delegation receives the relevant information from home."

These words were spoken calmly and our actions were also reasonable. Next I referred to the unjustifiable detention of Chinese students by the U.S. Government. Assuming a more somber expression, I said sternly: "There are now over 5,000 Chinese students in the United States. Many of them want to return to China but have been obstructed in every way possible by the U.S. Government. When they applied for permission to leave the United States, the U.S. Government told them they could not go and even threatened to fine them as much as \$5,000 or send them to jail for anything up to 5 years, or both. This is totally unreasonable."

When I uttered these words, I realized our complaints were fully justified. I also felt upset; the United States policy toward China was then of military blackmail, economic blockade, political attack and reactionary McCarthyism. At home, the U.S. Government persecuted and discriminated against all Americans who were friendly toward China, "investigated" and illegally interrogated many organizations and individuals, whipped up hostility toward communists and the labor movement and cracked down on progressive and democratic forces. We had in the United States a large number of patriotic, accomplished students, including Qian Xuesen [6929 1331 2772] and Zhao Zhongyao [6392 1813 1031] who went there in the early years. After they heard that the new China had been established, they were overjoyed and eagerly made plans to return to the motherland. However, not only did the United States detain them, but it also illegally arrested, imprisoned and ill-treated them with the result that some people did not even dare to apply to come home. As the mother of these Chinese descendants, the new China had the obligation and responsibility to protect them. They wanted to come back and we also needed them for our development.

We demanded that the U.S. Government "immediately put an end to their custody of Chinese students and restore their right to leave the United States to return

to China anytime. Chinese nationals in the United States should also be given a similar right."

Johnson was almost at a loss for words, but he reiterated that in taking Chinese scholars into custody, the United States was acting entirely within the law. During the Korean War, the U.S. Government did issue an order, which I had often criticized, prohibiting the departure of all Chinese who had received training in the United States in such fields as rocketry, atomic energy and weapons design. I believed very strongly that this unreasonable order should be rescinded immediately.

We tackled this issue again in subsequent sessions and finally worked out a solution. I will discuss it further in the next chapters.

We met for the fourth time on 21 June. I opened by suggesting that we draft a joint communique declaring the complete freedom of the nationals of either country, provided they had not broken any law, to return to their own country. I also proposed that a third nation be asked to take care of the interests of detained nationals and students of both nations on the basis of mutual equality.

The attitude of the United States was stubborn; its only concern was to take what it could from the talks. Johnson therefore turned down my suggestion and said that the United States would issue a unilateral statement affirming the complete freedom of Chinese nationals to go anywhere they liked, provided they obeyed American laws and regulations.

Once again Johnson emphasized "American laws and regulations." To put it bluntly, they were not ready to let Chinese students go.

The liaison personnel of the two nations met again on 16 and 21 July. We were represented by Pu Shan [3184 1472], a section chief in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the United States, by Alfred Le Sesne Jenkins, political affairs officer at the China desk in the State Department.

We spent the two meetings examining and verifying the lists of names submitted by the other side. Pu Shan gave the Americans the names of American nationals already granted permission to leave and demanded that they provide us information concerning the conditions of Chinese nationals and students in the United States. He again asked the Americans whether or not they were agreeable to our suggestion of entrusting the interests of both countries' nationals to the representative of a third nation.

Jenkins thanked us in diplomatic language for allowing six Americans to leave China. Yet he failed to update us about the situation of Chinese students and nationals in the United States and again turned down our "third nation" proposal.

From the minutes-like record above, it can probably be seen that we had a positive attitude and always tried to take the initiative. Our solutions to various problems were reasonable, as were our demands. Chinese diplomatic struggle had demonstrated its flexibility as well as its adherence to principles.

The United States, on the other hand, revealed itself as rigid and stubborn, often to the point of putting itself in a reactive situation. The ambassadorial talks clearly mirrored both sides' attitudes and positions.

As I said before, the Geneva Conference was only a prelude to 15 years of Sino-U.S. talks. Once the prelude began, even Dulles did not want to close the door on Sino-U.S. contacts. China, for its part, was also ready to leave the door slightly ajar so as to better observe the United States, wage a struggle against it and keep open a channel of communication in the absence of formal diplomatic ties. This was the art of Chinese diplomatic struggle, the fruit of Premier Zhou Enlai's painstaking labor to develop Sino-U.S. relations.

CHAPTER II. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

The Selection of the CPC Central Committee

In April 1955, I took up the post of Chinese ambassador to Poland. One day at the end of July, the bright sun was shining over beautiful Warsaw. Comrades working in the embassy went to the outskirts for a picnic. I very much liked the scene on the outskirts of Warsaw. We found the green bushes and open country pleasing to both the eye and the mind. We felt relaxed and happy. When we were sitting together talking cheerfully and eating our food, a confidential secretary gave me a telegram sent by the Foreign Ministry.

This was a telegram for the office of the Chinese charge d'affaires in Britain, to the effect that through the mediation of Britain, the United States had advanced a proposal on Sino-U.S. talks at ambassadorial level. A copy of the telegram had been sent to the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw. I felt puzzled after reading the telegram. Why had a copy of a telegram for the office of the charge d'affaires in Britain been sent to the embassy in Warsaw? Every comrade talked about this matter. They guessed that Ambassador Wang would possibly be sent to participate in the talks. I never thought of this myself, because after the Geneva Conference, I was no longer in charge of matters regarding Sino-U.S. relations.

Several days later, the Foreign Ministry sent a message officially notifying me that I had been appointed senior representative of the Chinese side at the ambassadorial-level Sino-U.S. talks. The U.S. side appointed its ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Johnson, as its negotiator at the talks. It was a coincidence that the two rivals at the Geneva Conference came to grips again.

After receiving the notice, I was uneasy and even disturbed. Although I participated in the Sino-U.S. meetings at the Geneva Conference, there was a powerful delegation at my side, and there were many experienced "capable persons" who suggested ways and means. In particular, I was working by the side of Premier Zhou. I could personally listen to his teachings, and go about things according to his direct instructions. When doing things, I could rely on the prime minister. However, as a chief negotiator, I had to take sole charge of everything. Although I could contact the government and the premier at all times, I was far from the motherland, and should make decisions, analyses, and judgment myself with regard to many things. I should also actively put forward suggestions to the government, and be good at acting according to circumstances. I was not allowed to commit a single mistake. It was absolutely not easy to do so. The situation was complicated, and what I was doing was a matter of prime importance, to which the whole world paid close attention. I felt as if a heavy burden had been laid on me.

Of course, I also thought of some other, beneficial factors. To deal with the talks at ambassadorial level, the Foreign Ministry specially set up a guiding group responsible for the Sino-U.S. talks. The group was responsible for devising measures to be taken at the talks. The group leader was Zhang Hanfu, the deputy group leader Qiao Guanhua, and secretary-general, Dong Yueqian. In addition, its members included Gong Peng, Pu Shan, Wang Baoliu, and so on. A brain trust comprised of a galaxy of talent was my mainstay. What gave me assurance was that the group was working directly under the leadership of Premier Zhou, and that Qiao Guanhua, who was called a "talented scholar," was responsible for specific work. As far as I was concerned, I had had dealings with the Americans as early as the 1930's. I was familiar with their thinking, work style, and the way they handled things. Generally speaking, they were frank, open, lively, and easygoing. Comrade He Long once told me that when the central authorities were selecting the negotiator, there were several candidates in addition to myself. Due to my experience in foreign affairs for 10 years or so in the party, and to having had long-term contacts with, and being familiar with, the Americans, I was eventually selected as chief negotiator on the Chinese side.

The matter of my contacts with the Americans made me recall the diplomatic work of our party during the war of resistance against Japan. Indeed, the contacts between the CPC and the Americans did not begin after the CPC became a ruling party. They started during the period of the war of resistance against Japan. Comrade Zhou Enlai worked in the KMT-controlled area for a long time, and led the party work in the area. In 1938, to meet the demand for giving publicity to the party policy on resisting Japan, an external propaganda group was established directly under the southern bureau. The group worked under the direct leadership of Comrade Zhou Enlai, and I was responsible for specific work. Members of the group included my former wife Anna von Kleist, Bi Shuowang, Xu Mengxiong, and others. These members of the group had a good command of English. The task of the group was to translate the works of Chairman Mao, articles on the war of resistance against Japan, and the battlefield reports of the 8th Route Army. The article "On the Protracted War" and others, written by Chairman Mao during the war of resistance against Japan, were first translated by our group.

We vigorously publicized the party's advocacy of a united front and the achievements of the liberated areas.

During the initial period of the second cooperation between the CPC and the KMT, the two parties carried out their cooperation relatively smoothly and the work of the external propaganda team flourished. In Wuhan, we had discussions with Rewi Alley, Edgar Snow, and Agnes Smedley and decided to set up a national industrial cooperative. We also made arrangements for Doctor Bethune, an Indian medical team, and others to go to Yanan. It was precisely in this period that our work team began to contact some Americans. At that time, General Joseph W. Stilwell, military attache of the U.S. Embassy to China, Colonel Evans F. Carlson of the U.S. Marine Corps, and other people in the American Consulate General had frequent contact with us. At that time, the KMT did not interfere in or restrict these activities in our work.

In October 1938, Wuhan was lost and all the party organizations were moved to Chongqing, the then alternate capital of the Chiang Kai-shek government. In 1939, Comrade Ye Jianying announced on behalf of the south China bureau the formal establishment of the foreign affairs team. I was appointed head of the team, Chen Jiakang was deputy head, and Qiao Guanhua, Gong Peng, Li Shaoshi, Zhang Wenjing, Liu Guang, Chen Hao, and others were members of the team. The foreign affairs team worked under the direct

leadership of Comrade Zhou Enlai. As a result, our party's external activities were carried out more vigorously, so that we broke the situation of only one party, the KMT, carrying out diplomatic activities, and won the understanding, sympathy, and support of the antifascist allies, including Britain and France. The foreign affairs team had contacts with all the embassy reporters and military organizations of the various countries. What is particularly worth mentioning is the work done by Gong Peng, who was a capable female member of our team and who was in charge of contacting the news reporters of various countries. She did her work prominently and even now many old reporters who worked in Chongqing remember and respect her.

At that time, one of the important aspects of the work of the foreign affairs team was obtaining international aid, and the key to the work was to obtain aid from the United States. On Comrade Zhou Enlai's instruction, we made friends widely and deepened friendships. We became acquainted with the personnel of the U.S. military headquarters in China and the U.S. Embassy in China and with reporters of U.S. press circles. We paid particular attention to making friends with those among them who adopted an objective attitude toward the CPC and we worked on them. For example, I had many contacts with U.S. Ambassador Gauss and Councillor John Carter Vincent, and became good friends with young diplomats in the U.S. Embassy, including Davies, the (Service) [Xieweisi 6200 0251 1835] brothers, (Efty Tremlett), George Atchison, Freeman Tawney, and Philip Sprouse; and with Mac Fisher, John King Fairbank, and Colonel David D. Barrett. We often met, discussed problems, and exchanged opinions. I gave them some Yanan propaganda materials to read. Some of them were descendants of missionaries sent by the United States, had grown up in China, were familiar with things in China, were considerate, and spoke Chinese fluently. Generally, they were indignant regarding the corrupt rule of the KMT government and wanted to know something about the CPC, the largest party in China not in office. Even now, I cherish the memory of General Stilwell, who was commander in chief of the U.S. Far East Military Region and who was an honest soldier filled with a sense of justice. He established a friendly relationship of mutual respect and confidence with us.

Through our work and through the efforts of American friends, in 1944 a small number of U.S. news reporters first broke the blockade of the KMT and visited Yanan. They gave many reports to the world on the CPC, who had won the support of the people and who had conscientiously fought against Japan, and on their interviews with Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai, and other CPC leaders. Soon afterward, President Franklin Roosevelt sent Vice President Wallace to visit China.

Urged jointly by General Stilwell and ourselves, the United States proposed sending a military observer mission to Yanan. Chiang Kai-shek feared that the United States would thus know the true situation there and many times rejected this proposal. At a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, Wallace told Chiang that if Chiang continued to reject the proposal on the visit of a U.S. military observer mission to Yanan, the United States would cut its military aid to Chiang Kai-shek. Under such pressure, Chiang was forced to satisfy this demand of the United States. Colonel Dixie made preparations for and organized the observer group, which was headed by Barrett. This mission arrived at Yanan in July 1944. They were enthusiastically welcomed by Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou and they made an on-the-spot investigation in the Yanan liberated area. The democratic atmosphere everywhere in Yanan, the strict discipline of the troops led by the PLA, the spirit of hard struggle of the officers and soldiers in Yanan, and the pithy analysis of the situation by Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou, and other leading comrades impressed them deeply.

The flourishing revolutionary atmosphere constituted a sharp contrast to the corruption in the areas under the rule of the KMT. Xie wei en [6200 0251 1869] and others were also members of the observer group. This visit opened their eyes and enabled them to have a clearer view of the situation in China. In their report to the U.S. Government, they correctly estimated the Chinese situation and reflected the corruption and incompetence of the KMT government and its passive attitude toward the resistance against Japan. At the same time they praised the CPC's policies in resisting Japan. They proposed that the United States should not implement a policy of supporting Chiang and opposing the communists and wanted it to support the CPC. It was a pity that their penetrating judgement was not accepted by the U.S. State Department, which always banked on the KMT and thus caused a serious historic mistake of far-reaching impact in the China policy of the U.S. Government.

Comrade Zhou Enlai was delighted to see the U.S. military observers mission arrive in Yanan. In a letter to me he said: "Your letter flying to me pleases me very much. Now that we have established ties with them, it will be easy for both sides to keep in touch in the future. Your efforts have finally brought about good results. The prospects are simply boundless. Jiakang has just come back (author's note: this denotes Chen Jiakang's return to Yanan from Chongqing) and has told us about what has happened this year. Thank you all for your great efforts...."

"We send you a lot of books and newspapers this time. You can select some of them to reprint and distribute in the United States. Father (Xia Nanhan) [1115 0589 3352] has taken away a copy of the English version of the report by the chief of staff (author's note: Chief of Staff Ye Jianying). If you cannot get the copy from him, you may perhaps translate it yourself and have copies of the translation distributed. Probably Colonel Barrett (author's note: Colonel David D. Barrett, a colonel of the U.S. Army) has already copied the report and sent it to the Stilwell headquarters.

"Some American friends have written to us. I would like you to write back for us. I hope you can maintain contact with these friends: Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, Evans Carlson, John Carter Vincent, and (Belton) [4101 1422 4098]. Have you heard anything from (Breadland) [4101 3676 5695] in the concentration camp in Hong Kong? Please send us some copies of the booklets that you have published in English by the next flight. We hope we can have three copies of each edition on hand. As for the year's work report, you had better ask our revered Comrade Lin (author's note: Lin Boqu) to bring it back...."

"Zhou Enlai, 6 August 1944"

The reader can see what great importance Comrade Zhou Enlai attached to our contacts with American friends as well as to the work of the external affairs section at that time. Although he then stayed in Yanan, he still gave specific instructions to us and encouraged us to work hard.

I still remember that it initially took 15 days to travel from Chongqing to Yanan by car. It was only after the arrival of the U.S. military observers mission in Yanan that there was a regular flight between Chongqing and Yanan. What Comrade Zhou Enlai said in his letter -- "your letter flying to me" -- reflects the situation at that time. When the first airplane landed in Yanan, there was an accident as the runway was not long enough. Fortunately, nobody was injured in the accident. When receiving the crew of the plane, headed by David Barrett, Chairman Mao humorously asked them: "Was anybody injured? Anyway, it is not the horse's responsibility."

I still remember that we waged a struggle against the KMT over the question on the delegation to the UN founding ceremony in 1945. The KMT's attempt to monopolize the whole delegation by their own delegates encountered strong objection from the CPC. We demanded that the CPC be represented in the delegation and nominated Comrade Dong Biwu as the CPC representative; Guo Moruo and I as advisers; and other comrades including Wu Xiuquan, Zhang Hanfu, Shen Qizhen, and Chen Jiakang as members of the delegation. However, the KMT tried in every possible way to reject this justified demand by the CPC. And finally, after exhausting all pretexts, the KMT agreed to let our party be represented in the delegation by Dong Biwu, Zhang Hanfu, and Chen Jiakang only.

Despite all the obstacles the KMT had thrown in our way, we managed to surmount every difficulty and did a great deal of work among foreign diplomatic envoys and reporters in China. Many of them appreciated our call for resistance against the Japanese aggressors. And, with pleasure, they took an active part in publicizing the honest and democratic image of the CPC while exposing all sorts of malpractices by the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek was very discontented with this. It was reported that he once flew into a rage, scolding the enormous KMT propaganda organization for losing the upper hand to a small group of the CPC. In a note sent to the KMT Propaganda Department, he angrily said: All you guys are so stupid and indolent in studying that you are defeated by the CPC. What a pity this is!

The U.S. Government continued to stick to its reactionary policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and opposing the Communist Party after the war of resistance against Japan. These friendly Americans were rudely treated by Patrick J. Hurley, the then U.S. ambassador to China, and they were cruelly persecuted under McCarthyism after the founding of New China. Before I went to Geneva for the talks, these friends were all investigated either openly or in secret. Some of them were removed from office, others were transferred and demoted, and still others had to change their professions or lost their jobs. They drifted from place to place and led vagrant lives. In particular, Davies and John Stewart Service suffered the most miserable experiences. Service was charged with treason and the accusation was not withdrawn until 1951. He took his case to the Supreme Court and won the suit in 1957. He worked again at the State Department in 1958 and his reputation was restored, but he still faced pressure from all sides. His miserable experience was really put to an end only after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States.

In 1945, Ambassador Hurley, who was unpopular in the U.S. Embassy in China, was recalled. With great attention to China, Truman appointed his special representative General George C. Marshall as the U.S. ambassador to China. At that time, Gen Marshall was already retired and was living in a city in the South. Just as he and his wife were tidying up their new house, a telephone call came from Truman, asking him to return to Washington as quickly as possible. In Washington, Gen Marshall accepted the appointment. He was asked to go to China in the capacity of the president's special envoy to act as a mediator between the KMT and the CPC. For its part, the U.S. Government hoped that the KMT and the CPC would stop the civil war and consent to forming a democratic coalition government, with stress on the KMT. This was the mission that brought Marshall to China.

At the U.S. Army headquarters, I was told the exact date of Marshall's arrival in China. I immediately informed Comrade Zhou Enlai and accompanied him and Comrade Wang Yifei to the airport. We got there before T.V. Soong, a trusted aide of Chiang Kai-shek. After Marshall came to China, the three sides -- the KMT, the CPC, and the United States -- set up a group headed by Zhou Enlai (the CPC), Chang Chun (the KMT), and Marshall

(the United States). Under the group there was the "Peiking executive headquarters" with Comrade Ye Jianying as our representative, Cheng Chieh-min as the KMT representative, and Walter Spencer Robertson as the U.S. representative, who also took part in the Geneva talks later. As I worked as an assistant of Comrade Zhou Enlai at that time, I often conveyed opinions and letters of Comrade Zhou Enlai to Gen Marshall, so we got a chance to see each other often.

Recommended by Marshall, Leighton Stuart was appointed ambassador to China in 1946. The son of an American missionary in China, he is an American born in China and was very close to Chiang Kai-shek. He used to pretend to love both the United States and China. He had established Yenching University. Many comrades of our party, including Gong Peng, Huang Hua, Mu Qing, and Wu Qing were all students at the university.

One day, Comrade Zhou Enlai said to Leighton Stuart in jest: We thank you for having trained so many people for us. Throughout this period, I worked as an assistant of Comrade Zhou Enlai, so I maintained necessary contacts with Leighton Stuart. Together with Comrade Zhou Enlai, representative of the CPC, I also participated in the talks with Marshall and Leighton Stuart.

I believe that I was assigned to this important task just because I had experience of maintaining contacts with different types of Americans and because Premier Zhou knew me and trusted me very much. With the support of comrades around me and summing up past experiences, I felt that I had to accomplish the task with confidence. Thinking that I would hold talks with the United States on behalf of the CPC, the Chinese Government, and the 600 million invincible Chinese people who had stood up, I was immediately imbued with a strong sense of pride and self-confidence. Although the United States refused to recognize us, it was still forced to hold talks with us.

As the talks approached, I was busy about preparations in line with the leadership's instructions, leafing through much reading material and discussing with comrades all the questions that might arise. Like a soldier sent on an expedition, I was excited and under some strain, but I kept on warning myself that I had to be coolheaded.

Generally speaking, the international situation tended toward relaxation after the 1954 Geneva Conference. The situation in the Far East began to be alleviated as a result of the cease-fire in Korea and the restoration of peace in Indochina. However, the United States did not take its defeat at the Geneva Conference lying down. For the purpose of retaliation and confrontation, the U.S. Government was busy preparing a so-called "joint defense treaty" with the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan after the Geneva Conference. With this treaty, the United States attempted to legalize its invasion and occupation of Taiwan and to use Taiwan as a base for expanding its military confrontation with China and unleashing a new war. Consequently, the military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait became much more obvious. The party Central Committee discussed the situation and believed that in order to destroy the U.S.-Chiang military and political alliance it was necessary to raise the call, "liberate Taiwan" to the whole country and the whole world as well. The party Central Committee also believed that it was inappropriate not to set the task of "liberating Taiwan" immediately after the cease-fire in Korea, and that we would commit a serious political mistake if we failed to carry out the task promptly. Thereupon, RENMIN RIBAO published an editorial, reaffirming: "We are determined to liberate Taiwan. We will not stop until we reach our goal."

Chief Commander Zhu De also delivered the speech, "The Chinese People Are Determined To Liberate Taiwan," on the occasion of National Day. After the returning from the

Geneva Conference, Premier Zhou made a report to the 33d meeting of the Central People's Government, specially stating the task of liberating Taiwan and calling on the entire people to carry on to the end the glorious task of liberating Taiwan and defending world peace.

In his report on government work at the First Session of the First NPC, held in September, Premier Zhou reaffirmed: "We are determined to liberate Taiwan," and pointed out that any proposal to "neutralize" Taiwan and create an "independent Taiwan" was aimed at splitting China and legalizing the U.S. invasion and occupation of Taiwan, and that the "Chinese people will never tolerate it." On 2 December the United States and Chiang officially signed the "joint defense treaty." On 8 December Premier Zhou made a further statement, ruthlessly exposing the nature of the treaty and pointing out that we would never recognize this illegal treaty.

In order to express the determination of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan, and to puncture the U.S.-Chiang "defense treaty," the PLA liberated Yijiangshan Islet at one blow on 18 January 1955, and Dachen Islet in 13 February.

In an interview with newsmen, Eisenhower called for "mediation" by the United Nations and said that troops would be sent to safeguard the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores when needed. At the same time, the United States also turned down the proposal initiated by China and the Soviet Union on convening a 10-nation conference to discuss the situation in the Taiwan area. Premier Zhou repeated time and again that the liberation of Taiwan was China's internal affair, and the United States had no right to interfere.

At that time we resolutely and strongly opposed American support for the Chiang gang and showed the dauntless spirit of the Chinese people in the face of U.S. military blackmail. At the end of 1954 we detained 13 American spies who undertook sabotage in China.

Faced with such a situation, the United States was compelled to make contacts with us and to acknowledge the fact that New China had stood up. Directed by the United States, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold in his own name visited our country in January 1955 after India made arrangements for the visit. His aim was to pry into how China would deal with the case of the 13 American spies and some other things. Premier Zhou pointed out to him that the UN position on China's representation in the United Nations and the Korean war was not fair, and that the United States had created tension in the Far East, and it should stop its interference in China's internal affairs and withdraw its troops from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

Here I remember one thing that shows again how Premier Zhou was flexible and magnanimous in handling diplomatic affairs. This happened just when Premier Zhou accompanied Hammarskjold to the gate after a banquet, he found that one of Hammarskjold's bodyguards was left out in the cold. Premier Zhou immediately asked me why he was not invited in, and someone replied that this bodyguard was an American. Premier Zhou said critically: Why should we be afraid of an American? Why can't we do work on Americans? We should invite him to the next banquet and I will even propose to toast to him when the time is ripe. This shows the tolerance and breadth of vision of Premier Zhou. We did as the premier instructed later and this ordinary American was deeply touched by our invitation to banquets.

Now back to the situation in 1955. In that year, the Afro-Asian conference opened in Bandung on 18 April. That was an important meeting, participated in by the majority of independent Asian and African countries with the exception of the Western powers and the Soviet Union. People now like to call it the Bandung Conference, which is of great and far-reaching historical significance in the world political arena. In line with the general principle of "striving to extend the united front line for world peace, pushing ahead with the national independence movement, and creating conditions to strengthen ties and establish diplomatic relations with most Asian and African countries," which was approved by the party Central Committee, Premier Zhou Enlai gave a series of sincere reports with far-sighted and broad vision to the conference, which shook the whole world. His lofty strength of character and modesty, as well as his wide vision of a great statesman, were widely admired and praised by delegates to the conference. China's position and attitude won sympathy and support from many Asian and African countries. With one voice, delegates to the conference praised Premier Zhou's outstanding contributions to the success of the conference. Noted American scholar Du Bois and his wife told me more than once that the African people's cause for liberation could attract wide attention in the world precisely because of Premier Zhou's brilliant speeches at the Bandung Conference.

In order to clear away the doubts of some Asian and African countries about China, sincerely show the Chinese people's ardent love for peace, and strive for peaceful world surroundings, beneficial to our country, the progressive cause of mankind, and the construction and development of our country's socialism, Premier Zhou made a historical statement on relations between China and the United States:

"The Chinese people are friendly with the American people."

"The Chinese people do not want to make war with the United States. The Chinese Government is willing to sit for negotiations with the U.S. Government on the question of easing tension in the Far East, and particularly the tension in the Taiwan region."

The very brief statement, like a huge stone thrown into the water, had repercussions all over the world. With this brief, explicit, and firm statement, the Chinese Government expressed its position and wishes. This was well received by the world press. As a result, the image and position of the PRC was evidently enhanced.

Many neutral countries, and especially the countries participating in the Afro-Asian conference brought pressure to bear upon the United States, hoping that it would hold direct negotiations with the Chinese Government in response to the call of Premier Zhou Enlai.

As more and more countries in the world knew, recognized, and supported New China, the United States landed itself in an increasingly isolated and passive position on the Taiwan issue. In order to seek an opportunity to ease the strained relations between China and the United States and to soften the denunciation by public opinion at home on the problem of prisoners relating to an espionage case, the U.S. Government found that it could no longer turn a deaf ear to the statement by Premier Zhou under the strong world-wide pressure. Hence, on 13 July the U.S. Government, though Britain, initiated a proposal to the Chinese side that China and the United States hold talks in Geneva at the ambassadorial level.

People appraised that Zhou Enlai was a strong match for John Foster Dulles in the struggle between China and the United States after the Geneva Conference. The impending talks would once again measure Zhou Enlai's strength with Dulles'.

Obviously, our talks would certainly involve the most acute, important, and uncompromising subject--the Taiwan issue, which was dealt with throughout the 9-year talks which I participated in.

China Took the Initiative

I went out to battle. I was fully prepared, but the facts in the following days proved that I took a naive view of problems. I originally thought that the most complicated thing would be no more than attending several meetings, but I did not expect marathon talks. When I set out from Warsaw, I took only a few summer clothes.

At the end of July, I first arrived in Bern, the capital of Switzerland. At that time Feng Xuan was ambassador to Switzerland. He accompanied me to Geneva by train.

The whole world was shocked by the news of the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial level talks. Major newspapers of various countries frontpaged the news with comments and predictions. Many of them played up my personal career, relations with Premier Zhou and even private life, and I immediately became a newsmaker. Upon my arrival in Geneva, newsmen immediately swarmed toward me at the railway station.

I made a brief speech to the press. I said: "The Chinese people are always friendly with the American people and they do not want to make war with the United States. Early in his speech to the Afro-Asian conference, Premier Zhou stated that China and the United States should ease the current tension by means of negotiations. As long as the two sides are sincere, I believe that the talks not only can properly solve the question of repatriating American nationals, but can also make contributions to the relaxation of the tension between China and the United States."

By the way, here I have something to add. From the outset of the talks, acute differences arose between the two sides on the agenda and goal of the talks. We held that the talks had to emphasize discussing some substantial problems such as the Taiwan issue, arrangements for direct talks between Secretary of State Dulles and Premier Zhou Enlai, and the establishment of cultural ties between the two countries. But the United States insisted on repatriating the Americans detained in China and demanded that China not resort to force over Taiwan. In order to make a start at the talks, we finally agreed to discuss the question of repatriating American nationals first and then the other substantial questions.

The first round of talks was set to be held at the small meeting room of the building of the League of Nations on the afternoon of 1 August. The meeting room was previously the office of the council chairman of the League of Nations. The meeting room was furnished simply and solemnly with a large oval conference table in the center.

Comrades Li Huichuan and Lin Ping and I reached the meeting room earlier than others. Our XINHUA NEWS AGENCY's correspondents told us that the "journalists club" was in a bustle.

It happened that some newsmen had already got wind of the news that our government would declare the release of 11 American spies in the first round of talks. For newsmen, this news was much more attractive than the holding of Sino-U.S. talks. An American correspondent burst out shouting: "Oh! China has taken the 'initiative' again." Some correspondents of other countries beside him immediately sneered at him and said: "Not that the United States cannot take the 'initiative.' For example, the U.S. State Department can immediately make a statement declaring that it will withdraw the 7th Fleet, which is protecting Chiang Kai-shek, and adopt a friendly attitude toward the Far Eastern countries. Then the United States could gain the initiative at the negotiating table."

We declared that we would release 11 American spies before the talks. This decision by Premier Zhou really created a favorable start for the talks and enabled us to take the initiative in the talks. But, at that time, I thought that it would be better to hold talks before we released the spies. However, the actual results of the first step we took for the talks were great. World opinion immediately pointed out that China was sincere and active in the talks and people's feelings also quickly turned favorable to us.

When we were entering the conference hall, many reporters waved us greetings in a friendly manner. Ambassador Johnson was several minutes late. Among those who accompanied him was Crowe, a sinologist of the U.S. Department of State. After the delegates of both sides took their seats, all reporters were busying themselves taking pictures of the occasion under the constant blink of magnesium light flashes that seemed to mark in history the vestiges of Sino-UN contacts. When the reporters left the conference room, the talks formally began.

First I read out the statement of our government on the release of 11 American spies and Johnson expressed his thanks to me. Subsequently, we began discussing the agenda of the negotiations.

The atmosphere of this round of talks was happy and relaxed whether partly because we had announced the release of American spies or partly because Johnson and I were well acquainted with each other. I was informed later that Dulles enjoined Johnson to exercise patience during the talks so as to avoid the repetition of the practice of confronting the tough with toughness as adopted during the Panmunjom talks, and to seek ways to preserve the present ties with Beijing so as to ensure the negotiations would not break down. Prior to the talks, Dulles said that he would be very happy if the talks lasted for 3 months.

The first round of talks made relatively smooth progress. Both sides reached an agreement on the agenda of negotiations ultimately, namely, on the repatriation of nationals of the two countries living abroad and other disputed practical issues between them. At the same time, it was decided that the talks would continue to be held the following morning.

The second round of talks lasted for only 1 hour. Both sides exchanged lists of their nationals living abroad to be expatriated. On the list I exchanged with my counterpart, there was included the name of Qian Wuesen. In a letter he wrote in July to Vice Chairman Chen Shutong, Qian Xuesen asked the government to help him return to the motherland at an early date. After reading the letter, Premier Zhou promptly passed it on to me. Then I took up the returning home of Qian Xuesen with Johnson, who quibbled that there was no proof indicating that the Chinese residing in the United

States wanted to return home and I immediately refuted his argument by citing the case of Qian Xuesen. I also proposed that India be empowered as a third country to look after the interests of the Chinese citizens living in the United States.

Johnson asked for a 1-day recess in order to request instructions from the Department of State. The third round of talks would be held on 4 August as scheduled.

During the third round of talks, the moment the talks were resumed Johnson asked our side to unconditionally allow all Americans in China to leave the country so that the meeting would enter the second item of the agenda -- with the aim of paving the way for discussion of substantive issues. I held that the question of the American personnel detained in China was part of the content of the talks and on no account was it a condition for continuing the talks and, with this in mind, I solemnly reaffirmed China's stand on the repatriation of Chinese students studying and Chinese nationals living abroad, pointing out that the United States should promptly release all the innocent Chinese who had been put in jail so that they could take the opportunity to return to their motherland. By then Johnson no longer insisted on the argument that keeping those Chinese who had a high level of technological knowledge in the country had always been the law of the United States. It can thus be seen that the law of the United States is not unalterable at all and it also serves politics.

Later in our talks, we discussed over and over many times the question related to repatriating the people of each country living in the other country.

On behalf of the U.S. Government, Johnson stubbornly clung to a principle that they thought was the most fundamental in U.S. policies toward China, namely the principle of refusing to recognize the PRC as an entirely independent sovereign state. Therefore, in dealing with some specific questions, the U.S. Government would always sensitively think whether its action would give an impression of or result in recognition of the PRC. Therefore, Johnson beat about the bush in discussing any question related to our country's sovereignty. For example, he always refused to agree to our proposal that the Indian Embassy to the United States take care of the Chinese living in the United States. For he thought that this would amount to recognizing the PRC's legitimate consular right to be responsible for Chinese people living in the United States, and to recognizing the PRC as a sovereign state and excluding the Taiwan authorities. The United States would by no means agree to this.

On this question alone, we carried out several rounds of struggle. Our side fully presented the facts and reasoned things out and finally Johnson found that he had no grounds to counter our arguments. After asking for instructions from John F. Dulles, he was forced to accept our proposal on empowering India to take care of Chinese people living in the United States. However, he made trouble again on the word "empower." Johnson said that the word "empower" could not be used and only the word "invite" was to be used. He thought that the word "invite" had less of a meaning of legitimacy and legal responsibility on the part of the PRC. He also unreasonably proposed that the power given to the Indian Embassy had to be strictly restricted to the investigations relating to those Chinese citizens who really wanted to leave the United States. Obviously, such a restriction would have left many loopholes for the United States to exploit. Moreover, the United States could have given any explanation to the specific conditions at will. Of course, we could not agree with that and I flatly refused his proposal. As a result, no positive results could be achieved, though we held about 10 rounds of talks.

Soon after the beginning of the talks, we began to find that we were wrong to think that the problem could be solved through a few round of talks. It seemed to us that the talks would be very arduous and would take a long time. The reporters who had some optimism or who wanted to catch news about a new breakthrough always waited impatiently for news outside the site of the talks. At the beginning, when we left the site, they would gather around us in high spirits and viewed with one another in asking questions, but our simple answers always failed to give them any exciting new information. Later, they seemed to feel disappointed as soon as they saw the expression on Johnson's and my faces. They began to doubt whether any results could be achieved in the talks or whether the talks would be suspended. There were more and more disappointing and pessimistic views in newspapers. The enthusiasm of the reporters also began to gradually cool down. By about the end of August, the talks were reduced from three times a week to once a week and the temperature had obviously dropped.

By that time, the talks were carried out in fixed patterns. Johnson and I read our written speeches by turns. Of course, sometimes there would be disputes between the two sides, and this depended on the ability of each side to find loopholes in the speech of the other side. Johnson was an experienced diplomat with wide knowledge. Perhaps, he strictly obeyed Dulles' instructions, therefore, he never broke etiquette or used caustic language in the disputes. Even when he was most embarrassed, he merely blushed and smoked a few more cigarettes.

We were also courteous at all time. Our stand was firm and our attitude was serious, but we spoke reasonable, acted calmly, and maintained a civilized and reasonable diplomatic style.

The assistants to each side never spoke at the talks but sometimes wrote their opinions on slips of paper to or whispered their opinions in the ears of the speakers. Both Comrade Li Huichuan and Comrade Lin Ping gave me many useful suggestions during the talks.

What was interesting was that though we were very serious and neither side gave ground at the conference table, there were some interesting or even friendly personal contacts between the two sides outside the conference room. Premier Zhou instructed us to boldly have personal contact with Johnson. Johnson had also obtained Bulles' consent to make personal contact with us.

When the talks were stalemated, in order to ease the atmosphere, we sometimes invited each other to meals. During personal contacts, we could say some things that we could not say on formal occasions, discuss with each other, exchange views, and sound each other out, and it was even possible for us to make some breakthroughs. I remember that it was Johnson who was the first to do this. In order to solve a problem, he wanted to know the attitude of our side and avoid the attention of the reporters. Therefore, he invited us to a quiet meal at a villa on a remote mountain and we solved a technical problem at the dinner table. Later, out of a similar need and with the consent of Premier Zhou, we invited them to a meal at the same place.

A few years later, perhaps Premier Zhou had forgotten the latter meal and asked me several times: Have you given them a meal in return for their treating you to a meal? That was Premier Zhou's way in doing things. He was always very careful and particular about diplomatic courtesy. On another occasion, when our Beijing Opera Troupe was giving a performance in Geneva, I invited Johnson and his assistants to see the performance, but time and again urged them to keep it secret and be sure not to let reporters know about it. After the performance, Johnson praised the performance, saying: "This is an artistic manifestation of China's ancient civilization and is something we Americans do not have."

At that time, there was no non-stop flight between Warsaw and Geneva. Each time I went to Geneva to attend the talk, I had to fly to Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia, 1 day ahead of schedule so that I could board a Czechoslovak plane there and then fly from Prague through Zurich, where I changed to a Swiss plane to Geneva. In Prague, I often met Johnson, so we two often boarded the same plane both on our way to and from Geneva. Sometimes, because of the bad weather, the plane could not take off. Under such circumstances, Johnson and I had to stay overnight in Zurich. Very often we had accommodations in the same hotel. During our trip, we did not have interpreters, so we never talked about official business. My English was not so good, but I managed to speak some English, while Johnson could speak some simple Chinese sentences. So, when Johnson and I chatted freely, sometimes in English and sometimes in Chinese, we felt relaxed and happy. At that time, the Swiss Government paid great attention to the Sino-U.S. talks in Geneva. It had ordered the airport authorities to give special consideration to us. So when we boarded or disembarked from a plane at the Zurich Airport, the head of the airport was very friendly to us, and each time, he came to meet or see us off in person, and also accompanied us to the guest room for a rest and treated us to coffee.

Later, owing to an airplane crash, Johnson no longer dared to fly on this route and flew from Paris instead. The crashed plane was a larger Czechoslovak plane that took off from Zurich Airport. On board were Chinese actors and actresses who had just completed their performances in Latin America and were returning home. Quite unexpectedly, the plane exploded less than 5 minutes after taking off. Originally, I had also booked a seat on that plane. I only escaped death by sheer luck because of a 1-day business delay. On another occasion, because of mechanical troubles, the plane I boarded had to land in Munich. At that time, the Federal Republic of Germany had no diplomatic relations with China, so I had to sit with all the other passengers waiting in the sitting room of the airport. This situation made the Chinese Embassy in Berne very anxious and Ambassador Feng Xuan was extremely worried and feared that something might happen to me. In order to inform the government of the Federal Republic of Germany of my presence at the Munich Airport, he purposely telephoned to the airport directly, demanding to speak to "Ambassador Wang." As a result, all the passengers in the waiting room looked at me in surprise, thus creating a sensation.

The reporters who heard the information rushed in and passed on the same news to one another: "The Chinese Ambassador for the Sino-U.S. talks has arrived in Munich!" from which you can see the great influence of the contacts between China and the United States.

In order to avoid quibbling over one question so as to enter the substantive talks more quickly, at home, we carried out a further check and handling of the detained Americans. I received the instruction from home: Announce to Johnson on 10 September that the re-check of 12 Americans has been completed by the authorities concerned in China, and they can be permitted to leave China. Our side had also made some proper concessions on some other concrete questions so that the talks, which had been stagnating for a period of time, finally made progress.

China and the United States finally reached an agreement on 10 September, the only agreement reached after 15 years of talk: "The People's Republic of China (the United States of America) acknowledges that the Americans in the People's Republic of China, who are willing to return to the United States of America (the Chinese in the United States of America, who are willing to return to the People's Republic of China) have the right to return to their own country, and declares that proper measures have been taken and will continue to be taken to ensure that they will be able to exercise their right of returning to their own country as soon as possible."

It is easy to see that the agreement was a strange joint communique, produced through painstaking efforts, under the circumstances that both countries did not recognize each other. The joint communique should not only embody the lack of recognition of one another, but also embody the common view of the two sides and the contact between the two sides, so a masterpiece called "agreement announcement," which is "agreement announcement" in English, was deliberately produced, in which each side spoke for itself. Many years later, the Shanghai Communique, issued after an agreement was reached between Nixon and Premier Zhou Enlai, was in a similar form. This agreement was the only formal agreement between China and the United States before the Shanghai Communique was issued in 1972. So when I read it again today, I still feel the weight carried by each word in the agreement.

Now, I'd like to stop talking about the question of the return of the overseas natives for the time being.

At the end of the 1950's, Premier Zhou once said at a meeting: Although we have not achieved any substantial results so far in the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial-level talks, we have had concrete and constructive contacts between our two sides on the question of the overseas natives, and we have gotten Qian Xuesen back. Only as far as this matter is concerned, the talks are worthwhile and valuable.

Entering Substantive Talks

On 22 September, we resumed a sitting in the talks. I thought that the first item on the agenda should come to an end after an agreement was reached on the issue of the Chinese living in the United States, and that we had to start the second item on the agenda of the Sino-U.S. talks at the ambassadorial level to discuss other substantive problems. However, I had not expected that the United States would take an extremely perfunctory attitude in the second stage of the talks, endlessly quibbling over the problems that had already been solved in the first stage, so that the talks became disorganized and could not move a single step.

Earlier, I put forward the essential problems to be discussed in the second stage of the talks, namely, the Taiwan issue and direct talks between Premier Zhou Enlai and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. I pointed out again and again: Only through talks at the level of foreign ministers, a practical way to eliminate differences, will we be able to solve such grave problems as the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan and easing of tension in the Taiwan region, and to discuss operating cultural exchanges and establishing trade relations between the two countries.

Compared with the first subject, the issue of the Chinese living in the United States, talks on the second subject, the Taiwan issue, became more complex and tough.

As far as I recollect now, on the condition that the United States was unlikely to change its policy toward China at that time, we came straight to the most arduous, insoluble, and contentious problem -- the Taiwan issue. This inevitably became a major obstacle to the talks.

So, was it possible for us to sidestep this problem and start with other problems? I think that under the historical conditions of that time, we had in the first place to force the United States to make concessions to key problems, and thus, by moving a step forward, push ahead with the whole situation. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to deal with other problems. At that time, the United States had invaded and occupied

Taiwan, split China's territory, created "two Chinas," and fiercely supported the Chiang bandit gang in intruding into the mainland in order to stage a comeback. The United States was so swollen with arrogance and hostility toward New China that the Chinese people could no longer tolerate it. For this reason, we had to wage a tit-for-tat struggle in the talks so as to boost the morale of the Chinese people and dampen the spirit of the U.S. Government. Before liberation, the Chinese people had long been humiliated and bullied by Western powers, therefore, the newborn China should, by no means, show the slightest timidity before them. This was the very strong feeling of the Chinese people at that time.

If we set aside these historical conditions and stubbornly concentrated on making a breakthrough in the talks, then we should depart from principles, hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, and even damage the great trust of the Chinese people in the government. This would lead us to commit "serious political mistakes," as Chairman Mao pointed out.

Dulles underestimated the strong national self-respect and feelings shown by the Chinese people on the Taiwan issue and their determination to seek a fair solution to the question. Johnson first got around substantive problems and tabled a question relating to the so-called fate of 450 American soldiers missing in the Korean war. Obviously, they had racked their brains and put forward such a question to play stalling tactics before starting negotiations on substantial problems.

I refused to discuss this question and said that the problem concerning military personnel in Korea had to be discussed by the Korean Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom. There was no need for us to discuss it.

Johnson's second proposal, that is, regarding the Taiwan issue, that both sides should promise not to resort to force, was of some substantive significance.

Premier Zhou seriously studied this proposal and unambiguously pointed out: The Taiwan issue has two sides. On one hand, the U.S. occupation of Taiwan has become an international dispute and the tension in the Taiwan Strait is affecting the peace, stability, and security of Southeast Asia. The tension is, above all, the result of the U.S. military presence in Taiwan. This military presence is directed against the PRC. The United States should abstain from using force against our country and withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, from China's point of view, Taiwan is, legally, historically, and factually, the inalienable territory of China. The Chinese people's preference for particular ways of liberating Taiwan is China's internal affair. The United States has no right to interfere, nor has it the right to ask us not to use force. These two questions must not be confused.

I solemnly relayed the above views to Johnson. At the same time, I asked the United States to turn its attention to more substantive problems.

Thus, when discussing the content of the second agenda, again, both sides refused to give in. After repeated consideration, we decided that we should take the initiative. Thus, we suggested that both sides could freely exchange their views on the second item on the agenda and that there was no need to define in detail the topics to be discussed or to arrange the order in which they were to be discussed -- all this took place at the 19th meeting, which was held on 5 October.

After we had broken the deadlock, the 20th meeting was held on 8 October. As expected, Johnson first spoke freely. He then read aloud and at length the U.S. Government's Taiwan policy and gave me several copies of his script. His speech, which was full of repetitions, could be summed up in two sentences: First, the United States intended to forcibly occupy Taiwan for a long time; second, the United States demanded that, before it consented to the holding of meetings between the Chinese and U.S. foreign ministers, China first had to announce that it would not use force against Taiwan.

Finally, it was my turn to speak. I severely criticized Johnson's speech and sharply pointed out that the second point in his speech meant an attempt to interfere in China's internal affairs as well as a conspiracy to keep "two Chinas."

On 27 October, acting on our own initiative again, we proposed another draft agreement concerning the U.S. proposal that both sides should promise not to resort to force. In this draft agreement, we invoked an article of the UN Charter, which calls on all UN members to settle their disputes by peaceful means, and recommended:

"The PRC and the United States of America agree that they should settle their disputes by peaceful means and not by resorting to force. In order to attain their common desire, the PRC and the United States of America have decided to hold meetings between their foreign ministers to discuss and settle the problem of alleviating and ending the tension in Taiwan."

Johnson rejected this draft agreement. Thus, the U.S. side landed itself in a passive position. This distressed Johnson very much. He kept on smoking and his ashtray was filled with cigarette butts before a round of talks finished.

Up to 10 November, the United States put forward its draft agreement, alleging "... with the exception of independent and collective defense, the United States, generally speaking, will not resort to force, and particularly in the Taiwan region." "With the exception of independent and collective defense, the PRC, generally speaking, will not resort to force, and particularly in the Taiwan region."

The first article of the draft agreement was absurd, as the United States wanted to have the right to "carry out independent and collective defense" in the Taiwan region. Did this mean that the Chinese Government had to recognize the U.S. illegal status of forcibly occupying Taiwan? The second article of the draft agreement was unreasonable because it meant that we had to abandon our right to liberate Taiwan.

In spite of this, I made an effort again with patience after I rejected this U.S. draft agreement. On 1 December I put forward a new draft agreement. Out of consideration of the fact that the United States was unwilling to refer to articles of the United Nations Charter and talks between foreign ministers of the two countries, this new draft only suggested that "the two countries should solve their disputes through peaceful negotiations and not by resorting to blackmail or force."

The United States lacked sincerity. They simply did not want to seriously discuss our draft. Johnson stubbornly played for time. In three meetings in succession he refused to make any concrete comments on our new draft and took a noncommittal attitude. He did not initiate any counterproposal until 12 January 1956. Compared with the previous draft agreement he advanced, the new one had nothing new in content. It again required our side to recognize that the United States had the right to "carry out independent and collective defense" in our Taiwan region. This was a matter of principle. We would in no way grant such a "right" to the United States.

The above facts show that we made endless efforts to seek a common agreement in the second stage of the talks so as to make the Sino-U.S. talks a channel for easing tension in the Taiwan region. Our proposals were practical and reasonable, but the negotiations became bogged down due to lack of sincerity on the U.S. side. Thus no agreement was reached at this stage of the talks. Between April and May 1956, the American side advanced another draft agreement and our side put forward a counterproposal, but again no agreement was reached and the talks made no headway at all.

One thing I want to point out in particular is that during the second stage of the talks, the United States violated the agreement reached in the first stage of the talks. It did not provide us the list of the Chinese living and studying in the United States even after stalling for a long time, and continued to make things difficult for them to return to their motherland. The United States put up innumerable obstacles to hinder the development of the talks in defiance of certain agreements which had been reached. I soon perceived this and was very angry. The antics of the United States in this stage of the talks made me further realize the anticommunist and anti-China nature of the U.S. Government.

In 1956 a tense situation remained in the Taiwan Strait. On the one hand, Sino-U.S. talks at the ambassadorial level were bogged down endlessly; and on the other hand, Dulles stated wildly that the United States would not shrink from launching an atomic war in the Taiwan region to intimidate the Chinese people into relinquishing China's sovereignty over Taiwan.

The dual tactics aimed at one thing. Just as I said above, Dulles, however, was too arrogant and underestimated the national pride of the Chinese people and the determination of the Chinese Government. No matter what tactics he might exploit, the Chinese Government in fact would on no account abandon its fundamental position of protecting the interests of the Chinese people.

An Excellent Move

The talks were still going on. However, by then, I had almost no hopes for them. As usual, Johnson and I would read each of our statements, then I would address some protests against U.S. incursions into our territorial waters and skies; and after a few words of confrontation, the meeting would end when a date was fixed by the two parties for the next round of talks.

Nevertheless, Premier Zhou was devising strategies within a command tent, and he was actively thinking of how to conduct a new struggle. The comrades of the guiding group were also making suggestions, thinking of ways and means, to seize every opportunity to do things favorable to our side and to boost the progress of the talks.

Like being startled by the first thunder in spring, the whole world was shocked in August 1956: The Chinese side unilaterally announced the lifting of the ban on U.S. reporters entering China, while a telegram was sent to 15 important U.S. news agencies, inviting them to send their reporters to China for a 1-month visit!

The U.S. press and State Department were shocked, too, causing sensation. We know that at that time the U.S. Government was practicing a strict news blackout on China, and nobody was allowed to provide true coverage of New China. As a result the overwhelming majority of the American people knew very little about New China, and they were yearning to learn the truth. The decision of the Chinese Government was un-

doubtedly a difficult problem for the U.S. Government, while the U.S. press became excited, and those U.S. reporters who had received the invitation of the Chinese Government were all the more so; and they successively sent in their applications for their visit to China.

However, the cunning Dulles took no action, and he would not easily lift the ban of the State Department on U.S. citizens, whether ordinary people or reporters, traveling in China. Therefore, at one time almost all the newspapers and magazines in the United States were unanimously criticizing this stubborn position of the U.S. State Department. In wrath they said, as a democratic country which advocates personal freedom that the United States should flagrantly restrict the freedom of travel of its own people was intolerable either under the Constitution or in justice.

For more than a year, the U.S. press pressed the U.S. State Department. Several reporters boldly broke through the blockade despite the ban and visited China. The U.S. youth delegation attending the World Youth Festival in the Soviet Union boldly arrived in China collectively after the conclusion of the festival regardless of the State Department ban, and they were received with the friendship of the Chinese people. They were willing to be punished when they returned to the United States just to visit New China. Toward the end of the 1970's, these people gathered again and revisited China. Then they were all in their fifties. The yearning and friendship of the American people for China has moved us deeply.

Confronting this situation which came all of a sudden, Dulles could hardly remain silent. Weighing the pros and cons, the U.S. State Department was finally compelled to make some concession, to prevent U.S. public opinion from opposing its all-round policy of isolating China. Even so, Dulles had dragged on for a solid year before acting. In August 1957, Dulles quietly negotiated with some U.S. press representatives. He had to compromise somewhat, and finally announced that the United States would allow 24 news agencies to send their reporters to China for visits.

Many U.S. reporters praised Premier Zhou for his marvelous move regarding this event, for he had successfully made the U.S. press fight against the U.S. State Department.

The reason Premier Zhou made this move was his hope of cultivating ties between the American people and New China; at the same time, the U.S. reporters would also be allowed to see what the Chinese people were doing, and what the aim of their activities were under the leadership of the CPC, and he also hoped that the U.S. reporters would brief the American people on the true features of New China.

Premier Zhou's move was also meant to boost the Sino-U.S. talks. In September 1957, I proposed in the talks a negotiatory draft on allowing reporters of the two countries to cover each country under the conditions of equality and mutual benefit, which was turned down. Dulles would never agree to China's sending an equal number of reporters to the United States for visits. He said, Chinese reporters were allowed to enter the United States only when they were eligible under the existing U.S. immigration law. What a sharp contrast between Premier Zhou's active invitation of U.S. reporters and the stiff refusal of Dulles on the negotiatory draft on visits by Chinese reporters. Premier Zhou's broad vision and his wise strategy won the high esteem of the world's public opinion and in particular the American people.

Toward the end of September, I proposed a negotiatory draft on embargo. In mid-October, I proposed the negotiatory draft on cultural exchanges and ties between the two peoples. In early December, I proposed a negotiatory draft on judicature. However, all were turned down.

Because of this stubborn attitude of the United States, the series of drafts I proposed failed to be implemented. These proposals have now become historical documents. Leafing through these documents today, people may see how the United States repeatedly played word games, in an attempt to indefinitely drag the talks on. And their general principle in the Sino-U.S. talks was to drag them on indefinitely.

Time passed with one round of talks after another. By 12 December, the talks had been going on for 73 rounds. During the last round of talks, Johnson announced politely that he would withdraw from the talks, as he was being transferred to Thailand as U.S. ambassador to that country. And he had appointed his assistant Ed Martin to take his place in the talks.

It was not difficult to see that was another of Dulles' tricks and he was trying to replace the ambassador participating in the talks with a counsellor, in an attempt to de-escalate the talks. I promptly stated that I would not agree to such a change. And I politely made it clear to Johnson: The present Sino-U.S. talks were at ambassadorial level. However, Mr Martin was only a counsellor, and he could not possibly represent the ambassador. I said, you cannot be serious about doing such a thing, Your Excellency Ambassador Johnson.

Just as Premier Zhou had said: We are willing to talk, and we are actively striving for some results, but if the United States is not willing to carry on the talks, we may put a stop to them. We are not willing to see the talks break down, but we are not afraid of a breakdown. If the United States wants war, we are ready to keep you company in that war.

Just because we adopted such a lofty stance with the United States, our party was able to maintain the initiative in the struggles of the talks. Thus, after the 73rd round of the talks, the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial level talks were interrupted for a year.

Here, I would like to quote Premier Zhou's speech on the Sino-U.S. talks at the Third Plenary Session of the First NPC as a summation of my talks with Johnson over a span of more than 2 years.

Premier Zhou said: "The Chinese side does not oppose publishing a joint statement on refraining from the use of force or armed threats in Sino-U.S. relations. In fact, as early as the Bandung Conference, China had declared that the Chinese people do not want war with the United States, and the Chinese Government is willing to sit down and talk with the U.S. Government, and to discuss the issue of relaxing and eliminating the tense situation regarding the Taiwan region. However, it must be pointed out that the tense situation regarding the Taiwan region was created entirely by the United States by occupying the Chinese territory of Taiwan by force. Therefore, any statement on refraining from the use of force between China and the United States will certainly lead to the relaxation and elimination of this tense situation. At the same time, in reference to how China will liberate Taiwan, it involves China's sovereignty and internal affairs, and we will not allow any foreign country to interfere in this matter. Therefore, a statement by China and the United States cannot interfere with this issue in any manner.

"Although the United States has said that the principle of not resorting to force should be specifically applied to the Taiwan region, it has been opposed to holding Sino-U.S. meetings at the foreign ministers' level to implement this principle, and it has refused to seek and decide on a channel to solve the disputes between China and the United States within a certain period of time. Not only that, but the United States has insisted on

its right of so-called "independent or collective self-defense" on China's territory of Taiwan. All this has demonstrated that the United States attempted a onesided statement favorable to itself, to maintain the status quo of the U.S. occupation of Taiwan on the one hand, and to continue to interfere with the Chinese people in liberating Taiwan on the other. Under the circumstances of failing to making such a statement, the United States has attempted to drag out indefinitely the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial-level talks, to achieve the aim of maintaining the status quo of the Taiwan region.

"These attempts by the United States are precisely the reason the Sino-U.S. talks have so far failed to reach an agreement. China will never agree to issuing a statement that is favorable only to one of the two parties, and it will not allow the talks to be utilized by one of the two parties as a means of achieving a onesided purpose. China holds that any joint statement must be mutually beneficial. At the same time, the continuance of the Sino-U.S. talks will be possible only on the basis of mutual benefit."

This passage won the warm and long-standing ovation of the delegates to the NPC.

Today, reading this passage, the scenes of that time--the bright eyes of the premier when demonstrating the above-quoted penetrating view, and his erect posture--reappear before my eyes; and the unremitting efforts Premier Zhou painstakingly made to develop the Sino-U.S. relations are even more unforgettable.

CHAPTER III. THE WARSAW TALKS

The Crisis in the Taiwan Strait

In 1957, Eisenhower continued in power. The international situation was rather complicated for a period of time then. There was a powerful voice against the United States throughout the world. The struggle of the African people for national liberation was surging forward. In the Middle East, a new situation appeared: The pro-American Chamoun government was overthrown in Lebanon; and a revolution burst out in Iraq overthrowing the old kingdom. In order to stamp out the anti-American flames in Middle East, the United States dispatched troops to Lebanon from July to October 1958. This was further denounced by the whole world.

Under such circumstances, in order to divert world attention from the situation in the Middle East and to put forth threats against China, the United States agitated the Chiang Kai-shek clique to "counterattack the mainland." The latter then dispatched planes to distribute propaganda leaflets over the mainland. The planes even flew deep into Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Xizang, Qinghai and other provinces. They also parachuted in special agents and bombarded Fujian Province. For a time, the clamor for "counter-attacking the mainland" and sabotage activities were often heard and seen. At that time, the United States assembled a large number of planes and warships from the Mediterranean, as well as from its own territory, to strengthen its 7th Fleet, which was deployed in the Taiwan region. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Burke even said that the U.S. Navy was ready to stage a landing on China's mainland at any time, just as it had done in Lebanon. Dulles threatened to expand the sphere of U.S. invasion of the PRC in the Taiwan Strait. The deliberate war provocation of the United States seriously threatened peace in the Far East and the world. For a period of time a pall of gunpowder spread all across the Taiwan Strait, and the situation there was very serious.

In order to severely punish the reckless provocations of the Chiang gang and to puncture the arrogance of the United States in international affairs, and at the same time to indirectly counter the Soviet policy of toleration toward the West after Khrushchev assumed power, the Chinese Government ordered the PLA to start shelling Jinmen, Mazu, and other islands from 23 August 1958. On 25 October, it announced the shelling of these islands during odd-numbered days and a halt to shelling the other days. The shelling was so heavy and sudden that the United States was very flustered.

Eisenhower, Dulles, and many other U.S. high-ranking officials were also greatly alarmed. It was said that as they did not know much about our real strength; they could not even fall asleep well and felt quite restless. To deal with this situation, the United States moved more troops from its west coast and another fleet from the Mediterranean to the Taiwan Strait. Dulles said later that this had been the largest assemblage of forces in U.S. history. They had never before concentrated so many forces in a certain area. At that time, the United States had deployed in the Taiwan Strait 6 of its 12 aircraft carriers and other warships. In short, by desperately moving troops and deploying forces in this area, the United States meant to stop us from getting back Jinmen, Mazu and Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek was also dreadfully scared at that time and was ready to move to other places. As a matter of fact, one of his economic departments had already been moved to the countryside.

The CPC Central Committee and Chairman Mao paid close attention to the development of the situation, pondering the way to deal with it.

I was then Chinese ambassador to Warsaw. One day at the end of August, I received an urgent telegram from Zhang Hanfu, asking me to return to Beijing as soon as possible because there was something urgent to discuss with me. Many comrades were guessing what the urgent matter might be, and I thought it could possibly be something concerning the resumption of Sino-American talks.

I packed my simple luggage and rushed to Moscow at once. It so happened that there was no scheduled flight to Beijing that day, but fortunately Gromyko was just leaving Moscow for Beijing on the same day because of the Korean issue. So I returned to Beijing with him on his MIG plane and arrived that very evening.

Zhang Hanfu told me that Premier Zhou wanted me back because the Central Committee was going to discuss the question of struggle against the United States. He also said that Chairman Mao had considered this matter for a long time and had many new ideas. He wanted to discuss the matter with me. I was told to wait for further information.

Two days later I was informed that the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was going to hold a meeting, at which I would be asked to deliver a report on details of the previous stage of the Sino-U.S. talks at the ambassadorial level. I arrived at the Yiniantang of Zhongnanhai, where the meeting was being held. Chairman Mao and Comrades Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Zhang Wentian were all present at the meeting. Premier Zhou asked me to deliver the report first. This was the first time I had a chance to report on the Sino-U.S. talks in the Political Bureau and directly to Chairman Mao. I said that we were always in an active position during the talks because the truth was on our side and we did not fear the United States and needed no help from it. Chairman Mao smiled and chimed in with a question: We want to make Taiwan return to the motherland, so how can we say that we need no help from the United States? I replied: Taiwan has always been part of Chinese territory since ancient times. It is our territory. The United States has no right to occupy it and should return it to us rather than asking us to beg for its help. During the meeting I also answered a number of questions raised by some Political Bureau members about the Sino-U.S. talks. Finally, the meeting decided to appoint some people to draft a new plan for Sino-American talks. When the meeting was about to end, Chairman Mao clasped my hand and said excitedly: You have made a good speech; that was full of vigor. You have made good progress! Comrade Qiao Guanhua and other comrades who had attended the meeting also said: Your speech was really very good.

After the meeting the comrades working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to busy themselves in drafting the plan for restarting the Sino-U.S. talks in accordance with the decision of the CPC Central Committee.

As far as I can remember, Comrade Chen Yi was then in Shanghai and did not attend this meeting. Later he became Premier Zhou's assistant in handling affairs concerning the Sino-U.S. talks. Once he instructed me to formulate a principle to solve a "package" of problems as a whole, as those raised in the previous stage of the talks were difficult to solve separately. In other words, the principle was: Without a solution of the Taiwan issue, all other problems could not be discussed. Comrade Chen Yi's instruction was entirely correct when there was a tension in the Taiwan Strait. It expressed the firm stand of China on the Taiwan issue. No matter whether the United States would talk with us or would resort to force on this issue, the Chinese Government would never waver on this question of principle. Once when Comrade Chen Yi saw me, he also said with a sense of humor: "It is good that you have dealt with military affairs in literary ways!"

The CPC Central Committee and the people throughout the country showed great concern for the Sino-U.S. talks, and I was often encouraged and spurred on by this. I came back to China twice on leave in the more than 2 years I was holding talks with Johnson. Since quite a few colleagues, friends, and young men wanted to know something about the Sino-U.S. talks, and especially, some democratic party friends were eager to know some inside stories and facts about the talks, Premier Zhou instructed me to deliver a report on Sino-U.S. talks to the CPPCC. On that same day many people were sent by various ministries and commissions to listen to my report. I said something about our tit-for-tat struggle against the United States and the determination of the CPC Central Committee, which was really inspiring. Some old people from the democratic parties were quite satisfied with my report. They said: What we have learned from newspapers about the Sino-U.S. talks is very simple. We did not know that the struggle was so sharp and the talks were so complicated until we heard your report. They said excitedly: The Chinese people have stood up and are no longer afraid of the Yankees. The Sino-U.S. talks have boosted the morale of the Chinese people! During those days at home, I once again felt the determination of the CPC Central Committee and the feelings of the people.

On 6 September, Premier Zhou issued a statement. It pointed out that Taiwan and the Penghu Islands have always been China's territory since ancient times, reiterated China's determination to liberate these islands, and warned the United States that it would have to accept the consequences if it provoked a war. It also suggested that both the Chinese and U.S. Governments should sit down and talk, exchange envoys within a definite time, and resume the talks at the ambassadorial level, which had been interrupted by the United States unilaterally.

On the very same day, the U.S. Government said that it welcomed Premier Zhou's suggestions.

Before I went back to Warsaw, Chairman Mao had a talk with me, pointing out some matters to pay attention to during the Sino-U.S. talks. He said: During the talks with the Americans, you must try to use more methods to persuade them. For example, you may tell them that both the United States and China are big countries, so why should you act as the enemy of the 600 million Chinese people merely for such a small island as Taiwan, with a population of less than 10 million? What can you gain from this? He also said that in the talks it is necessary to think more, to be modest and prudent, and to pay attention not to use these stimulating expressions once used during the Panmunjon talks and not to hurt the national feelings of the Americans. Both the Chinese and American

peoples are great people. They should be friends. He told the comrades also present that when I returned to Warsaw, the XINHUA NEWS AGENCY would be authorized to send a dispatch, saying that Wang Bingnam had been back to China for consultations.

This time when I was back home, Premier Zhou also talked with me several times and offered some concrete and detailed instructions for my work. One week later, I returned to Warsaw, bringing with me new instructions and the spirit of the CPC Central Committee.

On the day I was to leave there was no scheduled flight. That very night, Premier Zhou made a phone call to certain comrades concerned, asking them to send a special plane to take me to Irkutsk. Then I returned to Warsaw on a Soviet plane. Before I left I received a letter from Premier Zhou, which was written by him personally:

Comrade Bingnan: I am presenting you a typescript (draft) of the main points for our statement. During the first round of talks, if the U.S. side is impatient to state its views, just let it speak first. According to Dulles' remarks today in an interview with reporters, this is quite possible. If the U.S. side puts forward the first plan and there is still room for further discussion, do not be in a hurry to produce our plan. Instead, it is necessary to make some comments on the absurd points of the U.S. plan first and reserve the rest to be replied to at the next meeting. If the U.S. side does not give concrete opinions and is eager to know our opinions, we can also use these main points and produce our predetermined plan.

If the first round of talks is merely for making arrangements on technical matters, during which both sides will just make ordinary contacts, then the first paragraph of these main points can be used as a draft for your speech in this talks. Please act according to your judgment. Zhou Enlai 9 September 1958

Under the pressure of world opinion, the U.S. Government was finally forced to appoint Jacob Beam the U.S. ambassador in Warsaw, as its representative to the restarted talks and to give up its demand of holding the talks in a third country. Another reason for this change in the U.S. attitude toward the place for the talks was the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The concession was made in emergency when it did not know the real strength of the Chinese side.

As Beam and I were both staying in Warsaw, the place for the talks was then shifted from Geneva to Warsaw. As we did not have to rush about between the two places, much time was saved. However there were still some difficulties in determining the exact meeting place.

Soon after I arrived in Warsaw, Beam gave me a phone call, informing me that he was ready to hold talks with me. I gave him a reply on 12 September, saying that I was ready to meet him on the 14th in the Chinese Embassy. He did not answer me right away. Obviously, he had to ask Dulles for instructions. Later, he replied that he could not come to the Chinese Embassy and suggested that the talks be held in the Swiss Embassy in Warsaw.

Dulles was setting up defenses at every step. The reason why he did not allow Beam to come to the Chinese Embassy was simply to prevent any form of recognition of the PRC in international affairs.

In view of this state of mind of the U.S. Government, I suggested that both sides could hold talks in each other's embassies in turn. But this was again refused by the

American side. So we had to ask the Polish Foreign Ministry to provide us with a meeting place. The Polish Foreign Ministry agreed with pleasure to provide us with a meeting place and selected the Mysliwicki Palace for our talks, which was situated in the urban area of Warsaw.

We were busy making preparations to deal with our new adversaries. I had more confidence and knew how to act this time, because in addition to my experience gained at the previous stage in the talks with Johnson, the CPC Central Committee and Chairman Mao had given me concrete instructions during my stay in Beijing. Moreover, at any time and in all places I could feel the concern and expectations of the motherland, the people, and the party, although they were a thousand miles away from me. RENMIN RIBAO carried an editorial, and the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also made a statement. Premier Zhou was looking at me and giving me instructions for what I said and did, as if he were with me all the time. Seriously and calmly, I awaited the coming of the struggle, the talks which were to be renewed soon.

The Talks Shift to Warsaw

On 15 September 1958, the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks began when the situation in the Taiwan Strait was extremely tense. My assistants were replaced by Huang Hua and Lai Yali. Sometimes Comrade Yao Guang also joined us. In addition to Qiu Yingjue, we had one additional interpreter, Guo Jiading. They were all very competent.

The conference room was decorated in a way that was simple but yet elaborate. Four large tables were put together to form a large rectangle. The two delegations sat face-to-face on the two sides of the rectangle. The delegation heads sat in the middle. To their left and right were their own advisers and interpreters. The talks formally began at 1500, when everything was ready.

The director of the Protocol Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry showed the delegations to their seats and Ambassador Beam and I nodded to each other.

Beam was an experienced professional diplomat. He was calm, sober, and clear-headed. He lacked Johnson's sense of humor and a smile did not easily come to his face. However, he had the style of a scholar and looked like a professor. Beam was still single then and he did not marry until he was well over 50. His wife was a very able woman and she was very active in social circles. Later, a friend who knew Beam told me that it was an extremely uninteresting experience to be seated next to Beam, and that the presence of his wife could offset his weaknesses. Before holding talks with me, Beam had held talks with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, and he was supposed to be one experienced in dealing with the communists. Unlike the eloquent diplomats, Beam did not appear to be gifted with a silver tongue. However, I could hardly afford to underestimate him.

I asked Ambassador Beam to speak first. He began by asking China to stop its bombardment of Jinmen, Mazu, and other islands. He said that the United States acknowledged the protracted dispute between China and the United States over Taiwan and other nearby islands. However, it did not ask either side to give up their own opinions at this stage and that the United States aimed at ending those activities likely to be considered militarily provocative or else military activities would become more extensive. In a dull voice, he said that the common task for both China and the United States was to ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

His speech deliberately held China responsible for tension in the Taiwan Strait, and it obviously regarded the United States as the logical and legitimate occupant of Taiwan.

I was prepared for that. Thus, I calmly argued against his points. I pointed out that he had neither the right to speak for the Taiwan authorities nor the right to propose a cease-fire. I solemnly reiterated to my counterpart: Taiwan and the Penghu Islands are Chinese territory and the liberation of Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, Jinmen, and Mazu are China's internal affair. I also added that after recovering Jimen, Mazu, and the other islands, China would strive to liberate Taiwan and Penghu by peaceful means.

For some time after the beginning of the Warsaw talks the U.S. attitude toward Taiwan had remained unchanged and showed no sign of becoming more flexible. Thus, the talks became stylized again. Each time I spoke I began by reiterating the Chinese Government's stand on the Taiwan issue. I was of the opinion that if the United States did not abstain from interfering in China's internal affairs with respect to the Taiwan issue, China and the United States could not jointly settle any other problems.

On 30 September, at the 78th round of talks, Beam put forward a "draft declaration." Later, I learned that it had been meticulously drafted by Dulles. That was his last piece of "work" concerning the Sino-U.S. talks. The "draft declaration" began by stating in parallel the two countries' different views on the Taiwan issue and that China had Soviet support. Then the draft went on to say that China should promise to end its military operations against Jinmen. I did not give him a reply immediately. After studying the draft declaration thoroughly, we found nothing new in it. The United States was in fact using this "draft declaration" as a smokescreen to conceal its violation of China's sovereignty and its military operations in the Taiwan Strait.

So I flatly refused to accept this "draft declaration."

Thereafter the talks became monotonous. Beam and I held back. We were on guard against each other and we could not find a common language.

With the help of the Soviet Union, we had installed a direct telephone line connecting Beijing and Warsaw. Thus, Premier Zhou and I were in close contact. He always personally called me in order to give instructions and to remind me to pay attention to certain issues.

Now I can still remember the suspension of our shelling of Jinmen and Mazu on even-numbered days. Once we held a meeting on an even-numbered day by chance. Beam was glad about this and said that he hoped the shelling would be permanently suspended. I found this ridiculous and told him that it was our business whether the shelling was suspended or not, that the suspension of shelling and the Sino-U.S. talks were totally unrelated, and that we should discuss the question of the permanent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan at the talks!

Like Johnson, Beam did not attack people with harsh remarks. However, he was a little dull and serious in speech and manner. Whenever he was excited, he spoke with a slight stutter. However, he was not quite so rigid, and one could get acquainted with him more easily.

When the situation in the Taiwan Strait became tense, we were quite indifferent to each other and we rarely came into private contact.

At the end of 1959, Dulles, who stubbornly opposed New China and who did not want to change anything in his China policy, left office. However, Herter, the new state secretary, brought nothing new either.

In March 1960 James Edward Walsh, an American disguised as a Roman Catholic bishop, was arrested by our judicial organs and sentenced to death for espionage and his attempt to subvert the Chinese Government. On 22 March, I informed Ambassador Beam of this at our meeting. He was surprised at first. Then he lodged a protest. I rejected the protest and stated the serious crimes committed by Walsh. I said that there was ample evidence that Walsh had committed the crimes, that he could not deny the charge, and that it was China, not the United States, that had the right to lodge a protest.

During the Warsaw talks the United States never diverted their attention from the question of American criminals in China. At almost all the meetings they unjustifiably asked the Chinese Government to release those criminals. I rejected their request as a matter of course.

The 100th Round of Talks

The 100th round of the Sino-U.S. talks was held on 6 September 1960. I thought that in order for the talks to make progress in the future and for people to understand why no progress had been made in the talks, each of us should make a summary speech.

I first pointed out that throughout the 100 rounds of talks over the past 5 years, China had always negotiated with the United States on the basis of the principle of settling disputes through negotiations. However, I said, the United States had no sincerity whatsoever about settling the disputes and it is continuing to make the situation in the Taiwan area even more tense.

After that I said that since China and the United States began discussing the second item on the agenda, that is, those practical problems over which there were disputes between China and the United States, no satisfactory progress had been made. Although China had always adopted a positive attitude, made great efforts, and successively put forward 10 reasonable proposals in the hope that the tension in the Taiwan area could be eased and that Sino-U.S. relations could improve, the United States had adopted a diametrically opposite attitude. On the one hand the United States deliberately misinterpreted the agreement on the return of nationals of the two countries to their own countries by obstinately considering the agreement to be applicable to those Americans who had committed serious crimes in China and by asking China to unconditionally release them. On the other hand, the United States violated the agreement by not allowing Chinese in the United States to return to China.

In addition, the United States refused to abstain from using force against China or to withdraw all its Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

The efforts to ease and remove tension in the Taiwan area, I said emphatically, are the key to the Sino-U.S. talks as well as a touchstone for determining sincerity about holding the talks. In order to permanently occupy Taiwan, the U.S. Government has gone as far as to call Chiang Kai-shek's regime China's "legitimate government" and to deliberately interpret the U.S. invasion and occupation of Taiwan as a "treaty obligation" stipulated in a treaty concluded with the Chiang Kai-shek clique. Its conspiracy to create "two Chinas" and to turn Taiwan into a U.S. colony has become known to the whole world.

I pointed out some concrete facts: In the fall of 1958, the United States assembled the largest armed force up to that time in the Taiwan Strait in order to challenge and provoke the Chinese people; in the summer of 1960, President Eisenhower personally visited Taiwan in order to show hostility to the Chinese people, and U.S. military

aircraft and naval vessels kept intruding into China's territorial airspace and territorial waters. Not long ago the United States sent cruisers, submarines, and aircraft armed with nuclear weapons or capable of launching nuclear weapons to the Far East in order to openly pose a nuclear threat to China.

The facts were there. Beam felt rather uneasy when I came to that part of my speech. He sat there without uttering a word. He wanted to say something and yet he could find nothing to say.

I said, Mr Ambassador, you should know that those who play with fire will get burned in the end.

At that moment I felt that I was standing in front of the people of the whole world, and I had an urge to unreservedly expose the aggressive nature of the U.S. Government. I thought that otherwise I could not give full expression to the 600 million Chinese people's efforts, struggle, and aspirations over the past 5 years.

The disputes between China and the United States, I continued, cannot be settled by relying on the efforts made by China and nothing else, and it is now time you seriously reconsidered your approach to the Sino-U.S. talks and, in particular, the withdrawal of all U.S. Armed Forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. You had better consider this and leave at an early date. By doing this, you can extricate yourself earlier.

When I was delivering my impassioned speech, Beam remained silent. After listening to my speech, apart from showing disappointment, he could not forcefully refute me and he looked quite embarrassed.

After that, I put forward a new proposal on the exchange of Chinese and American reporters and correspondents. As far as China is concerned, said I, the purpose of exchanging Chinese and American reporters and correspondents is to clear up misunderstandings between the peoples of China and the United States, to initially improve the cold and stiff relations between the two countries, and to enable the two countries to settle, by peaceful means and on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the problem of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

The sensitive nerve of the U.S. Government could not bear this. As usual, the new proposal was not accepted.

On 8 September, RENMIN RIBAO especially published an editorial entitled "The 100th Round of the Sino-U.S. Talks" in order to back up my speech at the 100th round of talks. Comrades at home enthusiastically read the article and the peace-loving people praised the Chinese Government for its correct stand.

The New Tricks of John Fitzgerald Kennedy

At the end of 1960 there was a presidential election in the United States. During the election debates between John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Richard Milhous Nixon, it seemed that both concentrated their attention on the issue of Jinmen

and Mazhu and regarded it as a major issue. They both expressed the will to unswervingly support the Chiang Kai-shek regime in Taiwan.

After Kennedy took office, the United States launched an overbearing offensive all over the world. At the "20th Congress" of the CPSU, the Soviet Union entirely negated Stalin, and there was a serious difference between the CPSU and the CPC. This difference gradually came out in the open. The international environment around China was being aggravated day by day.

Because of China's mistake of the Great Leap Forward; because of serious natural disaster; and because the Soviet Union broke its contracts with China, withdrew its experts, and stopped its economic aid, the Chinese mainland was encountering serious economic difficulties. Talks at that time made no progress at all, like a huge unmovable rock.

Three months after Kennedy took office, I held talks with Beam in Warsaw.

Of course, I did not place any extravagant hopes in the Kennedy administration, but thinking about the positive side of the event, I expressed to Beam the hope that Kennedy would not stick to his predecessors' hopeless old policies and would be able to achieve something in developing Sino-U.S. relations.

After a few rounds of talks, Kennedy showed that he was no different from his predecessors. The U.S. side continued to pester us with the problem of repatriating civilians and continued to raise the old demand for both sides to refrain from resorting to arms in resolving the Taiwan issue.

Kennedy also invented a few new tricks. For example, he made a comprehensive proposal to us on exchanging reporters, but, regarding the concrete method for doing so, he impeded those Americans invited by us from visiting China. He proposed selling grain to China on preferential terms and donating relief packages to the poor in China. I thought that Kennedy was a bit naive, or even childish, to think that he could induce us to make concessions on such a major issue as the Taiwan issue by a few economic steps. I solemnly rejected his proposal. I said that New China was undergoing a period of serious difficulties, but China had a vast territory and rich resources, the Chinese people were hardworking and brave, and we were confident in our ability to overcome these difficulties by relying on our own strength. I also said that the Chinese people would never live on other people's alms; even less would we barter away principles.

Despite the failure to make any progress in the conference rooms, we continued to make efforts to have private contacts with Beam. Sometimes we invited him to tea and talked with him about the Laotian issue. During the Berlin crisis, I invited him to our embassy and asked him a series of questions. During these meetings, we would unavoidably mention the Taiwan issue, but we did so simply as a topic of discussion and with relatively mild language. None of us ever gave up the principle and stand of our respective governments.

In late September of 1961, Beam received an order to return to the United States to be transferred to the job of deputy director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. When Beam left, my counterpart was again changed.

It was said that when the United States chose its ambassador to Warsaw, instead of considering whether the candidate was familiar with things related to Poland, it first

considered whether he was familiar with the China issue, for this ambassador would have to conduct talks with the Chinese ambassador there. Cabot, who succeeded Beam as U.S. ambassador to Warsaw, was chosen precisely because he had had the experience of being U.S. consul general in Shanghai. Therefore, it was natural that he be appointed to the post.

A New Development

In March of 1983, I continued the talks with Ambassador Cabot. Cabot was very different from his two predecessors. He had 36 years of experience in diplomatic work, had been consul general in Shanghai, was kind and gentle, and was U.S. ambassador to Brazil before he came to Warsaw, but he did not display any outstanding diplomatic ability.

It was not until I met him in Boston in 1979, that I learned that he was one of the two most wealthy people in Boston. The other was Henry Cabot Lodge who was once U.S. ambassador to Vietnam. People in Boston had a saying: Local people talk to the Lodges, the Lodges talk to the Cabots, and the Cabots talk only to God. This meant that Cabot was richer than Lodge and he was able to buy over God.

Cabot accorded me a grand reception in Boston. He felt uneasy about his unfriendly speeches toward China in the past, and he wanted to visit China again, but he was afraid that he would not be welcome. His wife kept making negative comments at his side, saying China would not allow a man like him to visit again. When I heard this, I said that all of this had happened in the past and it was of no use to bring it up again now. Therefore, I immediately invited him and his wife to visit China, which made them very happy. Later, they were busy making preparations for the visit.

In 1982, Cabot wrote a special letter informing me of his decision to visit China on a certain date and expressing his appreciation for my invitation. Unfortunately, shortly before he set out for the visit, he died of sudden heart trouble. At the time of the talks between us in 1962, he was over 50 years old, was careless about his speeches, and did not hold to diplomatic etiquette. We often joked. I remember that once he said, laughing, that the CPC had to thank the United States. Did you see lots of U.S. equipment when you reviewed your troops after your victory? The equipment was supplied to you by Chiang Kai-shek. Therefore, you called Chiang chief of the transportation team who sent you these weapons without even asking for a receipt.

At that time, the Chiang Kai-shek clique in Taiwan took advantage of the serious natural disasters in our country and once more launched a wanton campaign to attack the mainland. The situation was unprecedentedly tense on the Fujian frontline where war clouds were gathering. According to the intelligence we gathered at that time, Chiang Kai-shek was purchasing large numbers of new-style weapons and refitting his airplanes to increase their fuel capacity so that they could fly between Taiwan and the mainland. The Chiang Kai-shek clique also announced the lengthening of the term of military service, forbidding its soldiers to leave their barracks and telling them to be ready for orders at any time. It had their shoes and belts carved with the words "Recover the mainland." It was said that it purchased a large amount of blood plasma from Japan. It seemed that Chiang Kai-shek planned to make a reckless move and would madly attempt to fight a desperate war with the mainland.

At the end of May 1962, I was on leave in China. One day the premier made a personal appointment to talk with me. He said that Chiang Kai-shek thought that it was a good opportunity to attack the mainland now because externally the CPC was on bad terms with the Soviet Union, and at home on the mainland there were serious natural disasters.

Chiang thought that this was one chance in 1,000 years and had made up his mind to make an all-out effort. Regarding the military situation, he told me to talk with Luo Ruiqing, chief of the PLA General Staff. I immediately called Luo to make an appointment with him. Luo asked me to go the office of the PLA General Staff Headquarters to talk with him. He told me many things related to the situation. He drew aside the curtain in front of a large map on the wall and pointed out to me the military deployment of the Chiang Kai-shek clique. He said that it was not a question of whether there would be a war, but a question of how we were to fight the war, that is, the question of whether we had to repel the enemy before they reached our coast or had to induce the enemy to go deep into our hinterland. We discussed these two strategies. When I was informed, I thought that the situation was indeed very serious.

On another occasion, the premier urgently wanted to have a talk with me. He told me to immediately wind up my leave and return to Warsaw. He said that after careful study, the CPC Central Committee believed that Chiang Kai-shek was very determined to attack and return to the mainland, but Chiang still faced some difficulties, and that the key question now was the attitude of the United States and whether or not the United States supported Chiang. We had to strive to make the United States stop Chiang Kai-shek's military action of launching a counterattack at the mainland. The premier gave me the instruction that we had to find an opportunity as soon as possible through talks to learn the attitude of the United States. I was aware of the vital importance of this task, which could not be neglected to the least degree. Therefore, I soon headed back to Warsaw and within the time set by our government authorities, contacted Cabot and made an appointment to have an interview with him. On the day we were to meet, our government sent me a telegram telling me to postpone the formal talks on the excuse of being sick. Therefore, for a few days I dared not go out of the gate of our embassy. Later, I learned the reason for the postponement: At home we were concentrating forces on the frontline in Fijian, but as there was heavy rain in the south, which had flooded some important bridges, the concentration of troops was delayed.

Later, following an instruction from home, I again broached the subject of a meeting with Cabot. In order to talk freely, I proposed informal talks. On 23 June, I invited Cabot to tea in my official residence to have a chat with him. Cabot came at my invitation.

As usual, Cabot did not hold to etiquette, and looked untidy. He talked and laughed while having tea. First, I talked about the situation in Southeast Asia. I said that the Chinese Government was worried about the development of the situation in Southeast Asia. Since the beginning of that year, the United States had sent additional troops to Vietnam, sent troops to Thailand, and stepped up its intervention in Laos, and had thus pushed the situation in Southeast Asia to the verge of a large-scale international conflict that could take place at any time. The Chinese Government had always adopted an attitude of restraint. Although Chiang Kai-shek's remnant troops were taking part in the Laotian civil war, and although China was suffering an increasingly growing threat to its security, it did not abandon its effort to achieve a peaceful solution of the Laotian issue or its attempt to ease the tension in Indochina and in the whole Southeast Asian region on the basis of noninterference in the internal affairs of the countries concerned. However, the key to the question of whether the tension could be eased was not in China's hands.

Then I emphatically said that the Chinese Government also wanted the U.S. Government to notice the tension in the Taiwan Strait. At this, Cabot suddenly turned serious and listened very carefully.

With emphasis, I said that the U.S. Government was entirely clear about the fact that the Chiang Kai-shek clique was making preparations to attack the coastal areas of the Chinese mainland and that this preparatory work was precisely carried out with the support, encouragement, and coordination of the United States. Since last February, the Chiang Kai-shek clique had begun to mobilize and deploy its military forces for an attack on the coastal area of the Chinese mainland. It had recruited soldiers ahead of schedule, lengthened the service term for its soldiers, and so on, and had thus made preparations for crossing the sea and forcing a landing. With the participation and coordination of the United States, the Chiang Kai-shek clique had frequently carried out landing maneuvers with live ammunition and frequently conducted activities to reconnoiter the coastal areas of the Chinese mainland.

The United States encouraged and praised Chiang Kai-shek for its preparations to attack the mainland. The U.S. Government had increased its "military aid" and "economic aid" to Chiang Kai-shek. Obviously, the United States wishfully thought that it had to support and encourage Chiang Kai-shek to undertake military adventures and that no matter what the outcome, it would get the benefit of dealing a blow to and further controlling Taiwan. With the support and encouragement of the United States, the Chiang Kai-shek regime was eager to try.

When I stressed the U.S. Government's role in backing Chiang Kai-shek's preparations for a counterattack on the Chinese mainland, Cabot looked a little nervous. Therefore, I went on to say that the Chinese people had dealt with Chiang Kai-shek for decades and knew how to deal with him. The Chinese Government had to point out that the U.S. Government was playing with fire, that once Chiang Kai-shek launched a war against the mainland it would not result in anything good for the United States, and that the U.S. Government had to shoulder full responsibility for Chiang Kai-shek's adventurous actions and for all the serious consequences of his adventures.

Finally, in a tone of warning, I said that I was sure that the day when Chiang Kai-shek attacked the mainland would be the date when the Chinese people liberated Taiwan. In view of the serious nature of the situation, I asked him to immediately inform the U.S. Government of the above situation. There was an interval of silence after Cabot heard my words. Then he expressed his appreciation of my frankness and said that he would inform the U.S. Government by telegram of what I had said.

He straightforwardly said that under the present situation, the United States would never support Chiang Kai-shek in launching a counterattack on the mainland. Chiang Kai-shek had undertaken the obligation to the United States that without the consent of the United States, it would not launch an attack on the Chinese mainland.

He said: I pledge to Your Excellency the Ambassador that we by no means want a world war and will make every effort to prevent such a war. Later, he time and again repeated this pledge. When he left, he even said that if Chiang Kai-shek wanted to act, we had to make joint efforts to stop him.

When I heard Cabot clearly declare his hand, I was aware that I had attained my aim. I could not help but feel relaxed. The United States had already made its attitude very clear and this was precisely what we urgently wanted to know. It had a direct bearing on the CPC Central Committee in arranging the strategic deployment on the Fujian front-line. Without any delay, I reported to the government at home what Cabot said. Later, some leading comrades of the CPC Central Committee expressed their great satisfaction for the information I had obtained in a timely manner about the attitude of the United

States. At that time, that information had a great impact on policy decisions at home. Later, I carried out more than 10 rounds of talks with Cabot. The talks did not bring about any results on the essential problems of Sino-U.S. relations.

Returning Home on Orders

I was instructed to return to China in 1964 to take up the post of vice foreign minister. The Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks continued intermittently in Warsaw between Wang Guoquan, who succeeded me, and the U.S. ambassador.

The Sino-U.S. talks at ambassadorial level came to a conclusion in February 1972 due to Nixon's visit to China, which effected a radical change in the situation. Consequently, this ended an important stage in the history of Sino-U.S. relations.

In the talks, which lasted for many years, aside from the issue of repatriation, no agreements were reached between the two sides on substantive issues involving Sino-U.S. relations.

With regard to this point, the press spokesman of China's Foreign Ministry explained the following in a speech made on 26 November 1968 on the date of the 135th round of talks: The Chinese Government has all along adhered to two principles at the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks. First, that the U.S. Government guarantee the immediate withdrawal of all its Armed Forces from China's territory, Taiwan Province, and the Taiwan Strait and removal of all its military facilities from Taiwan; second, that the U.S. Government agree to the signing of an agreement between China and the United States on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. However, over the past 13 years, the U.S. Government has refused to reach an agreement with the Chinese Government on the two principles, but has tried over and over again to quibble over side issues. The Chinese Government has repeatedly stated that it will never barter away principles. If the U.S. side continues to adopt such an attitude, the Sino-U.S. talks will produce no results, no matter what administration assumes power in the United States.

The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was further intensified in the early 1970's. As the PRC grew stronger day by day, the United States had to revise its global strategy and adopt corresponding measures to improve its policy toward China.

At the invitation of Premier Zhou Enlai, Nixon, who was elected President of the United States in 1969, paid a visit to China in February 1972 and signed the famous Shanghai joint communique, thus effecting a genuine breakthrough in the substantive issues involved in the Sino-U.S. talks. Diplomatic relations were established between China and the United States on 1 January 1979, 30 years after the founding of New China. The Carter administration declared the severance of its "diplomatic relations" with Taiwan. Following the exchange of ambassadors on 1 March, the U.S. Government withdrew its troops stationed in Taiwan in April. On 1 January 1980, the U.S. Government officially declared the termination of the U.S. -Taiwan "joint defense treaty."

The issues of principle repeatedly emphasized by Premier Zhou Enlai at the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks and the position of the Chinese Government on the Taiwan issue again and again stated by me in the 9 years and by Comrade Wang Guoquan in the following 6 years of the talks were at last recognized by the U.S. Government. Although this question is still an obstacle to the development of Sino-U.S. relations and the U.S. Government is still trying to create side issues, the historical trend will, after all, surge forward. A new epoch is approaching and history has proved that it is irresistible.

Having finished my memoirs, I put aside the writings and got lost in deep thought. I was overcome with emotion and could not remain calm.

The people of our generation, represented by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other outstanding figures, have shed blood and we have left our footprints on the tortuous road of Chinese revolution. Future generations will evaluate our achievements and errors. What conclusion, then, should we leave for the future generations?

In my opinion, the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks were an original creation of New China's diplomacy under specific conditions. It provided for the two big nations, which were mutually confronted, a channel to contact each other. Although the two countries did not recognize each other, they maintained a speaking relationship. Although they did not have diplomatic relations, they sent ambassadors to hold long-term talks. Both sides also reached certain kinds of agreements, namely an agreed-upon statement, a new form of statement in which each party stated its own position. This was also a new development in the history of international relations. At that time the new development played the role of indicating China's position and attitude as well as carrying out struggles and negotiations directly with the United States. As far as I can remember, in the late 1950's and early 1960's, when U.S. airplanes or warships intruded into China's airspace or waters, I lodged protests at the talks and then the U.S. side immediately replied: The matter will be investigated. The U.S. side also stated time and again that although it did not recognize China's 12-nautical-mile territorial waters, its warships would not enter the 12-nautical-mile area.

When the United States sent troops to Vietnam, I directly lodged a protest with the U.S. representative at the talks and indicated China's position. Therefore, we can say that the ambassadorial talks were in a sense the relations between the two countries under the specific conditions of the time. In certain respects, the contacts between China and the United States were more frequent than contacts between countries with diplomatic relations. If there had been no ambassadorial talks, it would have been rather difficult for us to find an occasion to express our views. When a major event took place in the international arena, both China and the United States could express their views and positions at the ambassadorial talks; thus each side knew the attitude and methods adopted by the other. As a result, the two countries knew each other very well even though they had no diplomatic relations. Herein lies the significance of the 15-year Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks.

My 9-year experience in the Sino-U.S. talks was also the period in which Premier Zhou Enlai displayed his talent in China's diplomacy, which was full of creativity, vitality, and distinguishing features. Sticking to principles and never wavering in the slightest degree, he adopted flexible strategies with courtesy, good reason, and restraint. In addition, he was also broad-minded. He established a new style for China's diplomacy, which combined the firmness of principle with the flexibility of strategy. Through his brilliant display in international activities, he became an outstanding diplomat of the communist party. Without Premier Zhou Enlai's wisdom and talent and without the 15-year Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks, it would have been impossible for the United States to establish diplomatic relations with China on the basis of recognizing Taiwan as its sacred territory. These are our contributions to China's diplomatic cause.

Times have changed, but the mark of history is still stamped on the wheels of the new era. The U.S. Government has not yet given up the Taiwan issue and it is still playing with the "Taiwan Relations Act." The question of Taiwan still exists though the form and extent of its expression has changed greatly.

Having dealt with the U.S. Government for so many years, I would like to offer the following advice: The U.S. Government should not try to make use of the Taiwan issue to follow the beaten track of harming Sino-U.S. relations. History will never turn backwards. The Chinese people will never forsake their principles, either. History has already drawn a conclusion and the lesson learned from this issue should be remembered.

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